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Patients with serious or life-threatening illness are frequently asked to 
make complex, high-stakes medical decisions.  The impact of anxiety, low 
health literacy, asymmetric information and inadequate communication 
between patients and health care providers, family pressures, rational 
apathy by health care providers, cognitive biases of both patients and health 
care providers, and other factors make it quite difficult for patients in these 
circumstances to process and comprehend the strategic uncertainty and 
resultant risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, whatever therapeutic or 
life-prolonging treatment physicians are offering.  All of these factors render 
the classic goal of “informed consent” unachievable in all but the rarest of 
circumstances: The effort to discuss and evaluate strategic uncertainty, its 
rational reduction into risks and benefits, and alternatives of treatment for 
purposes of optimizing decisional outcomes will have genuine intrinsic value 
only for ultra-rational patients (and physicians). 
In addition to these alterable barriers to rational decision-making—
i.e., barriers that can, in theory, be overcome by ultra-rational patients and 
physicians with sufficient time and persistent inquiry—there is a second 
decision-making realm in which the added complexities of bounded 
rationality, clinical uncertainty and, in particular, of overall Knightian 
uncertainty provide insurmountable, unalterable barriers to confident 
rational decision-making.  Within this more fundamental human realm of 
irreducible uncertainty, even ultra-rational, good-Bayesian decision-makers 
can never confidently calculate a highest-utility treatment option.  In order 
to better describe this secondary realm of unalterable barriers to rational 
patient choice, including its usually subversive effect on end-of-life 
decisional behavior, by both average, minimally-rational patients and ultra-
rational patients, we coin the terms “rational patient apathy” and, relatedly, 
“rational patient ignorance.” 
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Given that confronting the absolute uncertainty inherent in facing one’s 
mortality is cognitively, psychologically and emotionally daunting, and thus 
largely left unexplored and unpracticed by most patients for most of their 
healthier decisional lives, rational patient apathy at the sudden onset of a 
serious or life-threatening illness overwhelmingly defaults to negative 
decision-making: an affirmative choice to not make any balanced decision 
on the merits but rather to remain rationally ignorant of some or all aspects 
of the choice situation.  In the context of this persistent patient avoidance of 
substantive decision-making, empirical evidence demonstrates frequent 
reversion to a quantity-over-quality approach, allowing health care 
providers to “do everything” until continued medical intervention reaches 
the point of obvious medical or economic futility.  As a result—and as a 
largely discounted trade-off of choosing to avoid decisional burdens through 
non-careful consideration or no consideration at all—the overwhelming 
result of rational patient apathy in end-of-life decision-making is an 
irrational calculation and decision unto itself.  Not only does rational patient 
apathy negate the classic (and utopian) goal of informed consent, it also 
exerts tremendous costs—on patients, on loved ones, on health care 
providers and on society at-large—in terms of adverse effects, avoidable 
suffering, constantly recurring decisional commitment costs, and the wasting 
of scarce economic resources. 
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[I]gnorance more frequently begets confidence than does 
knowledge.—Charles Darwin1 
 
Ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat.—Tullius Cicero2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Patients with serious or life-threatening illness are frequently asked to 
make complex, high stakes medical decisions.  The impact of anxiety, low 
health literacy, asymmetric information and inadequate communication 
between patients and health care providers, family pressures, rational apathy 
by health care providers, cognitive biases of both patients and health care 
providers, and related factors weighs heavily on seriously ill patients.  These 
factors make it quite difficult for patients to process and comprehend the 
strategic uncertainty and resultant risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, 
whatever therapeutic or life-prolonging treatment physicians are offering.  
All of these factors render the classic goal of “informed consent” 
unachievable in all but the rarest of circumstances.  In previous articles,3 one 
of the authors described contextual barriers to fully-informed medical 
decision-making and, in spite of these barriers, urged physicians and patients 
to attempt to make the “best” end-of-life decisions possible.  This article 
explains why, for terminally ill patients, it can never be known, ex post, 
whether or not the “best” was achieved.  Similarly, for purposes of informed 
decision-making, it also can never be known, ex ante, whether the “best” is 
even rationally achievable. 
People avoid acknowledging mortality in general or making and 
documenting decisions in advance about health care preferences prior to 
diagnosis with terminal illness.4  Rates of advance directive completion 
remain low.5  Once faced with a life-threatening diagnosis, however, many 
 
 1  1 CHARLES C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 3 
(1871). 
 2  He himself thinks he knows one thing, that he knows nothing.  M. TULLIUS CICERO, 
ACADEMICORUM RELIQUIAE CUM LUCULLO, Book I, §16 (O. Plasberg, ed., Leipzig, Teubner 
1922). 
 3  See Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson, Avoiding Overtreatment at the End of Life: 
Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Consent, 36 PACE L. REV. 736, 737–
800 (2016); Barbara A. Noah, The (Ir)rationality of (Un)informed Consent, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 691 (2016). 
 4  See generally Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in Preparing for Death, 
21 ELDER L.J. 1 (2013). 
 5  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: 
PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 2 
(1995) (concluding that “advance directives have been advocated more than they have been 
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patients seek to exert substantial control over their treatment in order to make 
the “best” medical decisions under the circumstances.  Given that 
confronting the absolute uncertainty inherent in facing one’s mortality is 
cognitively, psychologically and emotionally daunting,6 and thus largely 
avoided by most patients for most of their healthier decisional lives, rational 
patient apathy7 at the sudden onset8 of a serious or life-threatening illness 
overwhelmingly defaults to negative decision-making: an affirmative choice 
to not make any balanced decision on the merits but rather to remain 
rationally ignorant of some or all aspects of the choice situation. 
In the context of this persistent patient avoidance of substantive 
decision-making, empirical evidence demonstrates frequent reversion to a 
quantity-over-quality approach, allowing health care providers to “do 
everything”9 until the continued medical treatment reaches the point of 
obvious medical or economic futility.  As a result—and as a largely 
discounted trade-off of choosing to avoid decisional burdens through non-
careful consideration (or no consideration at all)—the overwhelming result 
of rational patient apathy in end-of-life decision-making is an irrational 
calculation and decision unto itself.  Not only does rational patient apathy 
negate the classic (and utopian) goal of informed consent, it also exerts 
tremendous costs—on patients, on loved ones, on health care providers and 
 
used” and that “in general, only 10 to 25 percent of Americans have documented their end-
of-life choices or appointed a health care agent”); Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, 
Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 32, 36 (2004) (noting that 
less than 20% of Americans have living wills and that studies also suggest that living wills 
rarely influence the level of medical care—in fact at least a quarter of patients with living 
wills receive care that is inconsistent with their instructions).  The most recent data suggest a 
slight uptick in the percentage of Americans who have completed advance directives.  See 
Jaya K. Rao et al., Completion of Advance Directives Among U.S. Consumers, 46 AM. J. 
PREVENTIVE MED. 65, 65–67 (2014) (finding, based on survey data from 2009-2010, that 
26.3% of respondents had completed an advance directive and that older age, higher income, 
and higher educational attainment were correlated with a higher likelihood of having an 
advance directive). 
 6  Cf. SHELDON SOLOMON ET AL., THE WORM AT THE CORE: ON THE ROLE OF DEATH IN 
LIFE 23 (2015) (“By around age three, the grim handmaiden of self-consciousness—death 
awareness—begins to make her appearance.”). 
 7  For a global definition of rational apathy, see infra notes 215-227 and accompanying 
text.  For a phenomenological explanation of rational patient apathy, see infra Part III.C. 
 8  The piercing awareness and urgency of mortality delivered by such sudden onset was 
once laconically described by Christopher Hitchens as follows: “In whatever kind of a ‘race’ 
life may be, I have very abruptly become a finalist.”  CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, MORTALITY 4 
(2012). 
 9  Logically, it is impossible to “do everything” as a single human being locked in a 
linear space-time continuum.  In general, once one starts to do something (as one always does 
as a living being), one is no longer doing everything (else)—indeed, one is excluding oneself 
from doing everything (else) in every course of action.  The notion of “doing everything” 
would also have to include the choice of “doing nothing”—which is teleologically impossible 
since, as a living being, one is still doing something when the professed purpose of one’s 
chosen (in)action is to “do nothing.” 
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on society at-large—in terms of adverse health effects, avoidable suffering, 
constantly recurring decisional commitment costs, and the utilization of 
scarce economic resources. 
A. Uninformed Over-Provision of Medical Care 
Although the challenges to rational decision-making that we discuss 
within this article are not specific to the United States, the importance of 
recognizing these challenges and how they limit good decision-making are 
particularly important in this country.  For purposes of this paper, there are 
two contexts in which to consider the factors driving utilization of care: first, 
in the case of medical decisions regarding treatment of life-threatening 
illness and, second, in the case of medical decisions regarding end-of-life 
care when a patient is no longer likely to recover.  In this first context, it is 
difficult to quantify or describe whether and when patients are receiving “too 
much” therapeutic or life-prolonging care for life-threatening illnesses, but 
various studies of cancer care in particular suggest that patients often 
continue with second- and third-line therapies and unproven experimental 
therapies that are unlikely to improve quality of life or significantly prolong 
life.10  Second, it is well-documented that patients in the United States 
receive high amounts of intensive and invasive care at the end of life, 
compared with patients in some other countries.11 
At the same time, there is evidence that suggests that this comparatively 
high level of end-of-life care is frequently delivered without much 
meaningful reflection, let alone truly informed consent, on the part of 
patients.  Physicians acknowledge that they are providing unnecessary 
medical care for a variety of reasons, including fear of malpractice litigation, 
 
 10  See, e.g., A. Saito et al., The Effect on Survival of Continuing Chemotherapy to Near 
Death, BMC PALLIATIVE CARE (Sept. 21, 2011), https://bmcpalliatcare.biomedcentral.com 
/articles/10.1186/1472-684X-10-14 (concluding that, in the case of patients with small cell 
lung cancer, chemotherapy was associated with two months additional survival time but that 
there was no additional survival benefit from continuing chemotherapy within fourteen days 
of death and that patients receiving chemotherapy at the end of life were significantly less 
likely to utilize hospice care); Holly G. Prigerson et al., Chemotherapy Use, Performance 
Status, and Quality of Life at the End of Life, 1 JAMA ONCOLOGY 778, 778–84 (2015) 
(evaluating the effect of chemotherapy on patients with end-stage cancer and varying 
functional statuses and concluding that chemotherapy did not improve quality of life near 
death for patients with moderate and poor performance status and actually worsened quality 
of life near death for patients with good performance status); cf. Martin R. Stockler et al., 
Chemotherapy for Advanced Breast Cancer – How Long Should It Continue?, 81 BREAST 
CANCER RES. & TREATMENT S49, S49–S52 (Supp. 2003) (describing the life-extending 
benefits of chemotherapy for advanced, terminal breast cancer and the debate over whether 
to provide this therapy when it achieves modest life extension coupled with significant side-
effects). 
 11  See David Line, 2015 Quality of Death Index, ECONOMIST (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/healthcare/2015-quality-death-index. 
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Medicare’s fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism, patient and family 
requests for care, difficulty accessing medical records, a culture of denial of 
mortality, and a physician culture of viewing death of a patient as a 
professional failure.12  Recent data suggest that more than one-fifth of all 
medical care provided is unnecessary.13  The challenge in this environment 
is to identify those situations in which over-provision of care is likely 
occurring and to respond with treatment that is both clinically appropriate 
and consistent with the patient’s wishes.  Given that every patient is unique 
and that baseline end-of-life preferences vary significantly, any decision-
making about treatment options in the face of serious illness or imminent 
death must, by definition, constitute a complex, high opportunity-cost 
process. 
Patients say that they wish for a “good death,” but this abstract concept 
means different things to different people.  Even so, most people’s idea of a 
“good death” have some elements in common, such as avoiding unnecessary 
physical suffering.14  And most patients also state that they would prefer to 
die in the comfort of their home,15 yet only about 30% of patients actually 
 
 12  See Heather Lyu et al., Overtreatment in the United States, PLOS ONE (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0181970. 
 13  In a recent study that attempts to measure physicians’ perceptions of when they are 
delivering “futile” care to their patients, the data suggested that approximately 20% of patients 
in five critical care units were receiving futile or “probably futile” treatment.  See Thanh N. 
Huynh et al., The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to Be Futile in Critical Care, 
173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1887, fig. 1 (2013).  The survey instrument defined five situations 
in which treatment might be considered futile or medically inappropriate: burdens grossly 
outweigh benefits; patient will never survive outside an ICU; patient is permanently 
unconscious; treatment cannot achieve the patient’s goals; death is imminent.  See id. at 1888; 
see also Robert D. Truog & Douglas B. White, Futile Treatments in Intensive Care Units, 
173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1894 (2013) (critiquing the study design, arguing that legal 
complexities make it difficult for physicians to say “no” to futile treatment requests, and 
pleading for better communication and a conflict resolution process to address these 
situations). 
 14  For a review of the research on the multiple dimensions that influence perceived 
quality of dying and death, see Sarah Hales et al., The Quality of Dying and Death, 168 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 912, 912–18 (2008) (identifying several commonly identified 
qualities that a “good death” requires, such as freedom from pain and suffering, circumstances 
of death (home versus hospital), and cultural variables in different studied countries such as 
maintaining independence, control, self-determination, and entrusting decisions to others).  
Id. at 913.  For an excellent overview of the idea of a good death and of the emotional issues 
surrounding death and dying, see SHERWIN B. NULAND, HOW WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE’S 
FINAL CHAPTER (Vintage Books 1995). 
 15  See GEORGE H. GALLUP, JR., SPIRITUAL BELIEFS AND THE DYING PROCESS: A REPORT 
ON A NATIONAL SURVEY (1997) (reporting results of a survey of U.S. residents commissioned 
by the Nathan Cummings Foundation and Fetzer Institute); I.J. Higginson & G.J. Sen-Gupta, 
Place of Care in Advanced Cancer: A Qualitative Systematic Literature Review of Patient 
Preferences, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 287, 287–300 (2000) (finding that despite the fact that the 
majority of patients in England suffering from serious illnesses wish to die at home, most die 
in either hospital or a long-term care facility). 
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do so.16  Instead, large amounts of hospital-based health care resources are 
routinely utilized at the end of life,17 often with little or no measurable benefit 
to the physical well-being of dying patients.  As a result, many patients 
receive aggressive interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, 
ventilator support, or intensive care unit (ICU) care, and bear the inevitable 
physical suffering that comes with such interventions, even when death is 
imminent.18 
Recent data suggest that the overutilization problem continues 
unabated.  In the context of terminal illness, many people believe that more 
therapeutic care (including tests, procedures and drug therapies) leads to 
 
 16  See Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries: Site 
of Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in 2000, 2005, and 2009, 309 JAMA 
470 (2013) (concluding that, although only 24.6% of patients died in hospital in 2009 
compared with 32.6% in 2000, percentages of deaths in long-term care facilities held steady 
at around 27% and deaths at home rose from 30.7% in 2000 to 33.5% in 2009); see also Yafu 
Zhao & William Encinosa, The Costs of End-of-Life Hospitalizations, 2007, HEALTHCARE 
COSTS & UTILIZATION PROJECT (Nov. 2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53605 
(describing data from 2007 indicating that one-third of Americans died in hospital); Jeanne 
Lenzer, Unnecessary Care: Are Doctors in Denial and Is Profit Driven Healthcare to Blame?, 
345 BRIT. MED. J. e6230 (2012) (referring to another estimate that 65% of deaths in the United 
States occur in hospitals).  Yet another study found that 45% of U.S. deaths occur in hospitals 
and 22% in long term care facilities.  See DIV. VITAL STATISTICS, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, DEATHS FROM 39 SELECTED CAUSES BY PLACE OF DEATH, STATUS OF DECEDENT 
WHEN DEATH OCCURRED IN HOSPITAL OR MEDICAL CENTER, AND AGE: UNITED STATES, 1999-
2005 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality/gmwk307.htm. 
 17  Empirical research documents that approximately one-third of medical expenses for 
the last year of life are spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and technologies 
in that final month account for nearly 80% of these costs.  See Baohui Zhang et al., Health 
Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associations with End-of-Life Conversations, 169 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 480, 482–84 (2009).  Moreover, 30% of Medicare dollars spent go 
to care for the 5% of Medicare beneficiaries who die each year.  See Amber E. Barnato et al., 
Trends in Inpatient Treatment Intensity Among Medicare Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 
HEALTH SERV. RES. 363, 363–64 (2004); see also Teno et al., supra note 16, at 473 tbl. 2 
(noting that, in 2009, 29.2% of patients who died had received care in an ICU in the previous 
30 days); Donald M. Berwick & Andrew Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care, 
307 JAMA 1513 (2012) (describing six categories of health care spending waste, including 
overtreatment such as use of surgery when watchful waiting is better and unwanted intensive 
care at the end of life and estimating that wasteful spending in the overtreatment category 
accounts form between $158 billion and $226 billion in 2011). 
 18  See Amresh Hanchate et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-of-Life Costs: Why 
Do Minorities Cost More than Whites?, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 497–98 (2009) 
(surveying use of expensive end-of-life interventions among a large sample of Medicare 
beneficiaries and finding patterns of substantial expenditure on life-sustaining treatment in 
the final six months of life).  One palliative care specialist describes the ICU as a place “where 
a Wild West culture makes it a challenge for palliative care to get a foothold,” adding that it 
is difficult “to slow a wild horse, particularly one that believes it can outrace death.”  See 
Jessica Nutik Zitter, They Call Me ‘Dr. Kevorkian,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/they-call-me-dr-kevorkian/ (adding that she 
“believe[s] in letting the dying determine how and when they die, as opposed to coaxing their 
organs at all costs”). 
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longer life and improved physical well-being.19  Data concerning utilization 
reflect this belief.  Recent data indicate that, in 2009, 28.4% of patients 
received hospice care for only three days or fewer before dying, an increase 
from 22.2% nine years earlier.  Moreover, 29.2% of Medicare beneficiaries 
received care in an ICU during the final month of life compared with 24.3% 
in the earlier period.20  This pattern of systematic overutilization of non-
palliative terminal care means that dying patients continue to receive costly 
therapeutic care and life-prolonging treatment even when it is very likely that 
the benefits in terms of enhanced quality of life, increased survival time, or 
other measurable physical outcomes are limited or non-existent.21  Still, a 
large majority of dying patients consistently elects to pursue therapeutic care 
and supposedly life-prolonging treatment even though their marginal costs 
equal or, when measured wholistically by the notion of a “good death,” 
vastly exceed their marginal benefit. 
As a related consequence, dying patients also tend to underutilize 
hospice and palliative care.22  In 2015, the Economist Intelligence Unit 
research team published its latest Quality of Death Index (QDI) which ranks 
access to palliative care across the world.  While the United Kingdom, “due 
to comprehensive national policies, the extensive integration of palliative 
care into [its universal, nationalized health care delivery system], a strong 
hospice movement, and deep community engagement on the issue,”23 
 
 19  See Sean Palfrey, Daring to Practice Low-Cost Medicine in a High-Tech Era, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. e21 (2011), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1101392?ssour 
ce’hcrc.pdf (commenting on the mistaken belief that “‘doing everything’ is the best practice 
and the way to prevent harm”). 
 20  See Teno et al., supra note 16, at 471–73, tbl. 2 (also finding that 11.5% of patients 
had been hospitalized three or more times in the three months before death, up from 10.3% in 
the previous studied period). 
 21  See R. Sean Morrison et al., When Too Much Is Too Little, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1755, 1755–56 (1996) (describing a case of aggressive treatment of an elderly patient with 
advanced, terminal disease despite his repeated requests that he receive no further treatment 
and observing that such over-provision interferes with quality of life for these patients with 
little offsetting benefit). 
 22  See Teno et al., supra note 16, at 474 (noting that, although the use of hospice services 
has increased during the early 2000s, only 42.2% of Medicare beneficiaries with dementia 
and 59.5% of Medicare beneficiaries with cancer received hospice services at the time of 
death); Corita Grudzen & Deborah Grady, Improving Care at the End of Life, 171 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1202, 1202–04 (2011) (discussing over-use of therapeutic interventions at the 
end of life and advocating that better quality care often requires emphasizing palliative 
measures and avoiding unavailing therapies that risk unnecessary suffering and iatrogenic 
harm); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Discussions with Physicians About Hospice Among 
Patients with Metastatic Lung Cancer, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 954, 955–56 (2009) 
(finding that only half of patients with stage IV lung cancer had had any discussion with their 
physicians about hospice in the two months prior to death).  These patterns are even more 
marked among racial and ethnic minorities in the United States.  See generally Barbara A. 
Noah, The Role of Race in End-of-Life Care, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 349 (2012). 
 23  See Line, supra note 11. 
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repeated its first-place ranking from the first QDI in 2010, the United States 
remained stuck in ninth place.24  Part of the explanation here lies in the fact 
that the current U.S. health care delivery system creates an artificial 
dichotomy, and resultant structural separation, between curative and 
palliative care.25  Physicians who practice in the curative role tend to focus 
on clinical problem solving, will continue to advocate for therapy even when 
the prognosis is grim, and may often view death as a failure.  Physicians who 
practice in the palliative-care role focus on the patient as a whole person 
rather than as a disease diagnosis and will view unnecessary suffering at the 
end of life as a failure.  Thus, the underutilization of palliative and hospice 
care in this country represents a missed opportunity on a massive scale.  A 
growing body of evidence demonstrates that an emphasis on palliative care,26 
in conjunction with carefully considered therapeutic care, can not only 
improve patients’ quality of life wholistically but also provide a significant 
comparative advantage in prolonging life over standard therapeutic 
treatment.27 
When patients receive inadequate palliative care coupled with possibly 
inappropriate therapeutic care, they are more likely to experience avoidable 
suffering and reduced quality of life, during their last months and weeks of 
life.  When, however, care for a seriously ill patient integrates curative goals 
(for as long as they are clinically appropriate) with palliative measures, the 
patient, and also her loved ones and her health care providers, are all better 
off.  One major challenge to arriving at a mindset where the patient and her 
physician can discuss how to achieve this sort of balance between care and 
cure lies in the various obstacles to understanding the clinical picture with 
 
 24  The QDI rankings are based on scores derived from twenty quantitative and qualitative 
indicators across five categories, which include palliative and healthcare environment, human 
resources, affordability of care, quality of care, and community engagement.  Id. 
 25  See Kathy Cerminara & Barbara A. Noah, Removing Obstacles to a Peaceful Death, 
25 ELDER L.J. 101 (2018) (describing this artificial dichotomy, reasons for its perpetuation, 
and suggesting approaches to integrating palliative care more routinely with therapeutic care 
and smoothing the transition to hospice). 
 26  Palliative care refers to medical care intended to alleviate symptoms associated with 
illness, whatever the patient’s prognosis and may address pain, shortness of breath, insomnia, 
depression, nausea and lack of appetite, among other symptoms.  See Lise M. Stevens, 
Palliative Care, 296 JAMA 1428 (2006).  Palliative care is often appropriate even while the 
patient is receiving therapeutic care; the two are not mutually exclusive.  Once therapeutic 
care is discontinued, palliative care continues in order to manage symptoms. 
 27  See Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic Non-
Small-Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733, 736–38 (2010) (finding that patients 
recently diagnosed with lung cancer who began receiving palliative care immediately lived 
an average of three months longer than patients who received standard therapeutic treatment 
only); Matthijs Kox & Peter Pickkers, “Less Is More” in Critically Ill Patients Not Too 
Intensive, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1369 (2013) (concluding, based on a meta-analysis of 
multiple clinical trials, that many common treatments for critically ill patients pose a high risk 
of iatrogenic harm compared with their potential benefit and ought to be used more 
cautiously); see also Cerminara & Noah, supra note 25. 
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all of its variables and unanswerable questions.  The first step to achieving 
some understanding is for the patient and her physician to acknowledge the 
possibility of death from the disease, including a realistic assessment of 
prognosis. 
B. Clinical Scenario 
In order to ground the abstract concepts and theories of medical 
decision-making and informed consent that follow, we use the following 
hypothetical clinical scenario to illustrate what roles clinical uncertainty, 
bounded rationality, heuristic biases and, most importantly, Knightian 
uncertainty play in the interactions between a physician and her seriously-ill 
patient: 
         June Morton is a forty-six-year-old woman who recently 
visited her gynecologist for a routine annual exam.  The 
gynecologist discovered that one of June’s ovaries was noticeably 
enlarged and referred her to an oncologist.  An MRI of June’s 
chest and abdomen reveals masses on the ovary, and in the liver 
and lungs.  Biopsy has confirmed that the mass on the ovary is 
malignant and, as a result of these tests, June has been diagnosed 
with Stage IV invasive epithelial ovarian cancer.  June is shocked 
by the diagnosis, particularly because at the moment she is 
experiencing no major symptoms. 
         The oncologist, Dr. Mary Savoy, knows that, even with 
aggressive, multi-modal treatment, it is estimated that June has 
statistically only a 17% chance of surviving for five years.  Rather 
than frighten her patient, the doctor tells June that the disease is 
“very serious, potentially life-threatening,” and that it is 
important to begin treatment immediately.  Dr. Savoy and the 
treatment team recommend that June immediately undergo 
cytoreductive surgery in which surgeons attempt to remove as 
much of the cancer as possible.  This surgery reduces the 
remaining cancer cells present that must be addressed with 
chemotherapy.  When June asks what the surgery entails, she is 
also told the purpose of the surgery and that she can expect to 
spend about seven days in the hospital and can expect recovery to 
take approximately four to six weeks, depending on how much 
tissue must be removed from her abdomen.  Dr. Savoy also 
explains to June that cytoreductive surgery may involve removal 
of both ovaries, the uterus, and parts of the colon, bladder, gall 
bladder, and other affected organs. 
         June is also told that, given her young age and otherwise 
good health, she should consider intraperitoneal chemotherapy in 
which chemotherapeutic drugs are introduced into the abdomen 
directly during surgery in order to “bathe” cancer cells directly 
in the drugs and kill more cells. 
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         The oncologist, Dr. Savoy, explains that, once the 
cytoreductive therapy is completed (with or without 
intraperitoneal chemotherapy), there are multiple post-surgery 
treatment options available.  In addition to describing standard 
chemotherapy, she discusses with June the option of “dose dense” 
chemotherapy, in which multiple chemotherapeutic agents are 
delivered simultaneously to the patient at the highest doses that 
the patient can tolerate, in order to kill as many cancer cells as 
possible and to prevent the cancer cells from becoming resistant 
to the drugs.  She also tells June about some promising clinical 
trials of new chemotherapeutic agents, and about standard and 
experimental targeted therapy and immunotherapy.  Finally, Dr. 
Savoy points out to June that every patient is unique and that 
survival rates and other prognostic factors are only averages 
which vary according to the patient’s age and overall health. 
         June is divorced with two children, a sixteen-year-old 
daughter who is a junior in high school and a twenty-one-year-
old son who is in his third year of university.  She hopes for a cure 
and would at a minimum like to survive long enough to see them 
both graduate from high school and college respectively.  June 
herself has an associate’s degree and works as a bookkeeper.  She 
purchases her insurance as an individual through the insurance 
market in her state and receives a premium subsidy under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) because her 
income is relatively low. 
II.  RATIONAL HUMAN DECISION-MAKING AND CARE FOR LIFE-
THREATENING ILLNESS 
The rationality of all human decision-making, including June’s choice 
of any highest-utility treatment course of action for her cancer,28 is severely 
limited under all circumstances.  Even if June were an ultra-rational29 
 
 28  The juxtaposition may perhaps be subtle but is certainly intended.  See Mark 
Schlesinger, Choice Cuts: Parsing Policymakers’ Pursuit of Patient Empowerment From an 
Individual Perspective, 5 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 365, 365 (2010) (“Some terms come 
redolent with positive associations.  This is no less true in the policy lexicon of democracy 
(freedom, responsiveness, leadership and voting) than in everyday English (hope, friend, 
kindness and chocolate).  ‘Choice’ makes both lists.”) (internal citation omitted); cf. Mary 
Frances Luce, Decision Making As Coping, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S23, S23 (Supp. 2005) 
(“[F]ew words rival cancer for pure emotional impact, and decisions regarding cancer control 
are likely among the most threatening decisions that many individuals will ever make.”). 
 29  As used throughout this Article, being “ultra-rational” means that decisional agents 
(think Star Trek’s half-human, half-Vulcan Mr. Spock, first officer on the “USS Enterprise” 
or, alternatively, the “rational investors” in modern financial portfolio theory) will form only 
rational expectations; they are always in possession of all relevant information that, under the 
circumstances, can be available to them; they are aware that information asymmetries may, 
and that bounded rationality and opportunism inevitably do, apply to and constrain their 
decision-making (thus, they do not have the perfect omniscience and foresight of 
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decisional agent, she could never make a perfectly rational decision.  In order 
to explain and model why that is the case—why there are always several, 
insurmountable rational limitations applicable to all human decision-making 
regarding an ineluctably uncertain and scarce future—it is useful to carefully 
distinguish among three different realms of rational utility calculation and 
resultant models of rational decision-making:30 (i) the perfect calculation of 
choice in a “Coasean world,”31 (ii) the transaction-cost efficient calculation 
of choice under conditions of bounded rationality and opportunism in a 
“Williamsonian world,”32 and (iii) the non-Bayesian updating of beliefs in 
an uncertain “Knightian world”33 of constantly new information which 
triggers the perpetual, imperfect revision of homogenized past experience in 
order to achieve predictive utility.  Only the third, Knightian realm is “real” 
within the concrete world of human existence, learning, and decision-
making.  The Coasean and Williamsonian realms are purposely 
oversimplified, rational utility-maximization utopias of varying degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hyperrational decisional agents in traditional price theory, see infra note 38); they “coldly,” 
“detachedly” and “formally” evaluate the entire, subjectively knowable choice situation by 
competently calculating and comparing the expected future performance of each available 
choice/transaction; and, in doing so, they are able to bypass any and all cognitive and 
psychological “shortcomings” (heuristics, emotions, empathy, etc.) that would otherwise 
render their decision-making and self-interested utility maximization processes and outcomes 
suboptimal.  See, e.g., James R. Hackney, Jr., The Enlightenment and the Financial Crisis of 
2008: An Intellectual History of Corporate Finance Theory, 54 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1257, 
1260 (2010).  See generally Amitai Etzioni, Guidance Rules and Rational Decision Making, 
66 SOC. SCI. Q. 753 (1985).  See also Vanessa Houlder, Richard Thaler’s Advice: Be a Lazy 
Investor—Buy and Forget, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2017 (“[Humans] are far from being the ultra-
rational machines assumed by traditional economic theory.  Instead, they are error-prone, 
blinded by prejudices and fond of mental short cuts that lead them astray.”); Paul Slovic et 
al., Affect, Risk, and Decision Making, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S35, S39 (Supp. 2005) (“One 
cannot assume that an intelligent person can understand the meaning of and properly act on 
even the simplest of numbers, not to mention more esoteric measures or statistics pertaining 
to risk, unless these numbers are infused with affect.”); Peter A. Ubel, Beyond Costs and 
Benefits: Understanding How Patients Make Health Care Decisions, 15 ONCOLOGIST 5, 7 
(Supp. 2010) (“[R]isk information is rarely received dispassionately, but is usually processed 
by people in affective and intuitive ways, too.  Risks create feelings.”). 
 30  See infra Figure 1. 
 31  See, e.g., Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 796 (2006). 
 32  See, e.g., René Reich-Graefe, Calculative Trust: Oxymoron or Tautology?, 4 J. TRUST 
RES. 66, 68 (2014). 
 33  See, e.g., Tan Wang, Conditional Preferences and Updating, 108 J. ECON. THEORY 
286, 291–92 (2003).  See generally Shabnam Mousavi & Gerd Gigerenzer, Risk, Uncertainty, 
and Heuristics, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1671 (2014). 
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Figure 1 
Rationality Realms and Constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. The Coasean World 
In this first, flawlessly utopian realm of neoclassical utility theory, the 
main prerequisite for the prediction and achievement of perfect competition 
and, accordingly, perfectly rational decision-making is a colossal 
simplification of the otherwise imperfect reality of human cooperation.  
Here, perfectly rational, overtly self-interested, and omniscient actors, 
unrestricted by bounded rationality,34 with access to complete and perfectly 
available information, and with perfectly stable tastes and preferences, can 
account for every stochastic variable and, hence, can rationally calculate 
everything.  These Coasean actors calculate choice using well-defined 
mathematical, wealth-maximizing utility functions, without regard to 
 
 34  See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 
(1955); see also Renée A. Stiles & Stephanie A. So, Impact of Transaction Costs on 
Healthcare Outcomes, 3 EXPERT REV. PHARMACOECON. & OUTCOMES RES. 283, 285 (2003). 
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Knightian uncertainty, transaction costs, or resource scarcity, and within a 
calculative environment that also provides for perfectly neutral governments 
and perfectly specified and costlessly enforced property rights.35  In other 
words, in this Coasean world of zero transaction costs and total prescience, 
everything is always certain.  Nothing is ever scarce.  Indeed, genuine 
decision-making—in terms of “exercising discretion, generating and 
evaluating proposals and, finally, ratifying an informed choice from among 
a multiplicity of viable best-interest options”36—does not occur in such a 
perfect realm.37  Where hyperrational38 actors with perfect foresight can 
 
 35  See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197 (1921) (“Chief 
among the simplifications of reality prerequisite to the achievement of perfect competition 
is . . . the assumption of practical omniscience on the part of every member of the competitive 
system.”); Douglass C. North, Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History, 16 
J. ECON. LIT. 963, 964 (1978) (summarizing the assumptions underlying neoclassical 
economic theory as “(1) perfectly competitive markets, (2) perfectly specified and costlessly 
enforced property rights, (3) neutral government, and (4) unchanging tastes”). 
 36  Reich-Graefe, supra note 32; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 303 (1983). 
 37  See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE 
FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 159, 161 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. 
Winter eds., 1993) (“The only management task that seems to remain, and which is the focus 
of attention in the firm of traditional price theory, is the selection of profit-maximizing 
quantities of outputs and inputs.  But, since the required information for doing this is also 
freely at hand, and the required calculations are costless to make, the model strips 
management of any meaningful productivity in the performance of even these tasks.  The cost 
of maximizing is ignored or implicitly assumed to be zero.  De facto, the resources that might 
be required to make maximizing decisions are treated as if they are not scarce.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 38  Hyperrationality (also termed “super rationality” or “perfect rationality” in 
neoclassical economics and game theory) describes decision-making by homo economicus, 
i.e., by an economic agent who only engages with a homogenous group of other hyperrational 
thinkers; who, like them, strictly pursues utility and profit maximization in all of her choices; 
who, like them, is capable of solving highly complex mathematical coordination problems in 
the blink of an eye; who, like them, can therefore predict the decisional behavior of all other 
hyperrational agents (given that (i) everyone is following the same hyperrational decisional 
rule (or strategy) when facing the same choice situation and (ii) everyone has internalized 
their counterparties’ hyperrationality within their own hyperrational utility calculation); and 
who, like them, can evaluate all possible choice options leading to all possible outcomes in 
an instant and, accordingly, can confidently and correctly select the highest-utility/highest-
profit personal course of action in every given choice situation.  See Herbert A. Simon, 
Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1978); see also Lee 
Roy Beach & Raanan Lipshitz, Why Classical Decision Theory Is an Inappropriate Standard 
for Evaluating and Aiding Most Human Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION: 
MODELS AND METHODS 21, 21 (Gary A. Klein et al. eds., Ablex 1993) (pointing out that 
“classical decision theory is an abstract system of propositions that is designed to describe the 
choices of an ideal hypothetical decision maker—omniscient, computationally omnipotent 
Economic Man”); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction 
Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553 (1981).  For critical accounts of hyperrationality, see, 
for example, JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF 
RATIONALITY 17 (1989) (defining hyperrationality as “the failure to recognize the failure of 
rational-choice theory to yield unique prescriptions or predictions” and as the “irrational belief 
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calculate everything, and time (at least, time for rational in-advance 
calculation) is non-scarce, “there is no limitation on the computation of the 
optimal transactional choice that will achieve the largest net-gain outcome 
[so that] such computation always self-ratifies the final choice simply 
through calculation, comparison and ranking.”39  Strictly speaking, any 
decisional behavior beyond mere rational calculation—i.e., decision-making 
that would evaluate, make utility judgments among, and prioritize, different 
behavioral options in accordance with their expected future payoffs—would 
be engaging in unreason and constitute perfect irrationality. 
In this Coasean world, a perfectly omniscient and rationally clairvoyant 
June would simply gather and process all relevant internal and external 
information—past, present, and future— pertaining to her treatment options, 
her personal preferences, and her overall life circumstances and calculatively 
arrive at a highest-utility treatment or non-treatment decision.  She would 
then be able to costlessly implement this perfect choice—without any hitch 
or requiring any post-decisional monitoring, interim assessment, or 
subsequent revision of her choice.  Since June would know everything about 
the present and the future that would be necessary to know, she would know 
(as fully-measured facts and completely accurate projections): (i) how long 
she would have to live under each possible treatment or non-treatment 
option, (ii) how much pain, disability, and physical and emotional distress 
would accompany each of those options, (iii) how her overall life 
circumstances would change in the future (for example, her sixteen-year-old 
daughter might become pregnant in four months from June’s decision-point, 
or June herself might die in a car accident before the end of the year), (iv) 
what her exact future personal preferences and thresholds would be when 
addressing treatment-related pain and suffering as well as under changing 
life circumstances and, thus, (v) cumulatively, what her exact and perfect 
balance point would be for purposes of choosing between the quality 
(thriving) and the quantity (surviving) of her remaining lifetime.40 
 
in the omnipotence of reason”); Steven Shulman, What’s So Rational About Rational 
Expectations? Hyperrationality and the Logical Limits to Neoclassicism, 20 J. POST 
KEYNESIAN ECON. 135 (1997). 
 39  Reich-Graefe, supra note 32. 
 40  To perhaps state the obvious, in a Coasean world “where infinity and eternity are 
ignorant states of mind that can be overcome by rational, competent calculation,” Reich-
Graefe, supra note 32, June would never have arrived at this particular adaptive decision-
making point (or, for that matter, any other decision-making point).  Rather, at some behavior-
adapting point in the past, when she went through a perfectly rational calculation of her future, 
she would have known that (i) she would develop Stage IV ovarian cancer under certain 
circumstances (thus, no ovarian cancer would have ever been “discovered” during her recent 
routine gynecological exam—indeed, any and all routine annual exams would have no 
purpose whatsoever given that everything they could possibly “discover” would already be 
known) and (ii) that something could be done about those circumstances in terms of 
avoidance.  In other words, June would have only arrived at her current medical diagnosis if 
nothing could have been done about it in terms of avoidance behavior at any point in the past 
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Even under those computational conditions, however, June would not 
be able to ever make a “best,” i.e., highest-utility choice.  Assuming that her 
overall preference would be to return to her pre-diagnosis outlook of an 
indeterminable-length survival for an average forty-six-year-old woman, i.e., 
to a statistically close-to-100% chance of surviving for five years (and 
longer), June can never make a Coasean “best” choice that correlates with, 
and achieves, her preference.  She can never opt out of mortality and is 
always forced—even in a modelled Coasean utopia—to pick the better bad 
choice, namely, the most surviving coupled with the most thriving.  
Accordingly, the insurmountability of death even under conditions of 
Coasean utility calculation render the model per se useless for current 
purposes because surviving and thriving are never endless, absolute states of 
being.  Logically, they are always time-limited.  Otherwise, any and all 
concepts of “quantity” and “quality” (and, similarly, of “life,” “survival” and 
“death”) would be destroyed by infinity.  Human life is only “real” life and 
worth living because of the uncertainty of life and the certainty of death.41  
There is no life without death and no death without living.  As a mortal being, 
June is spending her life, by neither choice nor consent but simple 
(chrono)logical choice “architecture,”42 within a spatially and temporally 
linear and scarce world. 
Consequently, any “aspiring toward a consistent perfection”43 in a 
Coasean world which would move beyond its utility in modeling rational 
choice would be an “aspiring toward annihilation [and infinite] 
nothingness.”44  “Perfection, we know, is finality; and finality is death.”45  
Thus, any Coasean inquiry into real-life end-of-life decision-making must 
return empty-handed to its very starting point.  Coasean perfection, human 
mortality and adaptive decision-making never go together.  To “rigidly 
confine[]” a predictive model of June’s rational decision-making behavior 
within the “paradigm of neoclassical economic[]” choice theory will mean 
 
and, therefore, would have resulted in a “better bad” outcome.  If something was to be done, 
June would have “chosen” and pursued this option a long while ago and her current diagnosis 
and choice situation would have never evolved. 
 41  Cf. SAUL BELLOW, HUMBOLDT’S GIFT 265 (1975) (“Death is the dark backing that a 
mirror needs if we are to see anything.”). 
 42  Lawrence Lessig introduced the term “architecture” to describe a particular grouping 
of behavioral constraints (in addition to law, markets and social norms) as “the very basic 
feasibility limitations imposed on resources (physical, technological, budgetary, etc.), in both 
time and space, by the present circumstances and conditions under which decision-making 
and resultant action may only take place.”  René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate 
Governance: The Mechanics of Trusting, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 103, 132 (2013) (citing 
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 663–67 (1998)). 
 43  CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, LETTERS TO A YOUNG CONTRARIAN 19 (Basic Books 2001). 
 44  Id. 
 45  CYRIL NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW OR THE PURSUIT OF PROGRESS 85 
(1958). 
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that “large parts of [June’s] urgent reality are outside its comprehension.”46  
As a result, the rational calculability of outcomes and modeling of choice 
behavior in a Coasean world provides little or no assistance in navigating 
June’s pressing decisional dilemmas. 
B. The Williamsonian World 
In order to better reflect the “urgent reality” of June’s life and decision-
making in the face of omnipresent mortality—and, in general, to better adjust 
rational choice models to the insurmountable non-perfection of human life 
that requires cooperation and organization under inherent temporal and 
spatial constraints—the second calculative realm, Williamsonian transaction 
cost economics, attempts “to describe ‘man as he is, acting within the 
constraints imposed by real institutions’”47 rather than in “caricature 
terms.”48  In other words, the Williamsonian world endeavors to “find 
substantive criteria [of rationality] broad enough to extend the concept of 
rationality beyond the [Coasean world] boundaries of static organization 
under certainty”49 and, in doing so, accepts two fundamental rational 
limitations which can never be altered by ultra-rational actors: bounded 
rationality and opportunism.50  Bounded rationality acknowledges the built-
in cognitive limitations of the human mind to accumulate, filter and process 
all decision-relevant information as a result of the imperfect search and 
computational capacities of humans as well as the computational restrictions 
provided by both scarce and asymmetric information.51  Opportunism 
assumes that human agents are not “simpl[y] self-interest seeking [but] self-
interest seeking with guile,”52 so that, strategically, they may disguise or 
otherwise keep undisclosed their personal preferences and commitments to 
others in order to maximize their individual utility from cooperation.53 
These two limitations for perfectly rational calculation, in turn, frame 
the resulting twin dilemmas of adverse selection and moral hazard 
applicable to all strategic decision-making and, thus, human cooperation.  
Adverse selection refers to a choice situation where one party (namely, the 
agent/fiduciary—for example, a physician), prior to a particular transaction 
or commitment has more and better information available to assist with 
 
 46  George J. Stigler, The Conference Handbook, 85 J. POL. ECON. 441, 443 (1977). 
 47  Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 453, 458 (1993) (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 231 (1984)). 
 48  Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 300 
(1993). 
 49  Simon, supra note 38, at 10. 
 50  See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 47, at 458. 
 51  Simon, supra note 34. 
 52  Williamson, supra note 47. 
 53  See generally Stiles & So, supra note 34, at 285–87. 
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calculating her self-interested future utility to be derived from the transaction 
or commitment than has the other party (namely, the principal/beneficiary—
for example, a patient).  As a result, the second party with the less well-
developed set of information is at a competitive disadvantage compared to 
the first party and is subject to exploitation at the time of their initial 
“contracting.”  Accordingly, the informational asymmetry between them 
will result in a lack of efficiency in setting a mutually beneficial price-quality 
equilibrium as regards the services provided by the agent-fiduciary-
physician.54  Moral hazard describes the general strategic phenomenon and 
dilemma which occurs when one party’s (i.e., the agent-fiduciary-
physician’s) behavior is subject to change after a particular contemplated 
transaction or commitment by another party (i.e., the principal-beneficiary-
patient), because the first party will be placed in a control position where her 
actions can no longer be (fully) observed and (completely) contracted for, or 
otherwise controlled by, the second party.  As a result, the first party can 
unilaterally shift the downside risk and cost of her opportunistic 
underperformance to another party, either directly to the second party (i.e., 
the principal-beneficiary-patient, in which case the coping costs of moral 
hazard are agency costs)55 or to one or more third parties who do not 
participate in the particular transaction or commitment (in which case the 
manifestation of moral hazard constitutes negative externalities that present 
 
 54  See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490–91 (1970); Masako N. Darrough & Neal M. 
Stoughton, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Question of Financial Structure, 41 J. 
FIN. 501 (1986). 
 55  Put into the context of decision-making by seriously ill patients, moral hazard may, 
for example, manifest in June’s “selection” of Dr. Savoy as her oncologist because, in her 
first meeting, Dr. Savoy also promised her (either expressly or impliedly) to personally stay 
on top of everything (as regards June’s treatment and interim assessments of her treatment 
progress) at all times and to communicate all relevant information to June promptly and 
completely, but suppose that, at some later point and for some unknown reason, Dr. Savoy is 
often distracted, misses some scheduled appointments with June, and in other ways does not 
follow through with her original promise.  June can obviously observe some of the moral-
hazard manifestation in the missed appointments (in particular, if there is also no explanation 
from Dr. Savoy and no other communication from Dr. Savoy, in lieu of appointments, to 
apprise June of treatment progress, etc.).  But, otherwise, any other forms of sub-par 
performance by Dr. Savoy in light of her original promise will remain hidden from June and 
can no longer be effectively controlled by June (other than by terminating the relationship).  
Thus, in all instances in which Dr. Savoy could meet her original promise but decides for 
whatever reason not to, moral hazard has manifested and June has to bear the agency costs (in 
the form of less information, less assurance, less trust, etc.) of having a distracted, less-
communicative-than-promised oncologist. 
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as social costs).56  Moral hazard leaves the second party vulnerable57 and 
subject to exploitation for the entire duration of her contracting with the first 
party, so that the informational asymmetry between them will now result in 
a lack of efficiency in even maintaining whatever mutually beneficial price-
quality equilibrium the first party was able to negotiate and contract for with 
the second party in the first place.58 
Notwithstanding the limitations of bounded rationality and 
opportunism and the resultant twin dilemmas of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, human agents are deemed capable in the Williamsonian world to 
make competent and confident in-advance calculations of their respective 
utility in that they: 
(1) are aware of the range of possible outcomes and their 
associated probabilities, 
(2) take cost-effective actions to mitigate hazards and enhance 
benefits, 
(3) proceed with the transaction only if expected net gains can be 
projected, and 
(4) [assign the transaction to that counterparty] for which the 
largest net gain can be projected.59 
Nevertheless, this confident calculation and decision-making is significantly 
more complex and fraught with largely insurmountable obstacles in the 
context of health care decision-making in general, and in end-of-life rational 
choice behavior in particular.  To begin with, an acutely ill, terminally ill or 
 
 56  Again, put into the context of decision-making by seriously ill patients and elaborating 
on the above example, see supra note 55, moral hazard may manifest in this regard with June’s 
twenty-one-year-old son who is in his third year of university.  For example, if the son decided 
to miss some of his university classes in order to drive June to some of her scheduled 
appointments with Dr. Savoy (because June is too weak to drive herself) and, because of Dr. 
Savoy’s underperformance on her promise to June, some of those scheduled appointments do 
not happen, moral hazard has also manifested with regard to June’s son who now has to bear 
the social costs (in the form of having to comfort his mom, worrying about her treatment 
progress, wasting class time, labor, gasoline, etc. in getting his mom to and from Dr. Savoy’s 
office, etc.) of his mother having a distracted, less-communicative-than-promised oncologist. 
 57  See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL 
GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 64 (2002) (including 
patients with incurable diseases among human-subject populations that are deemed 
“vulnerable”). 
 58  See, e.g., Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 
(1979); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 
(1968); David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”, 79 J. 
RISK & INS. 1051 (2012); see also M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical 
Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 930 (2002) (stating that “sick people are singularly ill-
situated to monitor the exercise of medical discretion”). 
 59  Williamson, supra note 47, at 467.  The Williamsonian model is, accordingly, still 
grounded in the classical Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem.  See JOHN 
VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
(1944). 
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dying patient is, by large measures, a captive individual in any given 
physician-patient relationship60 and, therefore, has “a limited capacity or 
freedom to consent [to] or to decline”61 medical treatment at any point in 
time of her physician-patient relationship.  In addition to this relational 
captivity, any critically ill or dying patient will also have a severely limited 
capacity or freedom to engage in rational Williamsonian-world utility 
calculations in the first place.  Although June undoubtedly has decisional 
capacity in the commonly understood meaning of capacity to make medical 
decisions, her mental and psychological facility for self-interest protection 
and resilience—in terms of rational contracting (for example, as regards 
hazard mitigation and benefits enhancement), fending off opportunistic 
behavior, and controlling for moral hazard in her physician’s relational 
behavior—is severely reduced, both personally and situationally. 
As systematically examined in Kenneth Arrow’s seminal 1963 article, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,62 the special 
characteristics of the marketplace for health care services and delivery finds 
the patient at “a departure from the normal state of affairs,”63 making her 
“demand for medical services . . . not steady in origin as, for example, for 
food or clothing, but irregular and unpredictable”64 and, overall, “associated, 
with a considerable probability, with an assault on personal integrity.”65  At 
the same time, the patient’s stakes in making “efficient” decisions in 
purchasing health care services as well as “good” decisions in selecting and 
consenting to treatment options are significantly increased.  “[A]part from 
the cost of medical care,” associated risks of “death, . . . impairment of full 
functioning [and] loss or reduction of earning ability” apply which will turn 
illness, in any form, into “a costly risk” in and of itself.66  Given that the 
patient “cannot test the product before consuming it,”67 so that her credence 
consumption of a particular form of medical care by definition will forego 
the use of her personal resources (including time and energy) on alternative 
 
 60  See, e.g., Katrina George, Autonomy and Vulnerability at the Death Bed, 10 U. W. 
SYDNEY L. REV. 139, 143 (2006).  See generally Louis Lasagna, Special Subjects in Human 
Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 449 (1969). 
 61  Ruth Macklin, Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection, 17 BIOETHICS 473, 474 (2003) 
(discussing vulnerability in the context of human-subject research). 
 62  Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941 (1963). 
 63  Id. at 948. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. at 949; cf. Matthew A. Butkus, Free Will and Autonomous Medical Decision-
Making, 3 J. COGNITION & NEUROETHICS 75, 95 (2015) (“There is a common reaction in 
medicine that patients are expected to react negatively to bad health news—in fact, many 
consider it a sign of pathology if bad news does not engender some manner of depressive 
reaction.”). 
 66  Arrow, supra note 62, at 949. 
 67  Id. 
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options of care that she otherwise could have pursued, her overall 
opportunity cost68 in making “good” health care decisions is compounded 
further.  Accordingly, the patient’s “inherent vulnerability created by illness 
and by the process of treatment,”69 has an immediate and distortive effect on 
the physician-patient relationship and expected physician behavior in terms 
of marginality.  The physician, as an agent-fiduciary, should (but not 
necessarily will) orient her behavior towards “a concern for the customer’s 
welfare,” thus, distinguishing “medicine . . . from business,” making “self-
interest on the part of participants [no longer] the accepted norm,”70 and 
requiring a “[d]eparture from the profit motive [and] pure cash nexus.”71  
Finally, product uncertainty in medical care, i.e., “the existence of 
uncertainty in the incidence of disease and in the efficacy of treatment,”72 is 
strongly amplified given (i) the unavailability of “an adequate number of 
trials,” (ii) the resultant inability of “learning from one’s own experience or 
that of others,” (iii) the greater “utility variability [particularly] in severe 
cases,” and (iv) the “informational inequality” based on the actual or 
imagined better “information possessed by the physician as to the 
consequences and possibilities of treatment.”73 
In light of these factors, the rationally choosing patient now faces a vast 
and complex optimality gap.  It may therefore be posited that an ultra-
rational, repeat-player patient will be fully aware of and, therefore, unable to 
confidently overcome, two cognitive constraints on her medical decision-
making: ambivalence and ambiguity.  As regards ambivalence, 
Williamsonian calculativeness carries over the Coasean-model assumption 
that a calculating rational choice actor will never encounter a change in her 
own tastes, preferences, and beliefs once her utility function has been fully 
set and the largest net gain-transaction has been adopted.  In real life, the 
opposite must often be true:  humans are frequently unable, a priori, to assign 
 
 68  See Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
776, 780–81 n.18 (1979) (“The cost attributable to doing one thing to the exclusion of another 
stems from opportunities sacrificed to pursue the chosen course.  This sacrifice is called 
‘opportunity cost.’”). 
 69  Mark A. Hall, Arrow on Trust, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1131, 1136 (2001). 
 70  Arrow, supra note 62, at 949. 
 71  Id. at 950–51; see also R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 94–95 (Dover 2004) 
(1920) (“The difference between industry as it exists to-day and a profession is, then, simple 
and unmistakable.  The essence of the former is that its only criterion is the financial return 
which it offers to its shareholders.  The essence of the latter, is that, though men enter it for 
the sake of livelihood, the measure of their success is the service which they perform, not the 
gains which they amass . . . .  So, if they are doctors, they recognize that there are certain 
kinds of conduct which cannot be practiced, however large the fee offered for them, because 
they are unprofessional . . . .  The meaning of a profession is that it makes the traitors the 
exception, not as they are in industry, the rule.”). 
 72  Arrow, supra note 62, at 941. 
 73  Id. at 951. 
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well-defined utilities to projected outcomes.74  Given their cognitive 
limitations, they will only arrive at utility outcomes via a solvitur-ambulando 
strategy.75  Thus, in particular, part (3) of Williamson’s definition of 
calculativeness—making the transactional choice subject to the confident 
projection of expected net gains—remains subject to what has been 
described as a calculating actor’s own “opportunistic dissonance”76 (or, as 
Williamson has called it, the “frailty of motive”77).  Every human being 
encounters subjective uncertainty as regards her future preferences.78  
Ambiguity also affects the same Williamsonian calculativeness definition, 
in particular, its part (4)—arriving at a largest net-gain transactional choice 
through comparison and ranking of what potential counterparties have to 
offer.  Under conditions of ambiguity,79 humans are unable, a priori, to map 
out all of the “possible outcomes and their associated probabilities”80 and, 
thus, to fully apprehend the entire choice situation81—even in circumstances 
of minimal-to-zero ambivalence (little to no opportunistic dissonance).  
Accordingly, their projection and ranking of transactional net gains is subject 
to what has been labeled “rational vacuity.”82  Every human being, because 
of bounded rationality, experiences objective uncertainty about the effects of 
external and internal influences on her subjective assessment of what is her 
best choice. 
 
 
 74  See, e.g., Akos Rona-Tas, Uncertainty and Credit Card Markets 3 (unpublished 
manuscript), http://cor.web.uci.edu/research/. 
 75  It is solved by walking.  Cf. Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common Law and the Civil 
Law—A Scot’s View, 63 HARV. L. REV. 468, 470–71 (1950) (“A civilian system differs from 
a common law system much as rationalism differs from empiricism or deduction from 
induction.  The civilian naturally reasons from principles to instances, the common lawyer 
from instances to principles.  The civilian puts his faith in syllogisms, the common lawyer in 
precedents; the first silently asking himself as each new problem arises, ‘What should we do 
this time?’ and the second asking aloud in the same situation, ‘What did we do last time?’ . . .  
The instinct of the civilian is to systematize.  The working rule of the common lawyer is 
solvitur ambulando.”). 
 76  Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69. 
 77  Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and Its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION 
ECON. 97, 97 (1993). 
 78  See, e.g., Isabella Hatak & Dietmar Roessl, Trust Between Boundary-Spanning 
Agents: The Role of Relational Competencies, 3 OPEN J. SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (2015); Donald A. 
Redelmeier, Paul Rozin & Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients’ Decision: Cognitive 
and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 74 (1993) (“[P]sychologists have shown that 
people are prone to err when making decisions about long-term consequences because they 
fail to anticipate how their preferences will change over time.”). 
 79  Shabnam Mousavi & Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics Are Tools for Uncertainty, 34 
HOMO OECONOMICUS 361, 363 (2017) (defining ambiguity as “unknown probability 
distributions over known outcomes”). 
 80  Williamson, supra note 47, at 467. 
 81  See, e.g., Rona-Tas, supra note 74. 
 82  Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69. 
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Therefore, in a non-static Williamsonian world, June’s decision-
making, driven by utility calculation and optimization under conditions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism, will now run into an overwhelming 
number of rational choice complications.  For example, June may have 
chosen (and learned to appreciate for competence and patient beneficence) 
her gynecologist, but she was referred by her gynecologist to Dr. Savoy, her 
oncologist.  She will know that she knows next to nothing about her 
oncologist, making already her “selection”83 of this medical provider 
affected—to an in-advance unknown and largely unknowable degree—by 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  June will also know, in terms of rational 
vacuity, that she knows next to nothing about “the range of possible 
[treatment options and] outcomes and their associated probabilities”84 
applicable to her diagnosis—other than what information Dr. Savoy has 
directly divulged to her and what of this information June has been able to 
comprehend.  She will be further aware that Dr. Savoy’s diagnosis, 
recommended treatment, and prognosis are all subject to having been formed 
under conditions of Dr. Savoy’s own bounded rationality and opportunism.  
Therefore, the possible adverse selection inherent in her physician-patient 
relationship with Dr. Savoy—post-selection of Dr. Savoy but pre-selection 
of medical treatment—may now include questions of her oncologist’s 
professional competence and beneficent patient-orientation in general as 
well as Dr. Savoy’s correct application of this competence and patient-
welfare orientation in June’s particular case.  For example, these questions 
will involve correct diagnosis, correct recall of treatment and prognosis 
information, correct collection, processing, and comprehension of all other 
relevant information as it pertains to June’s treatment, and accurate, efficient 
communication of the complete set of relevant information to June.  
Moreover, in terms of moral hazard, June will know that she knows next to 
nothing about the financial and personal choice infrastructure that Dr. Savoy 
operates in—she is not privy to the fee reimbursement arrangements Dr. 
Savoy has with June’s health insurer;85 she has not been apprised of any 
 
 83  If June can be said to have made a choice of oncologist, her selection of Dr. Savoy, 
controlled by her gynecologist, was, at best, indirect and delegated.  See generally Gwyn 
Bevan et al., Changing Choices in Health Care: Implications for Equity, Efficiency and Cost, 
5 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 251, 258–62 (2010) (discussing archetypal Beveridge and 
Bismarck models of financing and organizing health care delivery and resultant scope of 
patient choice of provider); Mark Schlesinger et al., Complexity, Public Reporting, and 
Choice of Doctors: A Look Inside the Blackest Box of Consumer Behavior, 71(5) MED. CARE 
RES. REV. 38S (Supp. 2014). 
 84  Williamson, supra note 47, at 467. 
 85  Cf. Ubel, supra note 29, at 9 (“[F]inancial conversations are not a routine part of most 
clinical encounters.  Outside settings like plastic surgery, most patients do not often talk about 
the financial cost of interventions with their providers.  Indeed, it is rare for doctors to talk 
about the cost of care when patients face life-threatening illnesses.”).  See generally Mark A. 
Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical 
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financial conflicts or incentives which Dr. Savoy may have in recommending 
particular treatment options; she knows nothing about the personal 
circumstances of Dr. Savoy’s life that could make Dr. Savoy’s actions more 
or less opportunistic—either already now or later in June’s cancer treatment. 
In addition to these examples of hard-to-impossible-to-measure 
objective uncertainty and resultant ambiguity, June will know, in terms of 
opportunistic dissonance, that she knows next to nothing about her own 
tastes, preferences, and beliefs with regard to her treatment options for Stage 
IV ovarian cancer.86  Accordingly, there must remain large-scale 
ambivalence about possible outcomes, hazards to be avoided, and benefits to 
be enhanced (affecting parts (1) and (2) of the Williamsonian rational utility 
calculation above).  For example, June’s ambivalence will be based on her 
present subjective uncertainty about her future attitudes towards the pain and 
suffering associated with different treatment options (in particular, when 
encountered midstream in any given treatment scenario).  Similarly, her 
ambivalence will be nurtured by doubts about how over-optimistic her in-
advance calculation of these subjective treatment parameters may be, 
especially given her lack of any prior experience with cancer treatment.  
Finally, June must be aware that she neither has the luxury to “proceed with 
the transaction only if expected net gains can be projected”87 (i.e., June 
cannot wait until the time that she could calculatively reduce ambiguity and 
ambivalence to tolerable levels).  She also lacks the luxury to cost-efficiently 
question, negotiate, or monitor Dr. Savoy’s performance and to assign her 
medical-treatment transaction to Dr. Savoy only when she is the medical 
provider with whom “the largest net gain can be projected.”88  June cannot 
efficiently comparison-shop to begin with and, if attempting to do so beyond 
a standard second opinion, can expect to strategically increase the risk of 
moral hazard in her eventual physician-patient relationship given her overt 
 
Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 647–67 (2008) (analyzing in detail the “miserable 
market for medical fees”). 
 86  Cf. Butkus, supra note 65, at 91–92 (“[T]he process of informed consent requires the 
clinician to disclose the risks, benefits, and outcomes of particular interventions.  Ostensibly 
the patient then decides which option best suits his needs and values, but this concept does 
not take into account the plasticity of human emotion—his needs and values may not be the 
same once the intervention has been selected and performed.”).  See generally George 
Loewenstein, Hot–Cold Empathy Gaps and Medical Decision Making, 24(4) HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. S49 (Supp. 2005) (analyzing how people mispredict their own behavior and 
preferences across affective “cold” and “hot” states and examining the consequences of 
resultant empathy “gaps” for medical, and specifically cancer-related, decision-making); 
Peter A. Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Healthcare 
Decision Making, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57 (Supp. 2005) (describing how people often 
mispredict the emotional impact of unfamiliar circumstances and suggesting that healthy 
people generally mispredict the emotional impact that chronic illness and disability will have 
on their lives). 
 87  Williamson, supra note 47, at 467 (emphasis added). 
 88  Id. 
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display of “distrustfulness”—and the resulting lack of her reciprocal 
trustworthiness at the outset of their relationship.89  Accordingly, any rational 
calculability of outcomes and modeling of choice behavior in a 
Williamsonian world provides mainly one type of certainty for June’s 
decisional dilemmas:  if she is brutally honest with herself (i.e., if she reflects 
and acts ultra-rationally), a Williamsonian decisional calculus only supports 
and emphasizes how little she knows and how little she may ever confidently 
know and calculate in terms of preferred treatment utility.90  June is not homo 
economicus, hyperrationally maximizing choice under constraints of 
bounded rationality and opportunism.  June is homo mortalis, unable to opt 
out of the certainty of death and the absolute uncertainty of life. 
C. The Knightian World 
How can I behave urgently and with conviction when there are so 
many doubtful variables to contend with?—Kenneth Arrow91 
        Accordingly, as the third and final fundamental realm of rational utility 
calculation, Knightian uncertainty92 is essentially disregarded in the 
Williamsonian definition of calculativeness.  Here, the starting point is that 
all of human decision-making always occurs under unalterable conditions 
of true uncertainty.  In this very real realm of genuine (as opposed to 
strategic) uncertainty, no meaningful rational computability of costs and 
benefits is attainable.  In Frank Knight’s own words, “there is no possibility 
of forming in any way groups of instances of sufficient homogeneity to make 
possible a quantitative determination of true probability.”93  Knightian 
uncertainty is insurmountable by advance calculation and so cannot be 
reduced to probabilities and risks.94  It fundamentally disrupts the predictive 
 
 89  Cf. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (2000) (“Reciprocity means that in response to 
friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted 
by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much 
more nasty and even brutal.”). 
 90  Cf. Nora Szech, Becoming a Bad Doctor, 80 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 244, 245–46 
(2011) (“Especially patients, i.e., consumers in medical markets, have been shown to apply 
anecdotal reasoning.  Even if statistical information on different forms of therapy is available, 
patients often prefer to rely on personal stories.”); id. at 252 (“We have seen that if consumers 
are unfamiliar with the market and rely on anecdotes, all firms, no matter how bad, yield 
positive profits.”). 
 91  KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 15 (Norton & Co. 1974). 
 92  For a concise discussion of Knight’s seminal differentiation between risk and 
uncertainty, see, for example, Shabnam Mousavi & Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics Are Tools 
for Uncertainty, 34 HOMO OECONOMICUS 361, 363–64 (2017); Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, 
at 70–71. 
 93  KNIGHT, supra note 35, at 231. 
 94  Cf. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
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utility (a form of meta-utility) of all rational choice models.  Accordingly, 
this type of uncertainty as regards anything and everything the future may 
bring is sui generis compared to what has been encountered by 
Williamsonian calculativeness up to this point in the discussion: instead of 
strategic uncertainty (the main problem for an actor’s utility function in a 
transaction-cost economic world), “a world of Knightian uncertainty 
recogni[z]es that ambivalence and ambiguity are ultimately calculatively 
insurmountable.”95  In a Coasean world characterized by the neoclassical 
expected utility hypothesis and the perfect rational measurability of one’s 
future utility, everything is always perfect, everything is always certain, 
nothing is ever scarce.96  In contrast, in a Knightian uncertain world of 
universal and constant human vulnerability and certain mortality, everything 
is—at all times—imperfect, uncertain and scarce.  In their real world, 
humans are never able to transcend this existential imperfection and rational 
constraint.  The uncertainty and scarcity of their own future internal and 
external worlds will always remain unmeasurable and irreducible.97  Not 
only is this uncertainty humanly unavoidable, but the degree of uncertainty 
and its impact on patient outcomes is, ex ante, unknowable.  In the context 
of complex medical decision-making, with its attendant anxiety, asymmetric 
information and communication problems, the realities of the Knightian 
world coalesce into a perfect decisional storm. 
Human knowledge and foresight are always severely limited.  
Furthermore, humans’ first-hand, prior knowledge of the experience of dying 
is logically non-existent—one simply cannot test death.  On an individual 
basis, humans positively know little about the world around them.  They 
know even less about their inner worlds.98  Outside the very limited realm of 
their own purposeful actions as and when they take them, humans have, in 
principle, no predictive idea as to what their respective tomorrows will bring.  
In consequence—and in order to be able to still form expectations and, based 
on them, orient their actions and choices in the present towards a future that 
 
MONEY 162–63 (Macmillan 1936) (“We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions 
affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict 
mathematical expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist; and 
that it is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves 
choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often 
falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance.”). 
 95  Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 70. 
 96  Id. at 68. 
 97  Cf. Richard Zeckhauser, New Frontiers Beyond Risk and Uncertainty: Ignorance, 
Group Decision, and Unanticipated Themes, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY xvii, xxviii (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., Elsevier 2014) (“It is 
worth reiterating that the economics of risk and uncertainty lost its vitality in a prison of 
methodology that did not admit the real world.”). 
 98  See, e.g., Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Willpower and Personal Rules, 112 J. POL. 
ECON. 848 (2004) (analyzing imperfect self-knowledge, will-power and recall). 
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remains uncertain (but, prior to the onset of a terminal illness, generally 
attainable)—human decision-makers regularly calculatively suppress99 their 
awareness of Knightian uncertainty by discounting to zero its impact on their 
“imperfectly rational”100 decision-making.  In other words, as part of 
imperfectly rational decision-making, human decision-makers always have 
to engage in a pervasive form of rational delusion.  In particular, with respect 
to the certainty of mortality, they strategically reduce their imperfection-, 
uncertainty- and scarcity-bearing through a collective, shared reality of 
quasi-certainty, pseudo-homogeneity and “as-if”-utility.101  In doing so, 
humans—ineluctably caught “in a world of constant decisional demand and 
limited resources—calculatively mimic calculativeness”102 in order to 
respond to their mortality-induced vulnerability and to confidently calculate, 
 
 99  Such suppression calculation is deliberate but blind (i.e., at best, semi-conscious), an 
exercise in, and product of, necessary self-delusion.  See, e.g., William von Hippel & Robert 
Trivers, The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2011). 
 100  As used throughout this Article, decision-making is “imperfectly rational” when it is 
unalterably limited by bounded rationality and opportunism (of other and self).  Additionally, 
imperfectly rational decision-making is regularly constrained by rational errors and 
calculative flaws in the form of biases and other heuristics as identified in behavioral 
economics.  Unlike bounded rationality and opportunism, however, those biases and 
heuristics are alterable constraints for rational decision-making.  Only when they are fully 
remedied, thus, overcome within a given individual decision-making process can the resultant 
choice be described as “imperfectly rational”—namely, in the sense that the decision-maker 
is a good Bayesian and her decision-making “ultra-rational.”  When biases and heuristics are 
not fully remedied, thus, continue to implicate the rationality of decision-making 
notwithstanding their avoidability, the resultant choice may be described as “imperfectly 
irrational” and the decision-maker as being a “bad Bayesian.”  See infra notes 168–176 and 
accompanying text. 
 101  Coasean and Williamsonian models of rational decision-making are premised on the 
assumption that human actors actually work through an optimization calculus for purposes of 
maximizing utility.  However, in a reality of constant informational scarcity and bounded 
rationality, proper calculation remains a rare occurrence.  Thus, as a logical result of 
universally imperfect rational welfare calculability and as an effort to protect the remnants of 
this calculability as a minimally rational mode of human behavior (given that there is nothing 
else to replace these remnants with), humans rather “tend to behave ‘as though’ they assigned 
numerical probabilities, or ‘degrees of belief,’ to the events impinging on their action . . . [and 
to] behave[ ] ‘as if’ [t]he[y] assigned quantitative likelihoods to events.”  Daniel Ellsberg, 
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 643 (1961); see also MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 21–22 (1953) (“[U]nder a wide range of 
circumstances individual firms behave as if  they were seeking rationally to maximize their 
expected returns . . . and had full knowledge of the data needed to succeed in this attempt; as 
if, that is, they knew the relevant cost and demand functions, calculated marginal cost and 
marginal revenue from all actions open to them, and pushed each line of action to the point at 
which the relevant marginal cost and marginal revenue were equal.”) (footnote omitted).  For 
a critical assessment of this “as-if” calculative choice behavior, see, for example, Itzhak 
Gilboa et al., Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage’s Axioms Are Neither Necessary Nor 
Sufficient for Rationality, 187 SYNTHESE 11, 28 (2012) (“It is sometimes more rational to admit 
that one does not have sufficient information for probabilistic beliefs than to pretend that one 
does.”). 
 102  Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 72. 
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predict, and come to expect, in a minimally-rational manner, the contours of 
what their respective futures should bring.103 
Unfortunately, a diagnosis of potentially terminal illness will bring this 
life-long discounting and masking of Knightian uncertainty to an abrupt and, 
assuming a fully self-aware and honest ultra-rational patient, complete end.  
Prior to this diagnosis, discounting of Knightian uncertainty meant that 
surviving and thriving were both always attainable—an illusorily endless, 
in-tandem accrual of both quantity and quality of future life.  Once the 
diagnosis hits, dis-illusion ensues.104  The realization of the sudden non-
attainability of one’s future life will also bring with it the cognitive certainty 
that, at some point in the not-too-distant future, the surviving-thriving nexus 
will necessarily turn to an unavoidable in-tandem loss of both quantity and 
quality of life—namely, during the active, possibly prolonged and possibly 
painful dying process.  Since, in many cases, this active dying process will 
not have yet commenced at the time of diagnosis, the patient must enter a 
never-before-experienced realm where the co-conditionality of surviving 
and thriving completely ceases.  Instead, quantity/surviving and quality/
thriving of remaining life become antagonistic, and possibly, mutually 
exclusive conditions.  The patient now has to choose one over the other or 
discriminate in terms of more of one at the expense of less of the other.105  
There is no longer any later point in one’s lifetime where, through a delayed-
gratification strategy in the present (i.e., sacrificing the accrual of quality 
over quantity in the short-term), long-term utility will accrue in the future 
(i.e., accrual of both quality and quantity will again break even).  Similarly, 
there is no longer a later point in time where the first course of action can 
simply be corrected later for a better second course of action (while 
necessarily assuming the costs of some lost time and of the first 
“transaction”).  Now, opportunity cost sky-rockets, and decisional delay will 
quickly turn into decisional sacrifice.106  It’s now or never.  Accordingly, the 
 
 103  Including in such utility, of course, a reduction in their cognitive awareness of 
vulnerability-bearing, i.e., of their overall vulnerability costs in the first place. 
 104  Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 48 (“When people lose confidence in their core 
beliefs, they become literally ‘dis-illusioned’ because they lack a functional blueprint of 
reality.”). 
 105  A patient opting for the decisional default of “deciding nothing” or “waiting things 
out” (i.e., of not making an active decision for or against treatment) is, of course, still making 
a choice, possibly even an incorrectible one, vis-à-vis the distribution of her scarce future 
quantity and quality of life.  See also Ubel, supra note 29, at 9 (“Patients’ decisions become 
more difficult when they are asked to compare apples to oranges, metaphorically speaking of 
course.  For instance, some decisions require patients to make trade-offs between length of 
life and health-related quality of life.”). 
 106  In other words, delaying and deferring choice, seeking additional information, 
searching for alternative options and choosing default options in the interim becomes overtly 
futile choice behavior and is no longer “valuable” or “efficient.”  See generally Amos Tversky 
& Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
358 (1992). 
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insurmountable rational impact of Knightian uncertainty is heavily, if not 
existentially, pronounced in all interim decision-making that remains before 
one of the following events will occur: (i) a complete cure (returning to the 
in-tandem accrual of surviving and thriving) or (ii) the commencement of an 
active dying process (arrival at the in-tandem loss of surviving and thriving). 
In a Coasean world, June could, at all times, calculatively establish for 
all interim decision-making what her exact and perfect balance point would 
be in order to choose between the quality/thriving and the quantity/surviving 
of her remaining lifetime.  Instead, in the real world, June has to acquaint 
herself with two realms of Knightian uncertainty: the one directly pertaining 
to her illness, its diagnosis, treatment and prognosis—clinical uncertainty—
and the larger realm of her uncertain life circumstances and overall future in 
which her illness and clinical uncertainty is wholistically embedded107 
(including the relational uncertainty caused by the asymmetry of 
“presumably quite different medical knowledges”108 between herself and her 
medical providers)—non-clinical uncertainty. 
1. Clinical Uncertainty 
Once a patient receives a diagnosis of a potentially life-threatening 
condition, all of Knightian uncertainty, of course, continues—but at an 
amplified level in the sense that the ambivalence and ambiguity affecting 
rational decision-making pose graver potential consequences.  Physicians 
and patients want to make the “best” choices about medical care for serious 
illness but, given their bounded rationality, lack the omniscience needed to 
calculate all future possibilities without error.  All medical decision-making 
(as with all other types of human decision-making) occurs under conditions 
of irreducible uncertainty and resultant ambivalence and ambiguity.  
Philosophers Samuel Gorovitz and Alasdair MacIntyre offer a persuasive 
theory of the nature of physician fallibility in this regard.109  As they explain, 
fallibility in medical decision-making and treatment arises out of three 
distinct causes.  The first is ignorance based on a limited understanding of 
the medical issue—the physician has full access to information and collects 
it but cannot subjectively fully understand it.110  The second is ineptitude 
based on the physician’s failure to access and follow available medical 
information—all of the information is available to arrive at an evidence-
 
 107  See, e.g., Tracey A. Revenson & Julie R. Pranikoff, A Contextual Approach to 
Treatment Decision Making Among Breast Cancer Survivors, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S93 
(Supp. 2005) (describing four contexts of the “social ecological framework” in which 
treatment decision-making is embedded: “the situational context, the interpersonal context, 
the sociocultural context, and the temporal context”). 
 108  Arrow, supra note 62, at 964. 
 109  See Samuel Gorovitz & Alasdair MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, 
1 J. MED. & PHIL. 51 (1976). 
 110  Id. at 65. 
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based “correct” diagnosis and treatment plan but the physician, while 
capable of understanding the relevant information, fails to fully collect, 
process, and comprehend the information.111  In either case, the physician 
either underperforms and fails to follow best practices or the physician 
suffers from and applies biases that interfere with a (boundedly) rational 
processing of the information.  Both of these forms of fallibility can be 
overcome with more skilled, more careful, more conscientious, and more 
rational effort.  In other words, they can be optimized in a Williamsonian 
world. 
By contrast, Gorovitz’s & MacIntyre’s third cause of fallibility is 
necessary fallibility in which the information that must be understood 
scientifically in order to make the “best” decision simply cannot be known 
or predicted.112  In this scenario, no physician, no matter how skilled, careful, 
conscientious, and rational, can provide a solution or “best” recommendation 
because the solution is (at least, ex ante) unknowable due to the 
unpredictability of the multiple objectively unknown and unknowable 
variables involved in any patient’s prognosis or response to a particular 
treatment—in spite of the statistical averages that generally apply to the 
patient’s diagnosis.113 Necessary fallibility applies to every patient and every 
prognosis because every patient’s prognosis and future response to treatment 
remains subject to Knightian uncertainty.114  Not only is this uncertainty 
humanly and rationally unavoidable, but the degree of uncertainty and its 
impact on individual patient outcomes is, ex ante, unknowable.  Therefore, 
even the most skilled, careful, conscientious and rational physician’s 
judgment can turn out to be 100% incorrect about a particular patient’s 
prognosis or response to treatment.  Assuming that June, as an ultra-rational 
patient, were to again be brutally honest with herself, she would now have a 
much more complex and much less confident calculation to make than 
perhaps first assumed: acknowledging the (statistical) likelihood for some 
ignorance and ineptitude among her medical providers as regards her 
prognosis, recommended treatment, or both is already a tall order—
particularly given June’s expert dependency and, thus, her severely curtailed 
ability to cost-effectively control and bargain for Williamsonian hazard 
 
 111  Id. at 62–63. 
 112  Id. at 63.  “[W]e have provided a theoretical account of why it is that knowledge about 
the individual patient is not merely essential, but is always and necessarily potentially 
inadequate to the extent that damaging error may result from conscientious, well-motivated 
clinical intervention by even the best-informed physicians.”  Id. at 65. 
 113  See, e.g., Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xvii–xviii (“[A] patient who presses a 
physician will learn that aggregate statistics do not apply to the individual’s case, that the 
physician and delivery institution can significantly affect risk levels, and that no data are so 
finely parsed as to predict individual outcomes.  Uncertainty rules.”). 
 114  Hence, necessary fallibility is irreducible to quantifiable risks, and so is unpredictable 
in absolute terms.  See generally KNIGHT, supra note 35, at ch. 7. 
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mitigation and benefit enhancement.  Still, June can somewhat reduce the 
fallibility created by ignorance and ineptitude and “buy” herself more 
confidence in the form of a second medical opinion.  Of course, a second 
opinion will suffer from the same statistical likelihood of ignorance and 
ineptitude.  But June can take some comfort in the fact that the stochastic 
regularity of ignorance and ineptitude committed by two independent 
clinical teams in the same patient’s prognosis and treatment 
recommendations should, statistically, be substantially lower than when only 
consulting one team of medical providers.  If the second opinion supports 
Dr. Savoy’s prognosis and treatment recommendations, June has reason to 
worry somewhat less about fallibility in terms of ignorance and ineptitude.115 
Unfortunately, the same is never true for necessary fallibility which, of 
course, also always occurs with some statistical likelihood.  Here, an ultra-
rational June would know that her physician’s judgment is unavoidably 
affected by Knightian uncertainty.  She also would know that it is impossible 
to calculate in advance how much of Dr. Savoy’s judgment is affected by this 
true, irreducible form of fallibility.116  As a result, June cannot “buy” any 
more confidence through a second opinion.  From an ultra-rational 
perspective, any second opinion would only aggravate what is already an 
infinite regression problem caused by Knightian uncertainty.  For starters, 
given the stochastic regularity of necessary fallibility, June can never be fully 
confident that her best-treatment-option calculus based on Dr. Savoy’s 
expert judgment is correct—even in the complete absence of ignorance and 
ineptitude.  Accordingly, the “remaining” Knightian uncertainty-induced 
lack of confidence about the correctness of her first-order calculus (which 
must always be larger than zero and may be as large as 100%) will 
necessitate a second-order probability judgment designed to gauge how 
confident June is about the correctness of her first-order probability 
 
 115  Still, a second opinion always “cuts both ways” in terms of confidence enhancement 
vis-à-vis ignorance and ineptitude.  Remember that Dr. Savoy estimates that, even with 
aggressive, multi-modal treatment, June has statistically only a 17% chance of surviving for 
five years.  But, in an effort to not frighten June, she decides to not disclose this specific 
information and rather tells June that the disease is “very serious, potentially life-threatening,” 
and that it is important to begin treatment immediately.  What could be expected to happen if 
a second opinion both affirms Dr. Savoy’s five-year-survival estimate and discloses that 
information to June, in particular, if Dr. Savoy were to mention to June that the second opinion 
confirms her original estimate?  Notwithstanding the reduction of fallibility as regards her 
diagnosis in terms of ignorance and ineptitude, we would expect June to now have less 
confidence in her oncologist in general and also less confidence in the correctness and 
ultimate success of the treatment recommendations made by Dr. Savoy (i.e., she omitted 
telling June about a crucial aspect of the diagnosis, so what else did she miss, for example, in 
terms of treatment recommendations, both as regards the substance and the complete 
disclosure thereof?). 
 116  Indeed, Dr. Savoy has cautioned her in this regard, namely that “every patient is unique 
and that survival rates and other prognostic factors are only averages which vary according to 
the patient’s age and overall health.” 
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calculus—namely, that Dr. Savoy’s diagnosis and recommended treatment 
is “correct” and the “best” way forward for June.  Obviously, June’s second-
order probability judgment (possibly aided by a second opinion) will suffer 
from the same Knightian uncertainty cum necessary fallibility that has 
affected the first-order calculus,117 thereby, logically, necessitating a third-
order probability judgment and so on into infinity.118  In other words, an 
ultra-rational June would now have to acknowledge to herself that neither 
patient nor doctor can ever predict how incorrect a given prognosis may turn 
out to be in a particular patient’s case and how useless (or even harmful) an 
incorrect medical treatment may be if undertaken by the particular patient. 
Most likely, however, June is not deciding and proceeding in an ultra-
rational manner.  Rather, she is understandably shocked by the diagnosis.  
She also must be very scared given all of the uncertainty and change which 
the diagnosis and recommended treatment will bring to all aspects of her life.  
Most likely, among other minimally-rational decision-making strategies, she 
will resort to loss-aversion,119 optimism-bias,120 and confirmation-bias121 
behaviors, all of which would be common responses in critical-illness 
situations like hers. 
 
 
 117  Namely, that no number of skilled, careful, conscientious and rational physicians can 
correctly predict with certainty the correctness of a particular patient’s prognosis or the 
patient’s response to treatment. 
 118  See generally Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69–70. 
 119  Here, June can be expected to prefer avoiding the chance of further loss of remaining 
lifetime through opting for treatment intervention than acquiring the chance of gaining more 
remaining lifetime (or more quality of remaining lifetime) through opting for less aggressive 
medical treatment not recommended by her oncologist.  In fact, Dr. Savoy urges her to 
undergo the recommended treatment.  See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) 
(describing loss-aversion behavior). 
 120  Here, June can be expected to be over-optimistic in the sense that she will over-
emphasize the positive aspects about her treatment situation and will over-estimate the 
probability of positive outcomes.  In fact, June has been told that, given her young age and 
otherwise good health, she should consider having more aggressive surgery and more 
aggressive chemotherapy, that there are multiple post-surgery treatment options available, and 
that some promising clinical trials of new chemotherapeutic agents (both standard and 
experimental targeted therapy, as well as immunotherapy) are all available in order to “fight” 
her cancer into submission.  See generally John Chapin & Grace Coleman, Optimistic Bias: 
What You Think, What You Know, or Whom You Know?, 11 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 121 (2009). 
 121  Here, June can be expected to gather and remember information selectively in order 
to protect the confidence and optimistic outlook “bought” through her optimism-bias 
behavior.  In fact, even though she is told that her cytoreductive surgery may involve removal 
of both ovaries, the uterus, and parts of the colon, bladder, gall bladder, and other affected 
organs, she can be expected to discount and ignore (i.e., to selectively remember) such 
information in an effort to preserve and entrench a belief that hers is, at worst, an average case 
in which no such “complications” will materialize.  See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, 
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 
(1998). 
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June has now had the debulking surgery with intraperitoneal 
chemotherapy and has endured a long recovery and missed eight 
weeks of work.  She has residual pain from the surgery, digestive 
problems due to the removal of her gall bladder and a length of 
small bowel, and she has continuous nausea.  She has also lost a 
good deal of weight due to the nausea and difficulty eating.  Dr. 
Savoy informs June that now is the time to begin chemotherapy in 
order to try to kill as many of the remaining cancer cells in her 
body as possible.  The chemotherapy proposed is proven to be 
effective in about 60% of patients (about 40% of patients with 
ovarian cancer do not respond to this particular chemotherapy 
drug) in reducing cancer cells and prolonging life, but its side 
effects are very toxic and will leave June exhausted and nauseated 
after each weekly infusion.  There is no way to predict the 
likelihood or degree of response or the effects of toxicity with 
respect to any individual patient.  June is distressed at the fact 
that, if she begins the chemotherapy, she will be unable to return 
to work and that she will have little energy to care for her teenage 
daughter.  But June considers herself a “fighter” and believes that 
her cancer will respond well to the chemotherapy and that, 
because of her prior good health, the side effects will be 
manageable.  At Dr. Savoy’s urging, she agrees to the treatment. 
When considering a decision with respect to a cancer treatment using 
chemotherapy like June’s and assuming that the chemotherapy has a 
hypothetical 60% chance of “success” and a 40% chance of “no success” 
based on past application and experience—“success” in this context is 
simply defined as killing a significant number of cancer cells and, thus, 
theoretically contributing significantly to the prolongation of June’s life.  It 
is known that chemotherapy kills cancer cells—this is an example of a 
knowable fact that is also actually known—a “known known.”  It is also 
known that chemotherapy will do damage to other parts of the body and will 
cause severe side effects, but not known what or how bad the damage might 
be in a particular person like June—this is an example of a “known 
unknown” contingent outcome.  Based on the known knowns and known 
unknowns, a patient must make a decision about chemotherapy treatment.  
The 60% chance of success only correlates with the known knowns and the 
known unknowns—and only as a statistical average for a homogenized 
group of past cancer patients that does not include June.  These statistical 
averages are certainly useful information.122  But they are only one piece of 
 
 122  As Lawrence Schneiderman has observed, “[m]ost of us probably would agree that if 
a treatment has not worked in the last 100 cases, almost certainly it is not going to work if it 
is tried again . . . .  The experience of 100 cases is attainable in many areas of medicine.  This 
proposal is . . . one that seeks reasonable consensus where absolute certainty is impossible 
and therapeutic benefit is the goal.”  Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Defining Medical Futility 
and Improving Quality of Care, 8 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 123, 125 (2011) (adding that “in the 
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salient information with regard to a significantly larger choice situation that 
must include different chemotherapy and non-chemotherapy options and that 
rarely, if ever, acknowledges the inevitable necessary fallibility and 
Knightian uncertainty that is attached to these statistical averages (as well as 
to any other pieces of information relevant to June’s decision-making).123 
Therefore, acknowledging the limited rational intelligibility of 
statistical averages is only a first step in accepting the full extent of true 
uncertainty in making medical decisions.  A particular patient’s decision 
based on a statistical 60% chance of benefit as described above must, by 
definition, entirely ignore the additional category of “unknown 
unknowns”—those contingent future variables impacting patient outcomes 
that are objectively unknowable at the time of decision-making.124  To make 
as rational a decision as possible, physicians and patients must acknowledge 
that unknown unknowns always exist and that they may substantially impact 
the prognosis calculus (but in ex ante unknown and unknowable ways) so 
that they do not, and rationally cannot, know the extent of any unknown 
unknowns or how they might materialize in the particular patient’s future 
course of treatment and treatment outcomes.125  For example, the 60-40 
success ratio might have only a 10% chance of being applicable to the 
particular patient (determinable only after the fact) due to unknown 
unknowns unique to the patient.  In other words, this particular patient, 
because of unknown variables, is 90% likely not to fall into the average 60-
40 benefit-risk calculus that applies to the broader population of superficially 
like patients.  Notwithstanding this non-quantifiable-in-advance Knightian 
uncertainty (of known unknowns and unknown unknowns), patients who 
desire to survive will form expectations126 based on statistical averages, 
 
end we all will have to accept some empirical notion of medical futility or else throw all 
commonsense to the wind”). 
 123  Cf. Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xvii–xviii. 
 124  See, e.g., id. at xxii (“Unrecognized [ignorance] means that we are venturing forth, not 
anticipating that something we have not even conjectured might occur.”).  Cf. KARL R. 
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 280 (1961), cited in Schneiderman, supra note 
122, at 124 n.1 (“The old scientific ideal of episteme—of absolute certain, demonstrable 
knowledge—has proved to be an idol.  The demand for scientific objectivity makes it 
inevitable that every scientific statement must remain tentative forever.  It may indeed be 
corroborated, but every corroboration is relative to other statements which, again, are 
tentative.  Only in our subjective experiences of conviction, in our subjective faith, can we be 
‘absolutely certain.’”). 
 125  Cf. Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xxii (“Ignorance, although it cannot be conquered, 
can be defended against.  An attentive decision theorist cannot see into the future, but should 
always contemplate the possibility of consequential surprise.  A decision maker should always 
be aware of the factor of Ignorance and should try to draw inferences about its nature from 
the lessons taught by history, from experiences recounted by others, from accounts given in 
the media, from possibilities developed in literature, etc.  Decision makers who anticipate 
Ignorance in this fashion are in a situation of Recognized Ignorance.”). 
 126  See Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in  
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although these expectations may be irrational (or more imperfectly rational 
than warranted).  Physicians, when failing to acknowledge to themselves or 
disclose to patients this form of necessary fallibility, become complicit in the 
patients’ demanding and receiving potentially ineffective and harmful care. 
In the specific context of medical decision-making, the concept of 
“clinical uncertainty” is one form of necessary fallibility.  The term clinical 
uncertainty refers to the idea that, despite growing bodies of evidence with 
respect to particular medical conditions,127 their prognoses, and the potential 
efficacy of treatments, there is no way for a clinician to be entirely sure that 
the relevant body of evidence applies to or will predict the outcomes for any 
individual patient.  Patients facing terminal illness frequently want their 
treating physicians to advise them as to the “best” treatment for their illness 
or condition.  The problem is that, for multiple reasons, there is many times 
no obvious, medically “best” approach for any particular patient at any 
particular time.  As two commentators explained: 
The existence of an information mountain provides a myth of 
certainty for the patient, the public and perhaps for health care 
policy-makers.  Certainty is an illusion.  In most professional 
spheres the expert is more critical of the available evidence, than 
is the lay person.  Hopefully, clinicians are taught to be more 
critical than patients but they are faced with a dilemma.  They 
appear to be very well informed yet are acutely aware of the 
fallibility of the information that is expected to guide their 
practice.  How do clinicians respond to this dilemma? Their day 
consists of a succession of points at which decisions have to be 
made on the basis of incomplete and inadequate information and 
in a context in which risk, never mind error, is outlawed.128 
First, patients must understand that what is “best” depends at least to some 
extent on the patient’s own goals, values, and preferences.  While one patient 
may be seeking maximal life extension no matter what the costs in terms of 
adverse effects, increased suffering, or medical dollars, another patient may 
prefer to focus on maintaining physical and intellectual functionality even at 
 
TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 97 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) 
(“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent events and you 
have to neglect . . . the possibility of disappointment . . . because it is a very rare possibility, 
but also because you do not know what else to do.  The alternative is to live in a state of 
permanent uncertainty . . . .”). 
 127  For further discussion of the interrelationship between clinical uncertainty and 
evidence-based medicine, see generally Trisha Greenhalgh, Uncertainty & Clinical Method, 
in CLINICAL UNCERTAINTY IN PRIMARY CARE: THE CHALLENGE OF COLLABORATIVE 
ENGAGEMENT 23 (L.S. Sommers & J. Launer eds., Springer Science+Business Media 2013); 
Stefan Timmermans & Alison Angell, Evidence-Based Medicine, Clinical Uncertainty, and 
Learning to Doctor, 42 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 342–59 (2001). 
 128  A.F. West & R.R. West, Clinical Decision-Making: Coping with Uncertainty, 78 
POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 319, 319 (2002). 
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the cost of a potentially shorter lifespan.  For this latter group of patients, the 
prospect of loss of meaningful ability to interact with the world might drive 
decisions to focus more on palliation of symptoms than on (hypothetical) life 
prolongation.  Second, clinical uncertainty means that the ability of 
physicians and patients to make rational calculations about the comparative 
desirability of various options within the context of the patient’s subjective 
goals is always limited by the imperfections of predictive data on therapeutic 
response, adverse effects, and prognosis.129 
It is, therefore, impossible to determine with any rational certainty a 
“best” or “optimal” treatment before the fact.  Even after the fact, given the 
logical lack of any availability of a same-patient comparator treatment course 
of action and outcome, uncertainty will remain insurmountable—who is to 
say that a different treatment might not have been better or that all other 
available treatments would have been worse?  Patients (and perhaps 
physicians) mistakenly view the “best” or “optimal” treatment 
recommendations and resultant decisions like forks in the road at which one 
can take a “right turn” or a “wrong turn” when they are in fact more like a 
river delta into which multiple rivers flow but all of which end up in the 
sea.130  Choosing the best treatment is very different from a financial 
 
 129  See generally JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK (2007) (discussing clinical 
uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment recommendations); see also George A. Diamond, 
Future Imperfect: The Limitations of Clinical Predictive Models and the Limits of Clinical 
Prediction, 14 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 12A (1989) (describing different ways in which 
statistical regressive models to predict clinical outcomes can go awry).  Prognosis for 
meaningful recovery in many medical circumstances, such as for stroke patients, requires a 
discussion between physician and patient of complex variables such as the likelihood of 
regaining degrees of physical function and this, too, is difficult to predict as a scientific matter 
because there are so many variables.  A meta-analysis of data from multiple studies on the 
recovery of stroke patients who were receiving mechanical ventilation found that prognosis 
was generally poor, with 58% of these patients dying within thirty days, but that a minority 
of patients survived without severe disability.  See Robert G. Holloway et al., Prognosis and 
Decision Making in Severe Stroke, 294 JAMA 725, 725–27, tbl.1 (2005).  The authors of this 
study caution that physicians can be unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic in various 
circumstances and argue that physicians should think carefully about how they convey 
prognostic evidence.  See id. at 729, tbl.3 (offering the example of explaining to a patient a 
surgical intervention as giving a person “a 50% better chance of an improved outcome” versus 
that same intervention increasing the person’s chance “of an improved outcome from 5% to 
7.5%” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Prognosis and optimal treatment is similarly 
difficult to predict in the case of patients with cardiovascular disease.  See Haider J. Warraich 
et al., How Medicine Has Changed the End of Life for Patients with Cardiovascular Disease, 
70 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1276, 1276–77 (2017) (explaining how improvements in treatment 
of patients with heart failure have resulted in longer lives and fewer deaths from sudden 
cardiac death but less predictable end-of-life progressions and more time with disability, 
comorbidity and frailty for these patients). 
 130  For readers who are reminded of the tributaries-and-rivers metaphor in Judge 
Andrews’ dissent in the Palsgraf case, this is no coincidence.  Just as discerning how one 
causal actor among several plays a role in an injury, it is similarly difficult to determine after 
the fact whether one chosen treatment among several was “the best.”  See Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“Should analogy be 
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investment in which one attempts to buy the “best” stock.  With stock 
investing, one can look at past data and make a bet.  If the initial money 
invested creates a return, one can assess retrospectively whether the chosen 
stock gave the best return on investment by comparing how the same amount 
of money would have performed if invested in a different stock.  With 
humans and medical treatment, by contrast, one can never look back and 
assess with any certainty whether a different choice would have been 
“better”—because humans can only make the investment once and with no 
ability to compare alternative outcomes.131  Moreover, as soon as a treatment 
decision has been made and implemented, biases will often continue to kick 
in in order to shore up confidence in the decision.  In this case, June’s belief 
that she is a “fighter” will support her confidence in the decision to proceed 
with chemotherapy despite its toxicity.  At some point—if not at many points 
in the treatment of life-threatening illness—patients have to make a decision 
to begin (or forego) particular treatment, and they naturally crave 
reassurance that they are doing the “best,” or at least, the “right” thing.  These 
decisions are perhaps “informed” to the extent that physicians provide 
information about likelihood of success, but the concept of “informed,” even 
in an optimally informed scenario, is greatly limited by the fallibility factors 
described above. 
         Six months have passed.  Unfortunately, June has not 
responded well to the chemotherapy.  Her various tumors 
continue to grow, and she has experienced very severe side effects 
including nausea, dizziness, and wasting.  She is now extremely 
weak and has lost thirty pounds.  The tumors in her lungs have 
continued to grow, making it more and more difficult to breath.  
She also cannot take in enough nutrition orally to maintain even 
her very diminished body weight.  June has come to the emergency 
 
thought helpful, however, I prefer that of a stream.  The spring, starting on its journey, is 
joined by tributary after tributary.  The river, reaching the ocean, comes from a hundred 
sources.  No man may say whence any drop of water is derived.  Yet for a time distinction 
may be possible.  Into the clear creek, brown swamp water flows from the left.  Later, from 
the right comes water stained by its clay bed.  The three may remain for a space, sharply 
divided.  But at last, inevitably no trace of separation remains.  They are so commingled that 
all distinction is lost.  As we have said, we cannot trace the effect of an act to the end, if end 
there is.”). 
 131  In addition, while modern portfolio theory would hold that a rational investor would 
invest in a diversified portfolio of stock in order to spread risk, see, e.g., HARRY M. 
MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 6 (2d ed. 
1991), a patient cannot invest into a “diversified portfolio of treatment” in order to minimize 
the “risk” of any future “underperforming” treatment.  Similarly, a holder of stock in a 
publicly-held corporation enjoys limited liability—if, in the worst-case scenario, the entire 
investment is lost in the corporation’s bankruptcy, no other personal assets of the stockholder 
would be affected.  The stockholder enjoys limited-to-no-recourse liability.  In contrast, a 
patient’s “investment” in a particular treatment option that fails completely may, in the worst-
case scenario, amount to a death sentence.  Therefore, a patient always bears “full-recourse 
liability” for bad treatment choices. 
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room at the hospital and has been admitted to the critical care 
unit.  Dr. Savoy recommends that June have a feeding tube 
surgically implanted in order to supplement her nutrition and that 
June be intubated so that a ventilator can assist with her 
breathing.  Dr. Savoy suggests that these measures will “buy 
time” so that they can pursue the possibility of enrolling June in 
a clinical trial to test an immunotherapy drug that has been 
approved to treat other cancers but has not been thoroughly tested 
for metastatic ovarian cancer.  Dr. Savoy mentions that she is one 
of the principal investigators in the clinical trial, which June 
understands to mean that Dr. Savoy believes in the potential of the 
studied therapy.  June agrees to the feeding tube and ventilator, 
hoping to live long enough to see both her children graduate from 
high school and university respectively.  She also has heard good 
things about immunotherapy and hopes that it might make her 
tumors disappear or at least shrink significantly so that she can 
live some additional months or years feeling relatively healthy. 
         Unfortunately, further testing confirms that June has certain 
clinical manifestations of her disease that make her ineligible for 
the clinical trial.  She is now in the CCU at the hospital, intubated 
and receiving nutrition through a feeding tube.  Her pain is well-
managed but she is not likely to experience any improvement to 
her condition.  Although June is frightened and sad, she is stable 
for now and enjoys daily visits from her children and friends.  Dr. 
Savoy explains that June can choose to cease the life-sustaining 
interventions at any time.  She assures June that, if she chooses to 
stop these technologies, the palliative care staff will be able to 
manage any symptoms such as pain and shortness of breath.  She 
also asks June whether she would like to sign a do-not-resuscitate 
order (DNR) so that, if she goes into cardiac arrest, she will be 
allowed to die. 
The same effects of clinical uncertainty described with respect to the 
decision about whether June should consent to chemotherapy also applied 
when she consented to artificial nutrition and hydration.  At the time that she 
consented, she had no idea whether she would be admitted to the 
immunotherapy clinical trial and no idea how long she would have to live 
either with the immunotherapy or without it.  These are two examples of the 
known unknowns inherent in the choice situation.  Even if Dr. Savoy had 
more explicitly described her potential conflict of interest as a principal 
investigator of the trial, it is likely that June would still have trusted that Dr. 
Savoy was acting in June’s best medical interests in proposing the trial and 
the life-prolonging interventions that would be necessary for her to survive 
long enough to enroll in the trial.  Now June must decide whether and, if so, 
when she should request that these life-sustaining technologies be withdrawn 
so that she can die peacefully.  In these circumstances, many conscious 
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patients will find it difficult to contemplate foregoing additional days or 
weeks of life but simultaneously fear “losing control” of the situation, i.e., 
lapsing into unconsciousness or losing decisional capacity and being “stuck” 
with a prolonged death due to the effects of the life-sustaining technologies.  
This series of events illustrates how clinical uncertainty can lead to the 
default choice of continuing existing therapy and adding more interventions 
(instead of perhaps scaling back some treatment)—even when this situation 
is not what June would have ultra-rationally chosen if well-informed in 
advance.132 
2. Non-Clinical Uncertainty 
In addition to clinical uncertainty, a separate layer of what we call “non-
clinical uncertainty” adds complexity to the decision-making process, and it 
is useful to distinguish the two concepts in the context of medical decision-
making.  Non-clinical uncertainty can refer to, among other things, the ex 
ante uncertainty that every patient experiences with respect to what level of 
pain, disability, and physical and emotional distress (resulting from both the 
disease itself and the adverse effects of treatment) she can or is willing to 
tolerate.  This tolerance level will, naturally, change with the experience of 
the disease and treatment over time and in the context of changes in the 
patient’s life circumstances.  Unforeseeable and unknowable-in-advance 
changes in personal circumstances might also impact treatment decisions and 
consequent patient tolerance for disability and suffering.  With respect to 
June, for example, she might discover that her sixteen -year-old daughter is 
pregnant, and this discovery might substantially alter her surviving-thriving 
calculus, in terms of her willingness to now tolerate more severe adverse 
effects of treatment in a quest to prolong her survival, take care of her 
daughter and future grandchild, and therefore perhaps enjoy an additional 
period of thriving. 
In addition to this non-clinical uncertainty inherent in June’s own life, 
various aspects of health care delivery outside of the clinical realm also 
influence a patient’s ability to make the “best” health care decisions.  
Imperfectly rational calculation in a Williamsonian world gets more complex 
because it is severely implicated by bounded rationality and accompanying 
strategic external uncertainty—in particular, with regard to global aspects of 
health care delivery and culture that make end-of-life decision-making occur 
under suboptimal conditions.133  These decisions therefore become 
 
 132  Instead, June has ended up in a situation where her choice is between cutting her 
remaining life short (i.e., even less surviving of what is left of surviving) and continuing 
remaining life under the burden of life-sustaining technologies (i.e., even less thriving of what 
is left of thriving). 
 133  See Barry R. Furrow, Smashing into Windows: Limits of Consumer Sovereignty in 
Health Care, in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW 
AND ETHICS  (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Barbara J. Evans & Carmel Shachar 
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significantly more “expensive” in terms of opportunity cost.  A multiplicity 
of factors contribute to the earlier discussed overutilization of aggressive 
therapeutic care for potentially fatal illness and at the end of life.  They 
aggravate the uncertainty (acknowledged or not) in which each and every 
treatment decision is necessarily embedded and create serious obstacles to a 
non-flawed, confident gathering and processing of decision-relevant 
information by both patients and health care providers.  In response, patients 
and their physicians frequently—if not routinely and by default—short-
circuit the previously-described initiation and ratification segments of 
rational decision-making and revert, almost reflexively, to a quantity over 
quality approach. 
Broadly speaking, the U.S. medical system operates within a culture of 
denial of death.  A combination of trends provides evidence of denial.  
Longer average lifespans, together with the promise of new therapies, 
encourages individuals to avoid confronting mortality.  Some researchers 
now promote the possibility of substantial life extension, even of a “cure for 
death,”134 and speak of “[d]eath [a]s a series of preventable diseases”135  
Although commentators have criticized this mindset,136 research into 
lifespan extension continues with little regard for the consequences of the 
distorted message it sends.137  This quest for a fountain of youth denies the 
reality of mortality and also ignores the fact that more years of life do not 
necessarily translate into a better quality of remaining life.  These cultural 
influences have played a significant role in transforming the natural process 
of dying into a technologically-driven and, often, illogically overzealous 
 
eds., Cambridge University Press 2018) (describing limits on patient capacity to make health 
care decisions and behavioral interventions designed to compensate for bounded rationality 
limits); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Discourse, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 720–29 (2011) (describing the negative impact of various cognitive 
processes and deficiencies on medical (and other) decision-making); Wendy Netter Epstein, 
Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1274–85 (2017) (describing the 
negative impact of various biases and heuristics on informed medical decision-making). 
 134  Closing in on the Cure for Death, FIGHT AGING! (Sept. 2, 2003), 
https://www.fightaging.org/archives/2003/09/closing-in-on-the-cure-for-death.php. 
 135  Daniel Callahan, Death and the Research Imperative, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 654, 
654–55 (2000) (quoting William Haseltine, then CEO of Human Genome Sciences). 
 136  See id. at 655 (arguing that research “should not, even implicitly, have eradication of 
death as its goal” because it supplants emphasis on the importance of relieving suffering at 
the end of life and it “promotes the idea among the public and physicians that death represents 
a failure of medicine.”); see also Penni Crabtree, Fountain of Youth with Just a Shot in the 
Arm?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 25, 2004, at Al (explaining that mainstream science has 
debunked anti-aging claims as “hucksterism” that offers little or no benefit but poses 
potentially serious health risks). 
 137  Recent news stories document the efforts of tech billionaires to fund research into 
lifespan extension.  See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Tech Titans’ Latest Project: Defy Death, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/04/04/tech-
titans-latest-project-defy-death/. 
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prolongation of the lives of terminally ill patients—at all costs.138 
Physicians’ professional culture also contributes to the problem.  
Physicians themselves sometimes exhibit a striking reluctance to cease 
curative care for their patients, acknowledge that the patient is dying and turn 
to symptom management, and instead will continue to treat the illness 
aggressively or implement life-prolonging technologies such as artificial 
nutrition or ventilation.  While physicians’ attitudes towards these issues can 
vary according to their specialty,139 some specialists, such as surgeons, tend 
to have more difficulty relinquishing control over post-surgical patients who 
are not faring well.140  One physician tells a story of an oncologist who was 
upset about his patient’s decision to stop chemotherapy and enroll in hospice 
care.  The oncologist confronted the hospice physician and said, “We might 
as well just be walking away, and we might as well just shoot [the patient] 
now.”141  Interestingly, physicians themselves, when fatally ill, frequently 
refuse invasive treatment and life-prolonging technology, including CPR, 
preferring instead to accept the prognosis and spend their remaining time 
feeling as well as possible.142  Although the data is limited, it suggests that 
 
 138  See Noah, supra note 4, at 22–24 (describing and discussing longevity research and 
cultural denials of mortality). 
 139  See Soumitra R. Eachempati et al., The Surgical Intensivist as Mediator of End-of-Life 
Issues in the Care of Critically Ill Patients, 197 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 847, 849–51 (2003). 
 140  See id. at 850 (adding that surgeons may also wish to avoid appearing to lack 
confidence in themselves or may worry that losing a surgical patient will ruin their statistical 
success numbers). 
 141  See Kevin B. O’Reilly, End-of-Life Care: Pain Control Carries Risk of Being Called 
a Killer, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120416/ 
profession/304169955/2/ (relating an anecdote from a physician who directs a hospice 
program). 
 142  See Vyjeyanthi S. Periyakoil et al., Do Unto Others: Doctors’ Personal End-of-Life 
Resuscitation Preferences and Their Attitudes Toward Advance Directives, PLOS ONE (May 
28, 2014), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0098246 
(finding that attitudes towards advance directives varied substantially by physician sub-
specialty, race and ethnicity, and gender and that physicians themselves strongly prefer to 
avoid high-intensity treatments for themselves at the end of life—over 88% of physicians in 
one of the studied groups stated that they would forego resuscitation); Teresa A. Hillier et al., 
Physicians as Patients: Choices Regarding Their Own Resuscitation, 155 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1289, 1289–92 (1995) (finding that, when physicians were asked whether 
they would want cardiopulmonary resuscitation if diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, or 
various other advanced chronic diseases at various ages, most physicians would not want 
CPR, particularly with advancing age); Gregory P. Gramelspacher et al., Preferences of 
Physicians and Their Patients for End-of-Life Care, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 346, 349–50 
(1997) (finding that physicians preferred significantly less care at end of life than patients 
usually receive); cf. Garrett M. Chinn et al., Physicians’ Preferences for Hospice if They Were 
Terminally Ill and the Timing of Hospice Discussions With Their Patients, 174 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 466, E1, E1–E2 (2014) (finding that physicians who preferred hospice for 
themselves were more likely to discuss hospice with terminally ill cancer patients); Ken 
Murray, How Doctors Die: It’s Not Like the Rest of Us, But it Should Be, ZOCALO PUB. 
SQUARE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://zocalopublicsquare.org/thepublicsquare/2011/11/30/how-
doctors-die/read/nexus. 
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some physicians may internally acknowledge impending death to themselves 
while avoiding discussing it with their patients. 
Another cause of overutilization of medical tests and interventions is 
the fear of making a medical error or being accused of hastening death, with 
the accompanying prospect of malpractice litigation.143  Fear of liability, and 
an understandable reluctance to deprive patients of hope, has created a 
culture in which physicians may hesitate to initiate a discussion about 
ceasing therapeutic care or withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
medical technologies unless the patient or family broaches the subject.  
Research suggests that a significant number of physicians in the United 
States has been accused of, investigated for, and occasionally prosecuted for 
murder and euthanasia in circumstances in which physicians discontinued 
life-supportive measures, provided drugs for pain control, or sedated patients 
whose suffering they were unable to alleviate in other ways.144  Even when 
a patient has a DNR order or other advance directive in place, physicians 
may override the directive out of concern for potential liability.145  
Nevertheless, court decisions penalizing physicians and hospitals for non-
compliance with advance directives, along with administrative sanctions, are 
becoming more common.146 
Pinpointing the drivers behind unnecessary care, particularly at the end 
of life, remains difficult, probably because the overall trend results from a 
 
 143  See Alan Meisel et al., Seven Legal Barriers to End-of-Life Care: Myths, Realities, 
and Grains of Truth, 284 JAMA 2495, 2495 (2000) (explaining that physicians overestimate 
the risk of malpractice lawsuits and that poor communication by physicians about end-of-life 
issues increased the risk of litigation); Palfrey, supra note 19, at e(21)(1) (“Most doctors are 
intensely risk-averse.  We don’t tolerate uncertainty.  Not wanting anything bad to happen, 
we reflexively overtest and overtreat in order to protect our patients—and ourselves.”); Phillip 
Wickenden Bale, Honoring Patients’ Wishes for Less Health Care, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 1200 (2011) (describing the repeated hospitalization of a very elderly patient in a long 
term care facility in contravention of surrogate decision-makers’ request to provide only 
comfort care in apparent reaction to a government fine of the facility due to the accidental 
death of another patient). 
 144  See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Prevalence of Formal Accusations of Murder and 
Euthanasia Against Physicians, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 334 (2012) (finding, based on survey 
data, that over half of respondents had been accused of euthanasia or murder by a patient or 
patient’s family member within the previous five years and 4% of those surveyed had been 
formally investigated for hastening a patient’s death); Lewis Cohen et al., Accusations of 
Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1096, 1096–97, 1101 
(2005) (describing examples of such accusations along with occasional prosecutions and 
providing data for rates of prosecution in end-of-life care cases). 
 145  INST. OF MED., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL 
PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 133 (2015), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/ 
Reports/2014/Dying-In-America-Improving-Quality-and-Honoring-Individual-Preferences-
Near-the-End-of-Life.aspx (finding that physicians worried that complying with advance 
directives could lead to malpractice liability). 
 146  See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: New Penalties for Ignoring Advance 
Directives and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 28 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 74, 75–76 (2017). 
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combination of patient and family requests for such care and physicians’ 
unwillingness to be candid about the likely ineffectiveness of the care in 
prolonging life or improving quality of life.  There is, however, clearly a 
causal connection between overtreatment at the end of life and poor 
communication between physicians and patients.  Research suggests that 
physicians avoid or delay disclosing details about patients’ prognoses or 
spontaneously initiating discussions about ending therapeutic care and 
making the transition to hospice.147  With respect to patients with likely 
incurable cancers, research demonstrates that, while two-thirds of physicians 
tell their patients at the initial visit that they have an incurable form of cancer, 
only one-third ever state the prognosis at any point in the treatment 
process.148  Physicians also tend to overestimate the remaining life spans of 
seriously ill patients and to convey prognoses in overly optimistic terms.149  
Moreover, a remarkable number of physicians acknowledge deliberately 
deceiving patients when discussing prognoses.  In a recent survey of 
physicians, one in ten physicians admitted to lying to a patient within the 
previous year, and over half acknowledged that they had been unreasonably 
optimistic about a patient’s prognosis.150  Physicians also report that even 
 
 147  See, e.g., Nancy L. Keating et al., Physician Factors Associated with Discussions 
About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER 998 (2010) (concluding that most physicians surveyed 
indicated that they would not discuss end-of-life decisions and choices with terminally ill 
patients until they exhibited symptoms or there were no remaining treatments available); 
Bethel Ann Powers et al., Meaning and Practice of Palliative Care for Hospitalized Older 
Adults with Life Limiting Illnesses, 2011 J. AGING RES. (2011) (discussing the distinctions 
between and intersection of palliative care and end-of-life care and recommending better 
training of health care providers to understand that “end-of-life” is not a “well-demarcated 
period of time before death”). 
 148  See Belinda E. Kiely et al., Thinking and Talking About Life Expectancy in Incurable 
Cancer, 38 SEMINARS ONCOLOGY 380, 380–81 (2011). 
 149  See Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and Determinants of Error 
in Doctors’ Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients: Prospective Cohort Study, 320 BRIT. MED. 
J. 469, 470–71 (2000) (finding that, in predicting patients’ remaining life expectancies, 
physicians were correct only 20% of the time and were over-optimistic 63% of the time and 
concluding that a closer doctor-patient relationship was associated with over-optimistic 
predictions); Elizabeth B. Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Prognostic Disclosure to 
Patients with Cancer Near the End of Life, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1096 (2001) (finding 
that, in communicating expected survival times to patients with terminal cancer, physicians 
were frank with patients only 37% of the time, provided deliberately inaccurate survival 
estimates 40.3% of the time and preferred to offer no estimate for 22.7% of the patients 
studied).  The authors concluded that “for all of these patients, physicians were able and 
willing to formulate objective prognoses, whether accurate or not, but had difficulty 
communicating them, even to insistent patients”; cf. Elisa J. Gordon & Christopher K. 
Daugherty, ‘Hitting You Over the Head: Oncologists’ Disclosure of Prognosis to Advanced 
Cancer Patients, 17 BIOETHICS 142, 142–68 (2003) (describing the results of a small focus 
group discussion with physicians in which many expressed reluctance to convey statistical 
details about prognosis because they felt that the information would seem too abrupt and 
would interfere with patients’ hope). 
 150  See Lisa I. Iezzoni et al., Survey Shows That at Least Some Physicians Are Not Always 
Open or Honest with Patients, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 383, 383–88 (2012); Sandeep Jauhar, The 
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when cancer patients specifically request prognostic estimates, they would 
either withhold their opinion or intentionally provide an inaccurate figure in 
almost two-thirds of cases.151  The logical result is flawed decision-making 
by patients, creating an uncontrolled-for risk that patients will pursue 
aggressive and debilitating treatments in the misguided hope of prolonging 
life and without fully understanding (i) their respective choice situations and 
(ii) the potentially negative welfare implications of their choices. 
All of these already suboptimal decisional contexts are exacerbated by 
the fact that the system of reimbursement for health care in the federal 
Medicare program often distorts the type and quantity of care offered, by 
incentivizing physicians to provide more treatments and tests than necessary.  
Although Medicare now reimburses physicians for having advance care 
planning discussions with patients,152 this provision may do little to 
encourage the iterative conversations over the course of treatment for a 
serious illness that allow physicians to convey to patients changes in the 
calculus regarding continuing treatment.  Moreover, the Medicare program 
still reimburses physicians and hospitals in some situations on a fee-for-
service basis.  Simply put, this means that the more treatments, tests, and 
procedures the patient receives, the more reimbursement the physician and/
or hospital will receive.153  Many commentators have recognized the general 
 
Lies That Doctors and Patients Tell, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:21 AM), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/the-lies-that-doctors-and-patients-tell/?_r=0 
(explaining, with reference to his over-treatment of a very elderly and dying patient, that “[a]t 
their core, my actions were a kind of deception—convincing myself, despite all the evidence, 
that I could save her, stay the inexorable course of her disease.  Perhaps I was afraid of failure, 
or embarrassed by my impotence.  Those last few days of her life she almost ceased to be a 
person for me.  She became an experiment, a puzzle—one that I desperately wanted to solve”); 
cf. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993) (involving a claim by a deceased patient’s 
family that the physicians’ failure to disclose specific information about survival rates and 
times with pancreatic cancer impaired the patient’s ability to get his financial and business 
affairs in order).  Of course, if the patient’s preference is to avoid receiving explicit 
information about prognosis, this is a different matter. 
 151  See Lamont & Christakis, supra note 149, at 1096–98 (concluding that physicians 
would provide an honest estimate only 37% of the time and would provide no estimate, or a 
deliberate overestimate or underestimate 63% of the time). 
 152  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ADVANCE CARE PLANNING 2 (2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-
MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/AdvanceCarePlanning.pdf (explaining that “[e]ffective 
January 1, 2016, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) pays for voluntary 
Advance Care Planning (ACP) under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) and the 
Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS).”).  It remains to be seen whether 
this small change will have any measurable impact on the pattern of heavy utilization of 
therapeutic and life-prolonging care in patients with serious illness. 
 153  See, e.g., Stephen F. Jencks et al., Rehospitalizations Among Patients in the Medicare 
Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1418, 1419 (2009) (discussing the Medicare 
fee-for-service reimbursement system in the context of rates of rehospitalization for Medicare 
beneficiaries); Robert Steinbrook, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals for 
Payment Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED 1036, 1036 (2009) (discussing the 
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problem of overutilization of health care resources and have recommended 
the implementation of various programs designed to target this problem.154 
Physicians also must recognize that patients frequently fail to 
understand the likely efficacy of certain invasive treatments, either because 
this information is not included in the discussion or because it is impossible 
to predict with any accuracy the curative or palliative effects of the treatment 
on any particular patient.  Patients accept treatment with the hope of a cure, 
but sometimes fail to understand that a proffered treatment may, at best, 
prolong life.  With respect to chemotherapy for metastatic cancer, one study 
found that 69% of patients with lung cancer and 81% of patients with 
colorectal cancer mistakenly believed that the chemotherapy they were 
receiving was likely to cure their disease.155  The problem with this 
unrealistic or inaccurate expectation of cure is that patients will be more 
likely to consent to treatment that, while it may possibly palliate symptoms 
or even extend life, is also likely to cause significant toxic effects that will 
impair quality of life.  Patients who are fully apprised and, thus, at least in 
theory have the informational tools to understand that chemotherapy under 
these circumstances cannot cure their illness and will at best have a palliative 
effect on it may weigh the value of this treatment differently and may be 
more likely to decline it.  Another study suggests that some physicians (and 
thus, their patients) misperceive certain types of care as palliative when the 
evidence suggests that they are not providing any benefit and may cause 
iatrogenic harm to dying patients.  In this regard, this study indicates that 
many cancer patients are offered chemotherapy for palliative purposes when 
they are in the end stages of their disease, even though the evidence suggests 
that chemotherapy worsens quality of life near death for many patients.156 
 
incentives for overutilization of medical services created by a fee-for-service payment 
system).  There is some promising news on this front.  The U.S. recently passed a bill that 
will attempt to remedy the worst effects of fee-for-service medicine in the Medicare Program.  
The revamped reimbursement system will pay physicians based on the quality of the care they 
deliver rather than the quantity of care.  See Carol W. Cassella, Keep Patients Healthy, and 
Doctors Sane, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/ 
keep-patients-healthy-and-doctors-sane.html?_r=0; see also Siobhan Hughes, House Passes 
Medicare ‘Doc Fix’ Bill, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015, 7:03 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-passes-medicare-doc-fix-bill-1427386278. 
 154  See, e.g., Christine K. Cassel & James A. Guest, Choosing Wisely: Helping Physicians 
and Patients Make Smart Decisions About Their Care, 307 JAMA 1801, 1801–02 (2012) 
(describing various programs such as Choosing Wisely, Less is More, and the Good 
Stewardship Working Group that aim to educate physicians about commonly overutilized 
tests and procedures). 
 155  See Jane C. Weeks et al., Patients’ Expectations About Effects of Chemotherapy for 
Advanced Cancer, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 1620 (2012) (noting that, “[p]aradoxically, 
patients who reported higher scores for physician communication were also at higher risk for 
inaccurate expectations” regarding the curative potential of chemotherapy). 
 156  See Prigerson et al., supra note 10, at 778–84 (evaluating the effect of chemotherapy on 
patients with end-stage cancer and varying functional statuses and concluding that chemotherapy 
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All of these non-clinical, contextual problems surrounding the delivery 
of health care increase the uncertainty inherent in June’s decision-making, 
even if she is unaware of them.  Table 1 provides a systematic summary of 
the known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns, which an 
ultra-rational June would have to competently calculate for purposes of 
making a treatment decision with the highest attainable utility and the 
smallest remaining amount of clinical and non-clinical uncertainty: 
 
Table 1 
June’s World of Uncertainty 
 
Clinical 
Uncertainty 
Known 
Knowns 
 Chemotherapy kills cancer cells 
 Chemotherapy causes toxic adverse effects 
 Surgery and anesthesia have inherent risks for all patients 
Known 
Unknowns 
 June’s diagnosis and treatment prognosis may be incorrect 
 June may not respond to the proposed chemotherapy 
 June may have more or fewer complications and adverse 
effects than average 
Unknown 
Unknowns 
 June may be so atypical in her physiologic makeup that the 
statistics about potential response to chemotherapy simply 
do not apply to her 
 June may, for example, have an allergic reaction to the 
chemotherapy drug that has never been encountered before 
 June may be “lucky” in that a “miracle” cure for Stage IV 
ovarian cancer is discovered in time 
Non-Clinical 
Uncertainty 
Known 
Knowns 
 June is a 46-year-old woman with two children 
 June is mortal and will die eventually (although perhaps not 
from ovarian cancer) 
 June’s insurance coverage contains limitations that will 
cause her to accrue uncovered medical costs which she will 
find difficult to afford 
 
did not improve quality of life near death for patients with moderate and poor performance status 
and actually worsened quality of life near death for patients with good performance status). 
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Known 
Unknowns 
 June’s physician may be unduly optimistic about treatment 
efficacy 
 June herself may be unduly optimistic about her tolerance 
of treatment complications and adverse effects 
 June’s physician may have a financial conflict of interest in 
recommending the immunotherapy clinical trial 
Unknown 
Unknowns 
 June may die of something entirely unforeseeable and 
unrelated during treatment (e.g., being hit by a bus) 
 June may (temporarily) lose decisional capacity in a manner 
not related to her treatment 
 June may become unable to comply with her treatment 
regime because she is grieving the sudden loss of a loved 
one, loses her ability to drive herself to her treatment 
appointments, or is simply “giving up on herself” 
 
3. Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Updating 
The field of behavioral economics has critiqued the idealistic, utopian 
oversimplification of the Williamsonian-world rational choice model and 
has demonstrated how rational errors and cognitive flaws further affect and 
constrain—even within the bounds of bounded rationality and 
opportunism—rationally optimal human decision-making with principled 
and predictable regularity.  Unlike bounded rationality and opportunism, 
these errors and flaws (heuristics and biases)157 are alterable constraints to 
ultra-rational decision-making and therefore, in principle, can be remedied 
through more skilled, careful, and conscientious decision-making processes.  
In real life, however, decisional agents are, for good reason, path-
dependent158 and derive, from the vast, homogenized totality of all decisions 
 
 157  See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction—Heuristics and Biases: Then 
and Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 1 (Thomas 
Gilovich et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2002); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 
119.  As used throughout this Article, the terminology of “heuristics and biases” is meant to 
include not only insights developed in behavioral economics as to alterable cognitive 
shortcuts and constraints to ultra-rational decision-making, but to also comprise other 
decisional constraints beyond bounded rationality and opportunism as pervasively discussed 
in non-traditional decision research, for example, the role of affect, emotion, motivation, and 
risk perception on decisional behavior and the function of naturalistic expert decision-making 
in dynamic, evolving choice environments.  See generally Vimla L. Patel et al., Emerging 
Paradigms of Cognition in Medical Decision-Making, 35 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 52 
(2002). 
 158  “Path-dependency” is understood here in a non-pejorative, purely descriptive manner.  
The same is true for “rational errors” and “cognitive flaws.”  Cf. Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra 
note 79, at 367 (“Heuristics per se are neither good nor bad.”); Odette Wegwarth, Smart 
Strategies for Doctors and Doctors-in-Training: Heuristics in Medicine, 43 MED. EDUC. 721, 
727 (2009) (“Today’s medical students should learn and understand that heuristics are neither 
good nor bad per se, but that their reliability and usefulness interplays with environmental 
circumstances, such as the inherent uncertainty of a specific situation.”).  There is an entire 
spectrum of automatized and semi-automatized human behavior that has genetically evolved 
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made during their respective prior lifespans, some relatively accurate 
predictive utility—and, with it the meta-utility of an efficient orientation 
towards the future—by sticking to their learned “fast-and-frugal”159 
aversions, biases and similar heuristic decisional devices.  In short, as homo 
mortalis, June is “homo heuristicus.”160 
Accordingly, in addition to necessary fallibility, patients and physicians 
also turn out to be bad Bayesians.161  Their ability to investigate, evaluate 
courses of action, and properly calculate for purposes of informed, ultra-
rational decision-making about complex medical care is limited by heuristic 
flaws in collecting and processing information.162  In other words, these 
regularly employed biases and heuristic shortcuts further interfere with 
 
over time as well as been honed through adaptive behavior in each human lifetime which, on 
aggregate, will serve human decision-making under conditions of scarcity and Knightian 
uncertainty in the vast majority of cases much better than prolonged information gathering, 
rational deliberation, evaluation and ranking of behavioral proposals and, finally, selection 
and ratification of a highest-utility behavioral mode.  In this regard, reflexes (as, for example, 
the flight reflex) constitute automatized, involuntary human behavior that overrides rational 
decision-making and increases the survival rate of the human in question (in case of a real 
threat to survival) almost every time.  Similarly, instincts qualify as semi-automatic behavior 
(as, for example, the instinct of being in danger triggered by a sudden release of adrenalin into 
the bloodstream which may lead to controlled, somewhat voluntary, thus, non-reflexive flight 
behavior) but a carefully self-aware rational decision-maker can, as part of information-
gathering and -processing, realize that the instinct has been triggered “accidentally” (i.e., 
objectively, there is no lurking danger to the decision-maker), to the effect that the rational 
decisional behavior will override the instinctive behavioral mode.  Still, instincts short-cut 
aspects of cognitive decision-making because they alert a rational decision-maker of an 
existing (and often pressing) choice situation before the rational decision-maker will have had 
enough time and will have mustered enough attention to fully and rationally apprehend the 
choice situation through rationally diligent and competent information-gathering 
and -processing.  Accordingly, there may be many situations where reflexes and instincts (or, 
for that matter, aversions, biases, and similar heuristic “decisional shortcuts” described in 
behavioral economics) make human decision-makers choose less efficient options among 
those available in a given choice situation.  When, however, fully aggregated over the 
statistical length of a human lifespan, they are highly efficient means of adaptive behavior in 
order to secure the baselines of human existence (i.e., continued survival, physical and 
emotional wellbeing, flourishing).  Cf. Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 368 
(“Heuristics are adaptive tools that ignore information to make fast and frugal decisions that 
are accurate and robust under conditions of uncertainty.  A heuristic is considered ecologically 
rational when it functionally matches the structure of environment.”).  See also Butkus, supra 
note 65, at 80 (“Automaticity is a significant element of cognition—a variety of processes 
simply occur without volitional cueing.”). 
 159  Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 364. 
 160  See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds 
Make Better Inferences, 1 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 107 (2009). 
 161  See infra notes 168–176 and accompanying text; cf. Zechhauser, supra note 97, at xviii 
(“Unfortunately, the way most [economists and decision theorists] would counsel people to 
make choices is not the way most individuals do make choices.”).  Throughout this Article, 
we also use the term “bad Bayesian” only in a descriptive rather than a normative manner. 
 162  Cf. Ubel, supra note 29, at 8 (“When people receive information about cancer risks, 
they do not simply encode the numbers into a mathematical algorithm.”). 
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boundedly-rational informed decision-making—rendering choices 
imperfectly irrational.163  As mentioned earlier,164 optimism bias constitutes 
one example of this class of alterable rational constraints within the context 
of decisions about treatment and life-prolonging technologies for those with 
life-threatening illness.  Patients tend to think they will be among the 
fortunate 1% who greatly outlive the statistical prognosis for their disease or 
who respond unusually well to an otherwise non-curative therapy.165  
Understanding statistical predictions of survival time is challenging, even for 
physicians.166  Similarly, physicians have difficulty discussing uncertainty 
with patients.167  In June’s situation, it is almost inevitable that her optimistic 
outlook before commencing chemotherapy—considering herself a “fighter,” 
believing that her cancer will respond well to chemotherapy, and that 
because of her prior good health, the side effects will be manageable—will 
make her not only count herself, ex ante, among the 60% chance-of-success 
cohort but will also cause her to unconsciously discount to zero the 
likelihood of any “mixed” relative outcomes (i.e., partial success/partial 
failure, or less success/more failure), which are statistically left entirely 
unaccounted for within this absolute, dyadic 60-40 success-failure 
classification. 
Bayesian updating, as a concept, originated in probability theory, which 
itself is “the fundamental mathematical tool to quantify uncertainty.”168  
Thus, as a statistical device, Bayes’ Theorem169 lies at the heart of a rational 
human belief updating process where beliefs (about what is “certain” in the 
world around us and within us) are continually confirmed or revised based 
 
 163  See supra Figure 1.  Cf. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: 
A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 450 (1972) (“In his evaluation 
of evidence, man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all.”). 
 164  See supra note 120. 
 165  See Lynn A. Jansen et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Early-Phase Oncology Trials, 33 
IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RES. 1 (2011) (finding that, although participants in an early phase 
trial understood that the treatment would not cure their cancer, a majority of those surveyed 
nevertheless exhibited an optimism bias in believing that the experimental drug would control 
their disease and that they would experience only benefits from the drug and no side effects). 
 166  See Philip Sedgwick & Katherine Joekes, Survival (Time to Event) Data: Median 
Survival Times, 343 BRIT. MED. J. d4890 (2011) (providing data on median survival times for 
patients with advanced colon cancer and posing a multiple-choice question about accurate 
characterization of the median survival time data, and concluding that “[i]t may be hard to 
find the balance between explaining statistical information accurately and using words or 
concepts that are unambiguous to the patient”).  For a rare example of a patient with an 
excellent understanding of his own statistical prognosis, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Median 
Isn’t the Message, CANCERGUIDE https://www.cancerguide.org/median_not_msg.html (last 
visited July 28, 2018). 
 167  See James A. Tulsky et al., Opening the Black Box: How Do Physicians Communicate 
about Advance Directives?, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 441, 446 (1998). 
 168  LAURENT CONDAMIN ET AL., RISK QUANTIFICATION—MANAGEMENT, DIAGNOSIS AND 
HEDGING 43 (Wiley 2006). 
 169  Or Bayes’ Law as it is sometimes also called. 
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on new pieces of information received.  Often, a proper calculation of 
Bayesian probability will lead to counterintuitive statistical outcomes—i.e., 
ones that do not match or, at least, substantially confirm prior beliefs.  Hence, 
ultra-rational, good-Bayesian decision-makers would revise their prior 
beliefs into more (statistically) accurate posterior beliefs.170  Unfortunately, 
however, humans often fail to apply Bayes’ Theorem correctly so that proper 
Bayesian updating to account for new evidence rarely happens in a consistent 
manner.171  But notwithstanding the fact that humans are regularly bad at 
Bayesian updating, i.e., they are bad Bayesians, a minimally-rational version 
of updating of beliefs in the face of new information constantly and 
ineluctably happens.  Here, humans engage in non-Bayesian (or biased) 
updating because it still provides probabilistic utility: as bad Bayesians, they 
“do not rely on precise calculations . . . [but] on the direction in which beliefs 
are updated [so that as] long as bad news shifts beliefs about ability 
downward and good news shifts them up, . . . the spirit of [their non-
Bayesian calculative] models is preserved.”172  In other words, non-Bayesian 
updating persists in human decision-making because, on a meta-probability 
level, it autopoietically confirms and thus validates its own utility as a 
prediction (and psychological sense-making) tool.  When fully aggregated 
and correlated with recognized outcomes over the course of their respective 
entire cognitive lives, all new decision-making by humans updates their prior 
beliefs about the validity and utility of their non-Bayesian updating—i.e., 
how they think about probability and make probability judgments even 
though such “thinking” may not be a conscious process.173  This updating, 
however, occurs in only one direction, namely, to formulate their posterior 
beliefs in only a non-revisionist manner so that the world around them 
 
 170  See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Assessing Managerial 
Ability: Implications for Corporate Governance, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 93, 153 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017) 
(“A maintained assumption of most learning models is that individual incorporate new 
information rationally; that is, they update their beliefs according to Bayes Law.”). 
 171  Id. (stating that humans “often hold beliefs or take actions that are inconsistent with 
their having properly employed Bayes Law to account for new evidence”); see also Simon, 
supra note 38, at 9 (commenting on behavioral-economics research by Ward Edwards, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky on anchoring and adjustment heuristics and availability biases 
as follows: “They describe experimental situations in which estimates formed [by human 
decision-makers] on the basis of initial information are not revised nearly as much by 
subsequent information as would be required by Bayes’ Theorem”). 
 172  Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 170, at 154 (emphasis added); cf. Kevin D. McCaul 
et al., Linking Decision-Making Research and Cancer Prevention and Control: Important 
Themes, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S106, S107 (Supp. 2005) (stating that the “direction of 
[predictive] mistakes is also biased; in particular, people underestimate their likely happiness 
when confronted with negative life conditions”). 
 173  Cf. Butkus, supra note 65, at 83 (“The cognitive processes of which we are aware are 
surface phenomena, and merely a subset of all the phenomena occurring when we consider 
choices and options.”). 
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remains moderately coherent, explainable, and predictable.  Given this 
unidirectional, autopoietic tendency of non-Bayesian updating, humans also 
often tend to over-react to current, new information.174  Any new 
information, by definition, has the potential to challenge (rather than 
confirm) the validity and value of prior beliefs—including the meta-belief 
that non-Bayesian updating provides predictive benefit.  It may, therefore, 
trigger an unavoidable revision and updating of prior beliefs to such an extent 
that humans could (temporarily) no longer be able to form coherent posterior 
beliefs.175  In this scenario, a severely reduced predictability of future events 
would ensue and immediately lead to an existential level of disorientation.176  
Accordingly, humans operate with a constant, heightened vigilance with 
regard to new information that disturbs prior-belief equilibria—irrespective 
of whether the news is good or bad. 
To give a factually simplified and hypothetical example of Bayesian 
and non-Bayesian updating in this regard, Bayes’ Theorem allows one to 
answer a question like this: What is the probability that June is among the 
60% chance-of-success cohort (rather than the 40% chance-of-no-success 
cohort) given that she has had one of her ovarian tumors biopsied, and that 
the biopsy result is positive for the types of ovarian cancer that occur 
predominantly in the 60% responder cohort, so that she also will likely 
respond to the proposed chemotherapy (assuming that such a predictive-
response test were to exist)?  As a mathematical formula, Bayes’ Theorem 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑃ሺ𝑅 ∣ 𝑆ሻ ൌ 𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ 𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ𝑅ሻ𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ 𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ𝑅ሻ ൅ 𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ~𝑅ሻ 
 
         In June’s example, P stands for probability, R for the result of being 
among the 60% cohort, S for testing positive, and ~R for the mutually 
exclusive, other result of being among the 40% cohort (i.e., not being among 
the 60% cohort), while the vertical line symbol (∣) is simply read as “given 
 
 174  Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 170, at 154 (stating that “people are likely reacting 
to current signals more than rational Bayesian updating would imply”). 
 175  In other words, new information could shock and disrupt the entire learning and system 
of prediction. 
 176  Cf. 2 G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO 
PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION 562 
(1904) (“She works by intuition and feeling; fear, anger, pity, love, and most of the emotions 
have a wider range and greater intensity.  If she abandons her natural naïveté and takes up the 
burden of guiding and accounting for her life by consciousness, she is likely to lose more than 
she gains, according to the old saw that she who deliberates is lost.”); see also Luhmann, 
supra note 126, at 97 (“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to 
contingent events and you have to neglect . . . the possibility of disappointment . . . because it 
is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what else to do.  The alternative 
is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty.”). 
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that.”  Hence, in answering the above question, the formula now reads out as 
“the probability of being among the 60% cohort given that June tested 
positive equals the probability of testing positive given that the patient is 
among the 60% cohort times the probability of being among the 60% cohort, 
divided by that very same quantity plus the probability of testing positive 
given that the patient is not among the 60% cohort (i.e., that she rather is 
among the 40% cohort) times the probability that she is not among the 60% 
cohort (i.e., that she is rather among the 40% cohort).”  Bayesian updating 
is, thus, premised on two “mutually exclusive and exhaustive”177 sets of 
patients to whom the new information (i.e., the positive test result) applies: 
those who, indeed, turn out to be among the 60% cohort (after going through 
treatment) and those who turn out to be false positives, thus, who are not 
among the 60% cohort of treatment success (but, given the positive test, ex 
ante look as if they would be).178 
         In June’s example, we know that out of every 100 women with her type 
of Stage IV ovarian cancer, sixty react “successfully”179 to chemotherapy.  
Let’s further assume that, based on biopsy samples of patients’ tumors, a 
predictive response test were available that would be 80% accurate among 
the 60% cohort.  In other words, eight out of every ten (or forty-eight out of 
sixty) patients would accurately test positive as likely chemo responders 
prior to chemotherapy treatment.  The test, however, is problematic in that it 
(for some yet unknown reason) is less accurate among the 40% cohort of 
patients who do not react successfully to chemotherapy treatment.  Let’s 
assume here that, out of those forty patients, 55% (or twenty-two patients) 
also test positive (i.e., falsely as being among the 60% cohort).  Finally, let’s 
assume that June’s biopsy sample has tested positive.  Accordingly, what is 
the probability that June will respond successfully to her future 
chemotherapy treatment?  If you ask June, her intuitive non-Bayesian 
probability judgment will likely tell her that 80% of correct results as being 
among the 60% cohort “sounds really promising” and, assuming she literally 
calculates in this regard, that her original 1.5-to-1 odds (sixty over forty) of 
treatment success (her prior belief) have now significantly improved to 4 to 
1 (eighty over twenty) in favor of chemotherapy success (her posterior 
belief).  It is, indeed, correct that June has a bit of reason for statistically-
 
 177  Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without 
Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 685 (1995). 
 178  See generally David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: 
Problems and Opportunities, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
249, 253–54 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University 
Press 1982); Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note 177, at 685–86; Patel et al., supra note 157, 
at 56. 
 179  Again, “success” in this context is simply defined as killing a significant number of 
cancer cells and, thus, theoretically contributing significantly to the prolongation of the 
patient’s life.  It does not take into account the potential magnitude of adverse effects and 
their consequent impact on the patient’s quality of life. 
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driven optimism.  Nevertheless, only about half the amount of improved 
odds which June may have intuitively calculated in her non-Bayesian way 
have actually occurred as a result of her positive test.  By ignoring false 
positives among the 40% cohort, June is almost 100% more optimistic in her 
probability judgment and in updating her belief of treatment odds than, 
mathematically, she has reason for.  Here is Bayes’ Theorem applied to the 
above facts: 
𝑃ሺ 𝑅 ∣ 𝑆 ሻ ൌ 𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ 𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ𝑅ሻ𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ 𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ𝑅ሻ ൅ 𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ~𝑅ሻ ൌ
ቀ4860ቁ ቀ
60
100ቁ
ቀ4860ቁ ቀ
60
100ቁ ൅ ቀ
22
40ቁ ቀ
40
100ቁ
ൌ ሺ. 8ሻሺ. 6ሻሺ. 8ሻሺ. 6ሻ ൅ ሺ. 55ሻሺ. 4ሻ ൌ
. 48
. 7 ൎ 68.6% 
 
The probability of being among the 60% cohort given that June tested 
positive rounds out to 68.6%.180  Hence, the positive test result has, indeed, 
improved June’s originally known (statistical) odds that she will turn out to 
be among the 60% cohort after her chemotherapy treatment.  Nonetheless, 
what she believed to be her prior odds (1.5 to 1) only improved statistically 
to approximately 2.18 to 1 (.48/.7 over .22/.7), not even close to the over-
optimistic, false-positives-ignoring odds of 4 to 1.  Rather, when confronted 
with the new evidence and current signal of an 80% accurate positive test, 
June may prefer, in a typical bad-Bayesian manner, to rely on the more 
optimistic direction in which her treatment-success beliefs are updating 
(80% accurate of 60% success, i.e., being among the forty-eight out of sixty 
women with true-positive tests) instead of also properly accounting for the 
less optimistic direction (55% inaccurate of 40% non-success, i.e., being 
among the twenty-two out of forty women with false-positive tests).  Indeed, 
for purposes of psychological comfort (i.e., sustained bad-Bayesian meta-
utility), she may additionally engage in confirmation-bias behavior181 and 
 
 180  In order to proof this number, Bayes’ Theorem can also be run in the opposite direction 
by answering the question: What is the probability that June will, unfortunately, not respond 
successfully to her future chemotherapy treatment (i.e., be among the 40% cohort), 
notwithstanding the fact that she has tested positive for the 60% cohort?  Accordingly: 
𝑃ሺ ~𝑅 ∣ 𝑆 ሻ ൌ 𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ~𝑅ሻ𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ~𝑅ሻ ൅ 𝑃ሺ 𝑆 ∣ 𝑅 ሻ𝑃ሺ𝑅ሻ ൌ
ቀ2240ቁ ቀ
40
100ቁ
ቀ2240ቁ ቀ
40
100ቁ ൅ ቀ
48
60ቁ ቀ
60
100ቁ
ൌ ሺ. 55ሻሺ. 4ሻሺ. 55ሻሺ. 4ሻ ൅ ሺ. 8ሻሺ. 6ሻ ൌ
. 22
. 7 ൎ 31.4% 
Thus, June’s probability of being among the 40% cohort notwithstanding that June tested 
positive for the 60% cohort rounds out to 31.4%.  In other words, if June were among 100 
similarly situated women who all tested positive, statistically, close to a third of those 100 
women would still not react “successfully” to chemotherapy. 
181 See supra note 121. 
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“round up” her positive test that comes with an 80% accuracy182 to near 
certainty (i.e., 100% predictive test accuracy)183 of future successful 
chemotherapy treatment, thus, crowding out all other possible (and, ultra-
rationally and wholistically, perhaps more beneficial) treatment options.  As 
a result and by means of this calculative example only, June (and, to an 
empirically proven extent, also her attending oncologist)184 can be expected 
to short-circuit her informed-consent decision in a bad-Bayesian manner 
because, in full alignment with her preferences, non-Bayesian updating 
allows her to (more) confidently believe that the immediate commencement 
of chemotherapy treatment, as urged by Dr. Savoy, is now a no-brainer and 
almost surefire solution given her positive predictive test result.185 
III.  INFORMED CONSENT AND RATIONAL PATIENT APATHY 
         Up to this point in the Article, we have mapped out how uncertainty 
implicates complex medical and end-of-life decision-making.  We now turn 
in this part to how the aspirational world of law, specifically the law of 
informed consent, and the real world of actual patient and physician 
 
182 But only among the 60% responder cohort. 
183 For example, June may also “add” the twelve patients with false-negative test results to 
her optimistic “calculus” by telling herself that there are even more women who will respond 
“successfully” to chemotherapy treatment in the 60% cohort than the test accurately predicts, 
namely, the women with false-negative test results.  Statistically, however, there is not a single 
additional woman in June’s predictive-test cohort, namely, a woman with a correct true-
positive test result, that could also be among the twelve patients with an incorrect false-
negative test result within the 60% cohort.  In other words, June may intuitively add the twelve 
false-negatives to the original total of sixty women who react “successfully” to chemotherapy, 
now arriving at seventy-two women overall, rather than correctly adding the twelve false 
negatives only to the forty-eight true positives within the 60% cohort.  In other words, June 
will not understand that the forty-eight correct true-positive test results and the twelve 
incorrect false-negative ones are mutually exclusive. 
184 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Adrian Edwards, Simple Tools for Understanding Risks: 
From Innumeracy to Insight, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 741, 741 (2003) (“If patients knew about th[e] 
degree of variability and statistical innumeracy [of their attending doctors] they would be 
justly alarmed.”); Patel et al., supra note 157, at 56 (“Clinicians often overestimate the impact 
of a positive test, failing to appreciate the importance of the base rate (prevalence) of the 
disease they are considering.”); see also Eddy, supra note 178, at 253–59; Mirjam Annina 
Jenny, Niklas Keller & Gerd Gigerenzer, Assessing Minimal Medical Statistical Literacy 
Using the Quick Risk Test: A Prospective Observational Study in Germany, 8 BRIT. MED. J. 
OPEN (2018), https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/8/8/e020847.full.pdf. 
185 As a reminder, all of June’s (and, likely, Dr. Savoy’s) non-Bayesian updating also takes 
place in the larger context of Knightian uncertainty that is fully, irrationally discounted.  An 
ultra-rational, good-Bayesian decision-maker would be aware and would take into account 
that, when non-discounting, Knightian uncertainty could mean that there is some unknown 
unknown characteristic, unique to June, which renders her predictive response test results 
entirely false.  Since the probability of this unknown unknown characteristic (or of any other 
Knightian uncertain clinical condition) remains immeasurable under all circumstances and 
therefore cannot be specified and inserted into a Bayesian formula, an even larger calculative 
dilemma would ensue.  See infra text accompanying notes 207–210. 
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decision-making, specifically the phenomenon of rational apathy, react to 
uncertainty.  It is well- covered ground that informed consent law on the 
books compared to informed consent as it is actually practiced are very 
different—that the real life implementation of informed consent law is 
largely inefficient, disjunctive with reality, and even potentially harmful.  As 
we will explain, the largest, common-denominator driver behind these 
suboptimal outcomes in real-world complex medical decision-making is 
rational patient (and, relatedly, rational physician) apathy.  Decisional apathy 
as the default,186 “satisficing”187 herd-behavior of patients and health care 
professionals alike, relegates informed consent law to an ineffectual doctrine 
that deceptively signals an illusion of autonomy where there is little to none. 
A. Informed Consent as Utopian Ideal 
         In the United States, according to both legal and ethical principles, 
medical care should accord with the individual patient’s values and 
preferences.  Patient autonomy, as implemented in law via the doctrines of 
informed consent and substituted judgment, is the primary principle that 
governs medical decisions, including those made on behalf of patients who 
have lost decisional capacity.188  In ideal circumstances, patients can express 
their preferences directly to their physicians at the appropriate time.  When 
a patient retains decisional capacity, the patient’s choice may be irrational, 
unreasonable, or unwise, but the principle of autonomy, with limited 
exceptions, protects these choices. 
         Ideally, the law of informed consent would always ensure that patients’ 
decisions reflect their known individual preferences at the time of decision-
making.  Informed consent is ethically and legally required for virtually all 
medical procedures and treatment relationships.  As to the information 
disclosed, in general, informed consent requires a discussion of the risks,189 
 
186 See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Making Better Decisions: From Measuring to Constructing 
Preferences, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S17, S18 (Supp. 2005) (defining default as “the option 
selected if no active decision is made”). 
187 Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 129, 136 (1956) (introducing and explaining the concept of “satisficing”). 
188 See Alan Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE 
HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND 
CAMPAIGNS 51, 51–52 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) (“Autonomy is paramount for patients who 
possess decision making capacity, but it is also a major consideration for patients who lack 
this capacity.  Their wishes must be respected by the relatives or other health care proxies 
who make decisions on their behalf.”)  The American Medical Association (AMA) has 
acknowledged that patients have a right of self-determination that includes the right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment, and that this right is not lost when a patient loses decisional 
capacity.  See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Decisions Near the End of Life, 
267 JAMA 2229, 2229–33 (1992). 
189 As commentators on medical consent have explained, “[t]he magnitude of the risks and 
their frequency should receive special emphasis.  Also considered are alternative treatments 
and their benefits, risks, and measured utility, the likely results of no treatment; and the 
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benefits, and alternatives to the proposed medical intervention, including the 
option of doing nothing, or withholding or withdrawing care.190  The 
protection of patient autonomy that informed consent law provides is, as we 
have seen, only as good as the quality and accuracy of the information on 
which the consent is based and the individual decision-maker’s ability to 
comprehend and process that information. 
         Numerous commentators have observed that this view of informed 
consent is, in fact, utopian or illusory.191  As George Annas has observed, 
informed consent is “more accurately termed informed choice,”192 and 
because of the doctrine’s “implications for power and accountability”193 
critical evaluation of its limitations is essential.  Annas argues that courts 
have not gone far enough in requiring physicians to discuss relevant 
information with patients.194  And Peter Schuck, in discussing the “informed 
consent gap” between what idealists such as judges and medical ethicists 
 
probability of a good outcome with the proposed strategy.”  See Timothy J. Paterick et al., 
Medical Informed Consent: General Considerations for Physicians, 83 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 
313, 316 (2008). 
190 See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-11  (3d ed. 2015) (explaining 
that factors to be disclosed include diagnosis, nature and purpose of treatment, risks of 
treatment and, in some circumstances comparative data on the treating physician’s skills, 
alternatives to the proposed treatment, prognosis with and without the treatment, and conflicts 
of interest).  The scope of required disclosure varies by jurisdiction, but typically follows one 
of two models, with states about evenly divided between the two.  See BARRY R. FURROW ET 
AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY, PATIENT SAFETY, AND MEDICAL LIABILITY 195 (7th ed. 
2013).  In states that have adopted the professional standard of disclosure, physicians must 
disclose all information that a reasonable physician would disclose under the circumstances.  
See, e.g., Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002) ( “A physician has a duty in the 
exercise of ordinary care to inform a patient of the dangers of, possible negative consequences 
of, and alternatives to a proposed medical treatment or procedure.  To recover against a 
physician for failure to provide such information, the patient generally is required to establish 
by expert testimony whether and to what extent any information should have been 
disclosed.”); see also FURROW ET AL., supra, at § 3-10(a) (describing the physician-based 
standard of disclosure).  In jurisdictions that follow the patient-oriented standard, the 
physician must disclose what a reasonable patient would want to know under the 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs 
v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); see also FURROW ET AL., supra, at § 3-10(b) (describing the 
reasonable patient standard of disclosure). 
191 See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, 
AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998) (critiquing the operation of informed consent in practice but 
not advocating that it be abandoned); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 411 (2006); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 
(1994); Angela Fagerlin et al., An Informed Decision? Breast Cancer Patients and Their 
Knowledge About Treatment, 64 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 303–12 (2006). 
192 GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO THE 
RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 113 (2004). 
193 Id. at 113. 
194 Id. at 119 (noting that most courts, for example, do not require that a physician disclose 
the patient’s prognosis unless the patient asks and conclude that prognosis need only be 
disclosed if it was material in the patient’s particular case). 
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envision and what realists such as physicians know to be true, argues that the 
gap is essentially structural and “reflects the constraints imposed by human 
psychology, the physician-patient relationship, the tort law system, and an 
increasingly cost conscious health care delivery system.”195  He concludes 
that informed consent as envisioned by the idealists is mostly unachievable 
and that attempting to close the consent gap by imposing more onerous 
obligations via tort law would fail and might further widen the gap.196  Most 
of the critiques of informed consent doctrine agree that there is no practical, 
cost-effective way to narrow the gap between the ideal of disclosure, 
comprehension, and fully-informed, authentic choice and the actual practice 
of consent between physicians and patients. 
         When a patient is asked to make an informed decision to consent to, 
for example, a surgical procedure to remove his gall bladder, the physician 
will describe the purpose of the surgery, its risks and benefits, and 
alternatives to the procedure, if any, and the patient then will sign a consent 
form indicating a willingness to undergo the surgery.  Assuming that the 
surgery is successful, the patient anticipates that he will return to his 
previous, healthy life.  In the context of decisions about whether to consent 
to a potentially debilitating chemotherapeutic regime with limited likelihood 
of effectiveness for patients in general and for any one patient in particular 
however, the consent process becomes more complicated because of various 
aspects of bounded rationality, including clinical uncertainty as to prognosis 
and response to treatment.  In the face of this clinical uncertainty (and the 
unknown impact of various forms of non-clinical uncertainty), June may 
rationally abandon the attempt to balance risks, benefits, and alternatives and 
simply consent to the proposed treatment.  To decline treatment in these 
circumstances is to leave a potential path to cure or at least life-prolongation 
untaken; despite inherent uncertainty, June may—almost unavoidably 
must—consent. 
         This sort of “informed consent” which often results in provision of 
what turns out ex post to be unsuccessful treatment (and also in utilization of 
life-prolonging technologies at the end of life in ways that may be 
inconsistent with patient preferences), may seem to follow from the 
autonomy principle, but in fact it results from an overly mechanistic view of 
the physician’s role in guiding end-of-life decision-making.  Physicians are 
rarely called upon to make the actual decision about whether to withdraw 
life-sustaining medical treatment and, even when the patient or surrogate 
requests that the physician decide,197 the physician has an ethical obligation 
 
195 See Schuck, supra note 191, at 905. 
196 Id. at 938–39. 
197 See generally Arthur S. Elstein, Gretchen B. Chatman & Sara J. Knight, Patients’ Values 
and Clinical Substituted Judgments: The Case of Localized Prostate Cancer, 24(4) HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. S85 (Supp. 2005). 
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to do so based on an understanding of the particular patient’s values and 
goals of care.198  Physicians instead usually are asked to implement decisions 
made by patients (or their agents), after offering one or more treatment 
options.  Because the autonomy principle focuses on the patient’s 
preferences, the physician can, if she chooses, avoid the more complex 
discussion of whether initiating or continuing treatment serves the patient’s 
best interests as a medical matter, even if the patient consents to that 
treatment. 
         Consider, in this context, the advance-directive question regarding 
preferences for cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the case of cardiac arrest in 
terminally-ill patients such as June.  There are at least three scenarios in 
which a decision may occur, including a decision to postpone the decision.  
First, a patient may be asked, “Would you like to fill out a DNR form?”  
Second, the patient may be presented with the form and asked whether she 
would like the health care team to attempt resuscitation or not, and the patient 
may make a choice.  Finally, the patient may say that she prefers to answer 
this question later (because, in her mind, the question is not “ripe”) and may 
therefore, by default, leave the question to her physician or family because 
she may experience cardiac arrest without having confronted and answered 
the question.  Studies indicate that many patients prefer to leave the 
resuscitation question open and let their physicians or family members 
decide, should the occasion arise.199 
         More generally, the implications of the informed consent doctrine’s 
limitations for June are now obvious and, in some dimensions, unavoidable.  
June’s “informed” consent to the various steps in her treatment and life 
prolongation (debulking surgery with intraperitoneal chemotherapy, post-
surgery chemotherapy, ventilation and feeding tube) was never, except in the 
most limited sense, informed.  At the outset, her oncologist withheld detailed 
 
198 For an interesting case study of a situation in which the patient delegated the decision about 
whether to have coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery to his physician, see Alan W. 
Cross & Larry R. Churchill, Ethical and Cultural Dimensions of Informed Consent: A Case 
Study and Analysis, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 110, 110–12 (1982) (explaining that in this 
“paternalism with permission” situation, consent is not invalidated but rather requires the 
physician to “gain as complete an understanding as possible of the patient’s values, culture, 
and life-style . . . [to] appreciate the larger significance of the treatment choice for the 
patient”).  On general choice delegation behavior, i.e., deciding “whether to make a choice on 
[one’s] own or to delegate choice-making authority to someone else,” see, for example, 
Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez et al., The Intrinsic Value of Choice: The Propensity to Under-
Delegate in the Face of Potential Gains and Losses, 54 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 187, 188 (2017). 
199 Evidence also suggests that patients regularly delegate the particular decision about 
whether to attempt resuscitation in the case of cardiac arrest to their physicians or family 
members.  See C. Puchalski et al., Patients Who Want Their Family and Physician to Make 
Resuscitation Decisions for Them: Observations from SUPPORT and HELP, 48 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC’Y S84–S90 (Supp. 2000) (concluding that most patients prefer to leave 
resuscitation decisions to their family and physicians rather than asserting their own 
preferences—70.8% in HELP and 78% in SUPPORT). 
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information about her prognosis, which meant that even the very first step of 
consent to surgery was made by June without any real understanding of her 
statistical life expectancy with and without surgery, the details of risks versus 
benefits to surgery, and the overall impact of surgery on her short-term health 
and well-being.  If she had received and ultra-rationally understood more 
detailed statistical information about prognosis with and without surgery, it 
is possible that she might have elected to forego surgery, or follow-up 
chemotherapy and focus on palliation of her symptoms.  She might have 
chosen thriving over surviving.  Of course, it is impossible to know whether, 
in one of these latter scenarios, she would have lived longer overall, or for 
less time, and with what extent of avoidable treatment side effects compared 
with the effects of the disease process itself on her quality of life. 
         Finally, there is an additional layer of decisional complexity that, for 
purposes of keeping this discussion relatively simple, we exclude.  One 
estimate suggests that, in the final weeks of life, approximately 42% of dying 
patients aged sixty or older require assistance with decision-making and, of 
that 42%, about 70% of these patients eventually lose decisional capacity 
entirely.200  Another couple of studies place these numbers even higher in the 
context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment, concluding that 75% of 
patients with life-threatening illnesses and 96% of patients in intensive care 
units have lost decisional capacity at the point of decision.201  For these 
individuals, a surrogate decision-maker, typically a family member or a 
legally-appointed proxy who often also is a family member, must make 
difficult choices on behalf of the patient about how much therapeutic and 
life-prolonging medical care to request or accept.  For patients who have lost 
decisional capacity, an autonomy-based model of medical decision-making 
does not work well unless the patients were previously willing to discuss 
their preferences with family and physicians in advance.  Often, however, 
when a patient loses decisional capacity, insufficient evidence of the 
patient’s wishes will leave physicians and family members in a dilemma as 
to whether to implement, or to continue, providing therapeutic treatment or 
life-sustaining care.  Uncertainty about prognosis in the case of terminal 
illness adds to the complexity of decisions about withholding or withdrawing 
treatment or life-supportive measures.202 
 
200 See Maria J. Silveira et al., Advance Directives and Outcomes of Surrogate Decision 
Making Before Death, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211–18 (2010). 
201 See N.G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from the Critically 
Ill, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 309–15 (1990); Annette Rid & David Wendler, Can We Improve 
Treatment Decision-Making for Incapacitated Patients?, 40(5) HASTINGS CTR. REP. 36–45 
(2010). 
202 For a more detailed discussion of how surrogate decision-making adds complexity to end-
of-life choices, see Noah & Feigenson, supra note 3, at 758–66. 
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B. Rational Apathy in General 
         In addition to the fact that most physicians are not trained in discussing 
end-of-life decision-making,203 and therefore may avoid the discussion or 
even misrepresent facts in order to dampen the emotional impact of what 
they believe to be the clinical reality, informed consent as a process also fails 
because of the limiting effects of bounded rationality, opportunism, 
Knightian uncertainty and non-Bayesian updating.  Although the ideal of 
informed consent suggests that June, even though in real life she is not an 
ultra-rationalist, will receive and be able to “correctly” process at the best of 
her abilities the latest evidence-based information and counseling about the 
relative merits of choosing among different therapeutic options, the reality is 
that this course of joint action is highly unlikely.  Based on the data and 
trends described above, it is more likely that June will sign badly drafted 
consent forms after lack of adequate explanation from her physicians who, 
like her, have multiple incentives to avoid thorough and careful discussion 
and to allow the default mechanism of maximal care utilization to drive her 
future treatment.  Accordingly, the current law and resultant practice of 
informed consent are likely to fail June on multiple levels and at multiple 
decision points during her illness because the ideal of informed consent—an 
ultra-rational, “hyper-autonomous”204 decision based solely on scientific 
evidence and evaluation of risks, benefits, alternatives, best practices, and 
personal preferences—remains both illusive and elusive in end-of-life 
medical practice. 
         Moreover, the underlying causes that drive systemically suboptimal 
complex medical decision-making go much deeper:  The logical result of 
ambivalence205 and ambiguity206 affecting the rationality of all human 
decision-making is an infinite regression dilemma, i.e., an infinite calculative 
quest for a confident utility equilibrium.207  What starts out in the 
Williamsonian formula208 as confident calculation, upon introduction of 
 
203 See Shannon Griffin et al., JAMA Infographic Visualizing Health Policy: Medicare and 
End-of-Life Care, 316 JAMA 1754 (2016) (illustrating that, in 2016, 68% of physicians 
reported not being trained to discuss end-of-life care). 
204 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
205 As accompanied by the opportunistic dissonance of the patient- and/or physician-
decisionmaker; see Cooper, supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
206 Similarly accompanied by rational vacuity.  See Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69, and 
text accompanying note 82. 
207 See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text.  Cf. LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 3 (2d rev. ed. 1972) (“Personalistic views [of probability] hold 
that probability measures the confidence that a particular individual has in the truth of a 
particular proposition, for example, the proposition that it will rain tomorrow.  These views 
postulate that the individual concerned is in some ways ‘reasonable,’ but they do not deny the 
possibility that two reasonable individuals faced with the same evidence may have different 
degrees of confidence in the truth of the same proposition.”). 
208 See Williamson, supra note 47, at 467, and text accompanying note 59. 
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Knightian uncertainty and decisional ultra-rationality, becomes complete, 
unsuppressed awareness that there always remains an unknown and 
rationally unknowable probability209 that estimated utility projections may 
turn out to be 100% incorrect.  In other words, human decision-makers may 
be completely misled by their own ultra-rational calculations.  Any 
consciously known lack of knowledge in relative terms (i.e., known and 
knowable unknowns) affirms the impact of strategic uncertainty on rational 
decision-making.  Any consciously known lack of knowledge in absolute 
terms (i.e., unknown and unknowable unknowns) affirms the impact of 
Knightian uncertainty on rational decision-making.  In addition, the degree 
of both impacts on any decision to be made is—at least, ex ante—also 
unknowable in absolute, calculatively immutable terms. 
         Furthermore, when both strategic and Knightian uncertainty are fully 
aggregated over all past and future decisions during an entire human lifespan, 
there is now 100% certainty—and a concomitant 100% cognitive 
awareness—of zero ultra-rational confidence for any prospective decisions 
aimed at positioning oneself towards a Knightian uncertain (and therefore 
possibly unattainable) future.  As a logical endpoint, ultra-rational human 
decision-makers would now have to remain in a state of rational stasis—not 
mere rational apathy with regard to some aspects of their utility calculations 
and decision-making, but broad, all-encompassing paralysis given their 
inability to confidently calculate and predict any and all future events and 
their accompanying hypothetical utility effects.  Accordingly, it may be 
posited that an ultra-rational person, consciously and completely aware of 
this constantly recurring and inescapable choice situation, would make only 
one rational decision over and over again—namely, to rationally resign 
herself from making any decision, i.e., to not just wait things out, but to never 
decide anything ever again (other than to reiteratively “decide” to never 
change her only safe-haven and zero-cognitive-load default of not deciding 
anything on its merits).210  In other words, a fully ultra-rational person would 
decide, once and for all, to never opt out of perfect irrationality.211 
 
209 Based on the limited aspects of human existence positively known and knowable to human 
actors, for example, in June’s scenario, the limited prospective knowability of both clinically 
and non-clinically uncertain variables unique to her personal situation. 
210 The quotation marks on “decide” indicate that this “decision”—similar to decision-making 
in the Coasean world, but this time on the opposite end of the decisional spectrum—is not a 
genuine decision.  See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra Figure 1.  Taken to its logical extreme, an alternative in this realm of perfectly 
irrational decision-making, without the constraints of time, space and therefore, mortality, 
would be to only make completely random decisions for eternity, that is, to rationally resign 
from predicting future outcomes, calculating utilities and monitoring performance (as rational 
decision-making preparation and validation modes) but to still ratify and implement choices, 
albeit entirely random ones.  In eternity, all choices are equal in that they are of identical 
utility in terms of substantive rationality given the logical absence of any scarcity-induced 
need for value judgments.  Arguably then, choosing randomly always carries the lowest 
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         In “a real world that is both bounded and perceptually laden”212 and 
that introduces the certainty of human mortality into all human decision-
making processes aimed at orienting time-limited human lives towards a 
scarce future, neither decisional paralysis nor complete decisional 
randomness is genuinely available to humans endowed with some 
rationality.  As sentient beings, humans always have some self-awareness 
and capability to reflect on their mortality, and so recognize their captivity 
in a relentlessly progressing linear time and space continuum that constantly 
reduces their individual future lives.  In this real world of constant 
opportunity cost, it may be posited that most people ultimately will rationally 
resign from attempting to make as informed a decision as possible—given 
its impossibility due to the impacts of strategic and Knightian uncertainty, 
fully aggregated.  In other words, people will opt for the minimally-rational 
choice to remain rationally apathetic—to not acknowledge and therefore to 
not know what is otherwise positively knowable within the realm of their 
bounded rationality.  Rational apathy, as another rationally delusional form 
of blinding oneself against what otherwise one could know, often, but not 
always, turns out to be the decision-making mode with the highest remaining 
utility, including the lowest cognitive load.  People will “not be induced to 
take action . . . because [they] do[ ] not know ex ante whether investigating 
any particular proposed . . . action will pay off.”213 
         A starting point for purposes of describing rational apathy globally—
in terms that apply to all subject-matter contexts of human rational decision-
making—is to organize decision-making into separate, consecutive parts.  
“In broad terms,”214 four sequential segments of decision-making can be 
distinguished: 
1. initiation—generation of proposals for resource utilization 
and structuring of contracts; 
2. ratification—choice of the decision initiatives to be 
implemented; 
3. implementation—execution of ratified decisions; and 
4. monitoring—measurement of the performance of decision 
agents and implementation of rewards.215 
         Rational apathy particularly applies to the contemplative stages of 
decision-making (initiation, ratification, and monitoring).  First, it 
deliberately reduces the rational “payload” that good Bayesians would have 
to carry in order to arrive at a highest-utility choice during the ratification 
 
decisional cost—but only in terms of procedural rationality (the need for which does also not 
exist in eternity). 
212 MATTHEW B. MILES, MICHAEL A. HUBERMAN & JOHNNY SALDAÑA, QUALITATIVE DATA 
ANALYSIS: A METHODS SOURCEBOOK 7 (3d ed. 2014). 
213 Clark, supra note 68, at 782. 
214 Fama & Jensen, supra note 36, at 303. 
215 Id. 
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stage.  Second, it also reduces rational payload otherwise necessary to 
achieve a highest-utility outcome at the ultimate conclusion of the decisional 
process by refusing to acknowledge that this outcome may require further 
decisional revision and course correction during the implementation and 
monitoring stages.  Without rational apathy, the procedural rationality of 
decision-making alone will regularly constitute a daunting task for any good 
Bayesian.216  If one adds both start and end points to the above four-stage 
procedural sequence of initiation, ratification, implementation and 
monitoring,217 there is now a plethora of procedural challenges and 
constraints, which June as a good-Bayesian, ultra-rational decision-maker218 
would have to acknowledge and diligently overcome in order to arrive at 
both an optimal decision and an optimal decisional outcome.  A good-
Bayesian, ultra-rational decision-making process can be summarized as 
follows:219 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 See infra Figure 2. 
217 I.e., the initial choice situation necessitating the decision-making process as well as the 
eventual choice outcome once a decision made has been fully implemented (and is therefore, 
chronologically speaking, no longer subject to revision or correction). 
218 Cf. BRUNO DE FINETTI, THEORY OF PROBABILITY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTORY TREATMENT 
470–71 (Wiley 2017) (1974) (“A decision must . . . be based on probabilities; that is the 
posterior probabilities as evaluated on the basis of all information so far available.  This is the 
main point to note.  In order to make decisions, we first require a statistical theory which 
provides conclusions in the form of posterior probabilities.  The Bayesian approach does this: 
other approaches explicitly refuse to do this.”). 
219 See generally THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO 
CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
(1998); Baruch Fischhoff, Decision Research Strategies, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S9 (Supp. 
2005).  See also Butkus, supra note 65, at 93 (“First, it is necessary that the moral agent be 
able to express a choice—this is not tied to any particular medium of communication (for 
example, the patient does not need to be able to speak to do so), but rather, the patient must 
possess the ability to make his or her choices known.  Second, the patient must be able to 
understand the information germane to the health care decision.  If the patient cannot 
understand the information at hand, there is no way to act upon it or to voice a preference for 
one intervention over another.  Third, the patient must appreciate the significance of the 
information and the expected outcomes.  If there is no way for the patient to gauge risk or to 
weigh outcomes, there is no way for the patient to take ownership of the decision—there is a 
fundamental disconnect between the decision and the outcome.  Fourth, the patient must be 
able to reason with the germane information in a manner that allows him or her to logically 
weigh treatment options.”). 
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Figure 2 
Decisional Stages and Procedural Rationality 
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to be done during the process of decision-making as outlined in Figure 2 
above.  As a behavioral default of decisional “laziness,” rational apathy 
either refuses to perform this choice work at all or performs the task in only 
a perfunctory fashion.  Rational apathy may therefore be defined globally as 
the iterative rational decision (i) to not become (fully) informed within the 
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- information processing 
- generation of proposals 
- prioritization of preferences 
- evaluation of proposals 
- comparison of proposals 
- meta-deliberation 
- exercise of discretion 
- ranking of proposals 
- formulation of decision 
- exercise of judgment 
(global choice adequacy) 
- commitment (in 
deciding) 
- confidence 
- feedback (psychological) 
- commitment (in acting) 
- information 
gathering 
- information 
processing 
- comparison of 
choice outcome and 
intended outcome 
- generation of final 
assessment 
- evaluation of final 
assessment 
- commitment (in 
closing) 
- default “closure”/ 
task completion 
(moving on) 
- information gathering 
- information processing 
- comparison of choice 
performance and intended 
outcome 
- generation of interim 
assessments 
- evaluation of interim 
assessments for presence 
of secondary choice 
situation (course 
correction) 
- initiation, ratification, 
implementation and 
monitoring of secondary 
(revisional) decision(s) 
- temporal & spatial choice 
architecture 
- (chrono)logical scarcity 
- comprehension 
choice 
situation 
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present;220 (iii) to not (fully) formulate utility judgments on the merits (other 
than the reiterative utility judgment that engagement in judging matters on 
their respective merits is suboptimal behavior compared to not making utility 
judgments);221 and (iv) to not (fully) monitor and, where necessary, initiate, 
ratify and implement revisional decisions with regard to the utility of actual 
outcomes resulting from the refusal decisions made in steps (i) through 
(iii).222  As a result, a rationally-apathetic decision-maker will arrive at a 
current-low-cost223 default decision that is a negative decision224 as well as a 
non-active decision.225  Prior to being confronted with complex and time-
sensitive medical decision-making, rational apathy will discourage decision-
makers from even attempting actively-involved, contemplative decisions.  
Rather, with minimal decisional effort, the decision-maker opts into the 
default: to “stay the course,” to not make a change in position as regards the 
status quo and its trajectory, to wait and not see,226 and to only revisit the 
issue in the future when unavoidably dire or noticeably fortunate 
circumstances will pierce through the rationally-apathetic “default armor.”227 
 
 
 
220 Thus, aspects (i) and (ii) of rational apathy relate to the initiation stage of rational decision-
making. 
221 Accordingly, this aspect (iii) of rational apathy relates to the decisional ratification stage. 
222 Correspondingly, this aspect (iv) of rational apathy relates to the implementation and 
monitoring stages of rational decision-making. 
223 As distinguished from the long-term, “existentially-heavy” costs accruing from rationally-
apathetic choice behavior.  See infra notes 282–289 and accompanying text. 
224 Namely, a decision not to decide on the merits. 
225 Since the default decision is to remain passive and to not cognitively engage with the 
merits.  See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 186, at S19. 
226 Wait-and-see decisional behavior requires a contemplative, engaged-with-the-merits 
decisional stance because it involves a low-payload judgment that the time is not yet ripe for 
making a final decision on the merits.  As a result, this decisional behavior will continue to 
monitor the evolving choice situation.  Rationally-apathetic wait-and-not-see behavior is 
decisional avoidance behavior aimed at not having to confront the same, modified or worse 
choice situation ever again.  Its goal is to permanently (if only, reiteratively) disengage with 
having to make any (final) decision on any merits. 
227 Such point in time will arrive when the decisional laziness and lethargy induced by rational 
apathy loses the meta-utility of non-Bayesian updating.  At that time, the strategy of “staying 
the course” and following the same procedure of yesterdays and yesteryears (which helped 
insulate and sustain one’s belief system as a bad Bayesian) will come to an abrupt end.  For 
example, a diagnosis of terminal illness will bring to an end the non-Bayesian utility of a 
lifelong denial of mortality—as in the general belief (or attitude) that there will always be 
more time later to do something that one actually wants or needs to do now (but does not feel 
“ready” to make an affirmative decision on now). 
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C. Rational Patient Apathy 
If you do not know where you are going, it does not matter how 
you get there.—Anonymous228 
 
        Separate from the description of rational apathy as a general decisional 
phenomenon, rational apathy theory, “of critical importance in corporate law 
analysis . . . and corporate governance,”229 also can be utilized in the current 
context to discuss more specifically (i) the behavior of rationally-apathetic 
patients in their individual, bad-Bayesian decision-making and (ii) the 
collective impact of this behavior—when fully aggregated among the totality 
of rationally-apathetic patient decision-making—on the delivery of health 
care, particularly at the end of life.  In the broader sense, rational patient 
apathy applies (and is generated and reinforced) within four discrete 
dimensions: 
1. the default, minimally-rational informed-consent decision-
making of individual patients (rational patient apathy in the 
narrower sense); 
2. the minimally-rational decisional support of, and influence 
over,230 patient decision-making by individual doctors 
(rational physician apathy); 
 
228 See ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 9 (4th ed. 2014). 
229 Ige Omotayo Bolodeoku, Corporate Governance in the New Information and 
Communication Age: An Interrogation of Rational Apathy Theory, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 109, 
109 (2007).  See also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 81 (1933) (being the first to describe rational 
shareholder apathy as “the normal apathy of the small stockholder . . . such that he will either 
fail to return his proxy vote, or will sign on the dotted line, returning his proxy to the 
[managers] of the corporation”); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390–400 (1986); 
Clark, supra note 68, at 779–80; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in 
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983). 
230 Even though the legally-relevant decision-making, i.e., the act of consenting, is performed 
by the patient, the patient’s treatment choice, in most situations, is ultimately as much causally 
connected with the physician’s decision-making as it is with the patient’s.  See, e.g., Richard 
G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics 19 (NBER, Working Paper No. 
10881, 2004) (“Physicians commonly must choose from among many competing approaches 
to treating a particular condition and trusting patients rely centrally on the recommendations 
of the physician.  This makes the physician largely responsible for the consequences of the 
complex choice.”).  Accordingly, from a social-ontology perspective, informed consent is not 
the individual act of a patient at all; it is an instance of “joint agency,” i.e., “a single action 
performed by many individuals,” namely, patient, physician and, possibly, additional health-
services providers.  Philip Pettit, Corporate Agency: The Lesson of the Discursive Dilemma, 
in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY 249, 249 (Marija Jankovic & 
Kirk Ludwig eds., 2018); see also Wendy Nelson et al., Basic and Applied Decision Making 
in Cancer Control, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S3, S8 (Supp. 2005) (“In theory, the physician 
and patient construct the decision tree together, thereby making it a shared decision process.”). 
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3. in terms of agency costs,231 the merger and mutual 
enforcement of rational patient apathy and rational 
physician apathy within the patient-physician relationship 
(vertical rational patient-physician apathy); and 
4. in terms of social costs,232 the un(der)informed 
overutilization of medical care across the entire health care 
delivery system as a result of the totality of vertical rational 
patient-physician apathy occurring system-wide in a large 
majority of all patient-physician relationships (horizontal 
rational patient-physician apathy). 
         In the individual-efficiency dimension of single-patient decision-
making, rational apathy theory models and predicts that patients will not 
attempt to fully inform themselves of all material, reasonably available 
information regarding their prospective medical treatment requiring 
consent—because the opportunity cost of good-Bayesian information 
gathering and processing will substantially outweigh the default-choice 
expected utility of rational patient apathy.233  In other words, personal 
investments (of time, physical and emotional energy, and money) in 
diligently and systematically comprehending, selecting and monitoring 
options and courses of medical treatment are deemed irrational.  As a 
default, the minimally-rational patient will want to stay away as much as 
feasible from the costly, never-ending calculative morass of applied 
procedural rationality234 and non-biased, ultra-rational Bayesian updating.  
Rational patient apathy, on an individual patient basis, is therefore 
efficient—most of the time—for both decisional utility (by making cheap 
decisions in terms of transaction costs) and overall welfare utility (by 
arriving at a large majority of beneficial outcomes over the fully aggregated 
number of rationally-apathetic medical decisions).235  Rational apathy, 
 
231 I.e., as transaction costs that (i) are opportunistically caused by the physician and 
materialize in the patient’s suboptimal decision-making, and (ii) are opportunistically caused 
by the patient and materialize in the physician’s suboptimal support of the patient’s decision-
making. 
232 I.e., as negative externalities borne by the overall health care delivery system and by the 
totality of patients and physicians in it, caused by both patients and physicians as a result of 
their suboptimal, opportunistic decision-making and decisional support, respectively. 
233 Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 186, at S18 (stating that “people may wish to avoid the effort 
and cost of changing from a default, preferring to accept a default to making an active, 
effortful choice”). 
234 As outlined in Figure 2, supra. 
235 As discussed below (see infra Part IV.A), this efficiency clearly ends at the end of life and 
the decisional costs of a lifetime of rationally-apathetic decision-making will then become 
payable.  Additionally, not every rationally-apathetic decision during one’s lifetime is 
efficient in terms of its own overall utility.  Thus, more activist patients can be expected to be 
better in “selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior (see infra note 293 and accompanying 
text)—namely, to be able to discriminate more competently between choice situations that 
warrant rationally-apathetic responses and those that require more ultra-rational choice 
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however, inevitably inhibits individual decisional systematicity as well as 
any future preference for systematic decision-making. 
         Rational patient apathy is also supported by rational patient ignorance.  
In general, the notion of “rational ignorance,” introduced in the social 
sciences by Anthony Downs,236 posits that “when the expected benefits of 
information are small . . . people buy little information.”237  As an active and 
deliberate form of ignorance, rational patient ignorance will, accordingly, 
deny that a choice situation requiring rational engagement on the merits and 
triggering a need for information gathering even exists.  Rational ignorance 
prescribes the decisional and tactical default that the “same procedure as last 
time” (i.e., not affirmatively deciding or even investigating anything) is 
sufficient absent clear new evidence to the contrary.  Rational ignorance, 
therefore, shuts down any inquiry into the evidence presented by the choice 
situation so that, in principle, “clear new evidence to the contrary” never 
reaches the decision-maker’s unobstructed awareness.238  Accordingly, the 
rationally-ignorant patient embraces whatever is offered as the default (in 
June’s example, even “urgently” offered by Dr. Savoy) and will actively 
refrain from ever (i) becoming genuinely (partially) informed with regard to 
the original choice situation, (ii) genuinely monitoring (at least, not 
routinely) the performance of her default choice vis-à-vis expected utility, 
and, thus, (iii) becoming genuinely informed with regard to any subsequent 
choice situation(s) that would allow her to revise and perhaps improve the 
performance of her original default choice.  Yesterday’s default decision to 
choose rational apathy over any and all other decisional courses of action 
will, ideally, never have to be monitored or revised.  Rational patient 
ignorance is, therefore, the deliberate non-generation of plausible bad-
outcome probabilities and expectations.239  In effect, it is the convenient 
denial of statistically possible, but personally non-preferred rival futures.240 
 
behavior for purposes of maximizing outcome utility.  In other words, rational patient apathy 
is never efficient all of the time on a per-decision basis and is always inefficient on an 
aggregated-decision basis. 
236 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 244–46, 266–71(1957).  See, 
e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Rational Ignorance in Politics, Economics and Law, 1 J. DES 
ÉCONOMISTES ET DES ÉTUDES HUMAINES 25, 25 (1990). 
237 Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance Versus Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3, 3 (2001).  
Cf. Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xxi–xxii (“Ignorance arises in a situation where some 
potential states of the world cannot be identified.”). 
238 As a result, the choice situation and its merits, at best, remain “hovering on the fringes 
of . . . consciousness.”  SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 34. 
239 The rationally-ignorant decision-maker selectively decides to look the other way.  Even as 
learned behavior, conducted on auto-pilot and reflexively, it requires the decision-maker to 
take active evasive measures in order to avoid fuller confrontation with the merits of the 
choice situation. 
240 Cf. C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW OR THE PURSUIT OF PROGRESS 96 (1958) 
(“To travel hopefully is better than to arrive.”); Carol Blue, Afterword, in CHRISTOPHER 
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         In the collective-efficiency dimension—constituting the largest 
possible,241 “latent group”242 of patient-decisionmakers—rational apathy 
theory models and predicts that the benefits of rationally non-apathetic 
patients (or activist patients)243 will create social benefits (i.e., collective/
public goods) for all patients, including all passivist patients,244 in terms of 
incrementally yet globally optimizing the provision of medical care.  In other 
words, when assuming that (i) activist patients challenge and improve the 
decision-support performance of medical providers generally, (ii) those 
providers are long-term repeat players, and (iii) they train next-generation 
providers based on their experience and improved decisional competence, 
activist patients will, through their rationally non-apathetic individual 
decision-making, generate positive spillover effects (or positive 
externalities) for complex medical and end-of-life care globally—namely, 
by improving care on a per-patient level and across all present and future 
patients.245  Only activist patients, however, will bear the private costs246 of 
this generation of social benefits.247  Therefore, since these “benefits are non-
excludable group goods, most [patients]248 will see free-riding as the best 
 
HITCHENS, MORTALITY 95, 103–04 (2012) (“When he was admitted to the hospital for the last 
time, we thought it would be for a brief stay . . .  The end was unexpected.”). 
241 Namely, all humans at the respective ends of their lives to the extent that (i) they receive 
medical care prior to death and (ii) they can consent to such care. 
242 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 50–51 (2d ed. 1971).  “Large groups are . . . called ‘latent’ groups because they have 
a latent power or capacity for action, but that potential power can be realized or ‘mobilized’ 
only with the aid of ‘selective incentives.’”  Id. at 51. 
243 Those patients making (or attempting to make) boundedly-rational, yet more ultra-rational, 
good-Bayesian personal investments in comprehending, selecting, monitoring and, therefore, 
optimizing their respective medical decisions, treatments and outcomes. 
244 Those patients remaining rationally apathetic to protect their prior beliefs and the meta-
utility of their non-Bayesian updating. 
245 In other words, rational apathy theory here predicts that the totality of suboptimal, 
intrasystem decision-making by individual patients will translate negatively into the overall 
performance and efficiency of the system (and vice versa). 
246 In particular, ultimately, the cost of facing mortality and of recognizing the futility of all 
end-of-life care in fending off death, and to rationally account for the certainty of their 
impending death in their informed-consent decision-making. 
247 Cf. Clark, supra note 68, at 779 (“Whenever shareholders of a publicly held company vote 
upon matters affecting the corporation, they engage in a collective action that suffers from 
many systemic difficulties.  Such difficulties include ‘rational apathy’ of shareholders, the 
temptation of individual shareholders to take a ‘free ride,’ and unfairness to certain 
shareholders even where collective action is successful . . . .  Often the aggregate cost to 
shareholders of informing themselves of potential corporate actions, independently assessing 
the wisdom of such actions, and casting their votes will greatly exceed the expected or actual 
benefits garnered from informed voting.”). 
248 Who are already heavily disinclined to reverse their rational-apathy defaults in order to 
avoid private bads, namely, costly activist, yet, ultimately inefficient decision-making, 
particularly, at the end of life (i.e., with no or not much difference to the outcome, namely 
death). 
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strategic behaviour.”249  “By doing so, [passivist patients] can reap all of the 
benefits of [more activist] decision [behavior] without sharing in any of the 
costs.”250  In the collective realm, rational apathy theory therefore also 
models and predicts that “no collective action [will] be taken, and everyone 
[will] lose the chance of reaping [any] benefits”251 from the spillover effects 
of more ultra-rational, good-Bayesian end-of-life decisional behavior.252  
Accordingly, passivist patients, preferring to maximize short-term utility, 
can be expected to default even further towards suboptimal but 
“satisficing”253 rational apathy given that passivists regard the returns that 
accrue from costly activist decisional investment in the collective realm as 
the generation of team-production assets254 and public goods.255  In their 
view, those returns can never be specifically identified and paired only with 
their individual (more activist) investment, (cheaply) separated from the 
benefits that will accrue to all other patients (and the system as a whole)256 
and, therefore, made to exclusively benefit only their own decisional 
investment and private wealth-generation.257  Accordingly, rational apathy 
inevitably inhibits collective decisional systematicity as well as any future 
preferences for systematic decision-making. 
         As a result, rational patient apathy, even when efficient (some of the 
time) on an individual-patient basis, is never costless (or efficient) for society 
as a whole.  In the collective realm, rational patient apathy practiced by 
 
249 Bolodeoku, supra note 229, at 110. 
250 Jonathan J. Katz, Barbarians at the Ballot Box: The Use of Hedging to Acquire Low Cost 
Corporate Influence and Its Effect on Shareholder Apathy, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1483, 1491 
(2006). 
251 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 392 (1986). 
252 In other words, passivists would only become more activist if they were to “be 
compensated for the risk of engaging in such behavior”; see Clark, supra note 68, at 779, 882. 
253 Simon, supra note 187, at 136. 
254 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–81, 794–95 (1972) (describing team 
production and intrafirm competition as characteristics of specific investment). 
255 See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 387 (1954) (describing public, i.e., “collective consumption goods” as those “which all 
enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no 
subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good”). 
256 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 250, at 1490–91 (“The division of benefits problem stands for 
the proposition that voters in the corporate context will reap only a small percentage of the 
benefit of their vote to influence the corporation.”).  Arguably, in many situations there is no 
percentage of benefit since their individual vote does not influence the outcome at all (i.e., 
without counting their vote, the majority-vote outcome is still identical in result).  See, e.g., 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 395 (stating that “[s]hareholders are apathetic in 
the best of times because it is so unlikely that their votes would make a difference”); id. at 
397 (“No shareholder has the right incentives to participate in governance, because none could 
influence the outcome of the election.”). 
257 In other words, the collective goods generated by the activists cannot be manipulated into 
private goods that only accrue to the activists’ welfare. 
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passivist patients and physicians wrongly assumes “that if our actions are 
individually blameless, then the sum of our actions will be good for 
society.”258  Accordingly, when aggregating the modelling and prediction of 
rational apathy theory in both its individual and collective patient 
dimensions, rationally-apathetic patients and physicians incentivize a health 
care system to feature the following trends (as negative spillover effects of 
their suboptimal complex medical and end-of-life decisional behavior): 
1. to further orient the provision of medical care towards 
unmitigated overutilization of care that may be either 
medically inappropriate, or contrary to patient wishes if 
better informed, or both; 
2. to further increase the complexity and transaction costs of 
future activist-patient investments in rationally optimal 
health care decision-making; 
3. to further amplify the transaction-cost-avoiding value of 
rational apathy and the decisional efficiency of rational 
ignorance in an autopoietic manner; 
4. to reinforce the isolation and atomistic competition259 
prevalent in the market for rational-patient decision-
making (often under the guise of patient autonomy) for 
purposes of inhibiting the formation of patient coalitions 
 
258 Matthew Stewart, The Birth of a New American Aristocracy, ATLANTIC, June 2018, at 48, 
53.  Cf. Katz, supra note 250, at 1491 (“The free rider problem causes a shareholder to ‘sit 
back’ and let his fellow shareholders invest the time and energy in casting ballots.”). 
259 Atomistic competition prevails in “a market characterized by numerous individual actors 
on both sides, all without market power.”  DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (Craig Calhoun 
ed., 2002).  In the current context, atomistic competition means that the prevailing number of 
passivist patients, through an enormous daily multitude of individual patient-physician 
“transactions,” co-generate rational patient apathy (in the broad sense) and, with it, suboptimal 
medical decision-making considerably below total (agency and social) costs—all without 
much or any power held by individual (and more activist) patients to change these “market” 
conditions.  Thus, due to atomistic competition, the activist patient competes independently 
(for less apathetic decision-making) and without much, if any, ability to distinguish herself 
from the passivists or to offer physicians a better “product” (i.e., joint informed-consent 
outcome).  As a highly sporadic and irregular informed consenter, she cannot reach economies 
of scale in terms of setting good-Bayesian updating as a more prevalent condition in the 
marketplace for informed consent.  Thus, her share of this market is so small that in practice 
she cannot, by changing her decisional output to more good-Bayesian, less rationally-
apathetic choice behavior, influence the market share or “income” derived from sub-optimal 
medical decision-making by passivist patients.  To counteract these system-wide distortions 
of the atomistic competitive process on patients themselves and to incentivize “better bad-
Bayesian” medical decision-making overall, cooperation (if not, cooperatives) among activist 
patients, as well as between activist patients and activist doctors, would be necessary.  This 
would allow activist patients to formulate and bundle their patient interests in matters of 
informed consent and, thus, as collective “buyers” of informed consent, to bring rational 
patient apathy into conformity with actual supply- and demand-side preferences for informed 
consent. 
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and the collective-activist participation of patients in a 
more global, patient-oriented optimization of health care 
(decisional) systems;260 and 
5. to further aggravate, rather than mitigate, the average 
vertical agency costs261 and horizontal social costs262 
generated within the physician-patient relationship, 
especially in complex medical and end-of-life care. 
In other words, the aggregate result of this cascade of effects of rational 
patient apathy perpetuates a race to the bottom with respect to making “best” 
choices for therapeutic and end-of-life care of seriously ill patients.  The 
vicious cycle of rational apathy and rational ignorance—coupled with the 
various internal and external incentives that physicians have to minimize and 
avoid robust, time-consuming decisional support as to treatment options, 
individual patient preferences and the potential benefits of less care—will be 
difficult to disrupt and to partially reverse for those individual patients and 
physicians with activist decisional preferences. 
IV. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL EFFECTS 
         The practical and legal effects of rational patient and physician apathy, 
fully-aggregated, on the experience of health care and informed consent for 
seriously ill and terminally ill patients are both insidious in process and 
deleterious in result.  Together, they operate as a massive obstacle to activist 
patient and physician participation in and improvement to the delivery of 
complex medical care and its system-wide decisional governance.263 
A. Practical Effects: The Death of Rational Patient Apathy 
         In each of its four dimensions,264 rational patient apathy reinforces four 
fundamental fallacies and majoritarian beliefs shared among large parts of 
U.S. end-of-life care stakeholders (patients, doctors, hospitals, insurers, 
long-term care facilities, etc.)—namely: 
1. the fallacy that, on an individual-patient basis, optimal 
medical treatment is, or (with sufficient effort and evidence 
base) should be, identifiable and therefore that optimal 
medical decision-making is possible in absolute terms 
 
260 The collective-action problem for patients, in particular, end-of-life patients makes it hard, 
if not impossible, for patients to comprehend, select and monitor the quality of their care 
specifically, and the quality of their overall health care access globally. 
261 I.e., as between patient-beneficiary-principal and physician-fiduciary-agent. 
262 I.e., as among all patients. 
263 Cf. Katz, supra note 250, at 1492. 
264 See supra notes 230–232 and accompanying text. 
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through prospective knowledge since outcomes are 
sufficiently predictable;265 
2. the fallacy that, on an individual-patient basis, optimal 
medical treatment is, or (with sufficient effort and evidence 
base) should be, verifiable and therefore that optimal 
medical decision-making can be validated in absolute terms 
through retrospective knowledge since outcomes are 
sufficiently ascertainable;266 
3. the fallacy that medical decision-making (informed or 
otherwise), on an individual-patient basis, is wholistically 
optimal only when choosing prospectively-identified 
optimal medical treatment;267 and 
4. the fallacy that suboptimal medical decision-making 
(informed or otherwise) can, on a system-wide basis, be 
“nudged”268 prospectively into optimal medical treatment 
 
265 Cf. Stiles & So, supra note 34, at 284 (discussing, as a first general assumption in the 
context for health care delivery, “that for any care-giving scenario, there exists the equivalent 
of a medical bull’s eye, a scientifically ideal treatment known to yield the best clinical 
outcome”). 
266 Id. (discussing, as a second general assumption in the context for health care delivery, “that 
the treatment administered, whatever form it takes (e.g., medication, procedure or device) 
causes specific outcomes [obviating] the need to consider variations in outcomes introduced 
by events occurring beyond the confines of the healthcare system and leav[ing] the decision-
maker with a far more computable problem”). 
267 Id. (discussing how the “analytic power gained from this [second] assumption is the ability 
to model the care-giving process such that the scientifically ideal treatment yields the 
optimum clinical outcome and anything other than the scientific ideal produces a suboptimal 
result”).  See also Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 369 (discussing how “most choice-enhancing 
policies are predicated on a simple, but intuitive, model of decision-making [which] presumes 
that (a) consumers have well defined expectations (i.e. they know what they want from their 
medical care or health insurance), (b) they can coherently evaluate their current health care 
experiences in light of these expectations and (c) if dissatisfied, will learn about alternatives 
to their current circumstances”). 
268 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009); NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016); Epstein, supra note 133; Megan 
S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case for Relational Nudges in End-of-Life 
Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062 (2018).  At heart, nudging 
inescapably counts on rational inertia (see infra note 289).  Accordingly, nudging takes 
advantage of and encourages rationally-apathetic decisional behavior rather than to promote 
less apathetic decision-making on both an individual and a collective basis.  Nudging is about 
changing defaults and herding people into more “correct” decisional outcomes (with the 
“correctness” of outcomes being determined by some objective, inevitably normative and, 
usually, benign paternalistic standard) rather than allowing people to make decisions more 
“correctly” based on their subjective preferences.  “Correctness” here only means that patients 
choose with more procedural rationality (i.e., as “better bad-Bayesians;” see infra note 291 
and accompanying text) at their respective, personal level of decisional ability, guided by their 
own values and preferences. 
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decisions and outcomes—both system-wide and on an 
individual-patient basis. 
         As a result, all medical decision-making subject to rational patient 
apathy is rationally suboptimal given apathy’s deleterious effects.  
Unfortunately, the end-of-life decision-making context further aggravates 
this suboptimality.  In general, rational patient apathy suppresses rational 
awareness of mortality (and with it, Knightian uncertainty of the conditions 
of one’s future) in order to make an uncertain future imaginable, expectable, 
and predictable.269  It is the cognitively convenient, apathetic decision to not 
decide—not at this time, maybe later, if ever—and to create an existentially 
necessary illusion of a foreseeably unlimited remainder of life.  At the end 
of life,270 however, this meta-utility abruptly ceases.271  And because of its 
insidious nature, the meta-utility of rational apathy ceases without 
forewarning.  Now, there is suddenly and unexpectedly little quantity and 
livable quality of future left.  Now, mortality becomes virtually impossible 
to suppress rationally via decisional apathy.  “Later, if ever” morphs 
“forever” into “now, or never.”  In other words, the meta-utility of rational 
patient apathy as an “affect meta-heuristic”272 is what expires and “dies” first 
 
269 Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 66 (“[Modern humans’] capacity to strategize, to 
make decisions, to design and to plan based on an imagined future represented by words and 
symbols, is something no other creature on earth was then, or is now, able to do.”).  The 
imagination of one’s personal future, therefore, requires awareness of a different future than 
may be preferred, including, a non-future for the one doing the imagining. 
270 “End of life” can mean different things in different contexts.  Here, we use it to refer to 
that point where the patient understands that she will eventually die from her disease no matter 
what additional medical interventions she accepts in the meantime. 
271 Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 420 (“Because of the easy availability 
of the exit option through the stock market, the rational strategy for dissatisfied shareholders 
in most cases, given the collective action problem, is to disinvest rather than incur costs in 
attempting to bring about change through the voting process.”), with Arthur R. Pinto, 
Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 326 (1998) (pointing out that “shareholders in publicly traded 
corporations are viewed as passive with a preference to exit by selling rather than using their 
voice to challenge management”).  Passivist patients cannot exit and rectify their prior 
investment in bad-Bayesian decision-making.  Similarly, they have not practiced earlier the 
use of their voice to challenge their own bad-Bayesian life management for purposes of “better 
bad-Bayesian” decision-making and control.  Now that their investment is sunk, i.e., 
irretrievable, in absolute terms, their rationally-apathetic/ignorant investment horizon arrives 
at its inevitable and final end point.  While Easterbrook and Fischel find it “difficult to imagine 
a more effective exit option than the market in shares,” passivist patients find it difficult to 
imagine a less effective exit option than the death that is staring them into the face.  
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 420 n.70. 
272 Whereas an “affect heuristic” (McCaul et al., supra note 172, at S107) constitutes a 
“decision-making strategy that bases decisions on the rapidly experienced good and bad 
feelings attached to decision alternatives” (Slovic et al., supra note 29), i.e., in terms of 
substantive, on-the-merits rationality, rational patient apathy is what we call an “affect meta-
heuristic” in that it is a decision-making strategy that bases and reiterates substantive non-
decision on the rapidly experienced bad feeling of engaging in the procedurally-rational 
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at the end of life (assuming a patient like June with, at least, some sentient 
awareness of her situation).  Like overall human mortality, this eventual 
termination of rational patient apathy is logically predictable because it is 
always certain.273 
         Since apathy no longer “buys” the patient anything274 in terms of a 
long-term future outlook at the end of life (and therefore, is no longer 
minimally rational),275 all of the patient’s earlier, life-long utility “purchases” 
via the “currency” of rational apathy also, retrospectively, become suspect 
as to their true overall value.276  The added burden of this suspicion may, in 
general, make dying even more difficult from an emotional and cognitive-
load perspective.  As brutal as it may sound, we would expect and posit that 
those more activist patients who can look back over their lives and can 
recognize and abandon their prior apathetic decision-making (not only with 
regard to health care but also other major life decisions) and become more 
ultra-rational with their choice behavior going forward, even for the bit of 
time left at the end of their respective lives, will be “better off” as they 
 
decision alternative of more ultra-rational, good-Bayesian updating (and of the resultant loss 
of apathetic meta-utility). 
273 End-of-life patients can, of course, pretend to remain outwardly apathetic and ignorant.  
We posit, however, that in an at least minimally-rational sphere of decisional awareness, timor 
mortis will always “pierce through” any such pretense.  Thus, no further utility derives from 
the prior belief that rational apathy pays better.  Accordingly, any continued bad-Bayesian 
updating of this prior belief is now perfectly-irrational calculative behavior. 
274 If rational apathy is part of the human condition and can be regarded as either (i) a terror 
management strategy or (ii) an “adaptive toolbox” coping-with-uncertainty strategy, it is a 
terribly inefficient strategy in either case: in any life-long “battle” of apathy versus timor 
mortis, we posit that the latter will always win.  See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 210–15 
(discussing terror management theory); see also Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 37 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten 
eds., 2001). 
275 Rational apathy is a long-term strategic tool aimed at attaining life-long decisional utility 
through the cumulative effect of small everyday decisional increments and accretions of 
apathy.  At the doorstep of nonexistence, any long-term strategic decision-making for one’s 
own future ends. 
276 In other words, we hypothesize that the certitude of a given patient’s convictions vis-à-vis 
the general utility of rational apathy may be severely waning at the end of life.  Indeed, the 
patient might recognize her life-long, ultimately futile investment in what Bryan Caplan has 
modelled as “rational irrationality”: “If the most pleasant belief for an individual differs from 
the belief dictated by [more ultra-]rational expectations, agents implicitly weigh the hedonic 
benefits of deviating from [more ultra-]rational expectations against the expected material 
costs of self-delusion [assuming that these] kinds of errors are privately costless.”  Caplan, 
supra note 237, at 4.  Accordingly, the end-of-life patient may now not only realize the social 
inefficiency of rational patient apathy across the entire health care delivery system caused by 
prior “private irrationality,” id., of both herself and similar passivist patients, but she may also 
begin to question the assumed costlessness to herself of her private-irrationality decision-
making and thus begin to painfully ascertain the compounded personal opportunity costs of 
having forgone the benefits of second-best, “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior for most 
of her adult life. 
NOAH & REICH-GRAEFE (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  10:45 AM 
610 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:535 
prepare to die.  Accordingly, we hypothesize that rational patient apathy has 
to “die” first, be abandoned, or otherwise not be present at the very end of 
life in order for the individual rationally-apathetic patient to “die well.” 
         Unfortunately, when already in extremis or close to it, good-Bayesian 
decision-making constitutes an impossibly tall order—psychologically, 
emotionally, and cognitively.277  Even worse, there is one’s life-long 
decisional momentum against good-Bayesian decision-making.  First, any 
awareness of the private costs of Bayesian error—i.e., the cumulative 
decisional-utility costs of rational apathy and rational ignorance practiced 
over the course of an entire lifetime—is virtually non-existent in a mindset 
that conveniently discounts these costs by “counting” on a continued life of 
indeterminable duration (and, with it, costless course correction, if 
absolutely necessary).  Second, discounting does not mean that rational 
apathy is indeed costless.  Any exercise of decisional apathy creates more 
personal preference and moral hazard for additional minimally-rational 
decision-making in a future deemed open-ended and foreseeably never-
ending.278  When the actual future becomes tangibly scarce at the end of life, 
the “intangible loss-producing propensities of the [rationally-apathetic] 
individual”279 over the course of her lifetime will suddenly materialize and 
reveal themselves.  In this regard, we also hypothesize that—not only 
system-wide but also on an individual-patient basis—the decisional-utility 
cost of rational apathy and ignorance compounds over time, namely, in tiny 
sediments and accretions of per-decision “apathy fees,”280 and that the 
deferred payments of those apathy fees, fully compounded, will become due 
on demand in a sudden “balloon payment” at the end of life.  Thus, not only 
does prospective meta-utility “unexpectedly” end towards the end of life, but 
the total trading costs of one’s prior apathy-financed meta-utility become 
“unexpectedly” due.281 
 
277 Cf. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 367 (“[C]hoice itself is never simple from the patient’s 
perspective.  The stakes are too high, making the choices fraught with anxiety.  The 
consequences are impossible to fully anticipate, rendering judgments at best semi-informed 
guesses.  And the circumstances are never really amenable: either the patients are healthy—
and therefore cannot be bothered to dwell much on medical matters—or they are sick, which 
often limits their capacity to process a lot of complicated information.”). 
278 Cf. Pauly, supra note 58, at 535. 
279 Id. at 535 (quoting OLIVER D. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE 463 (rev. ed.  1963)). 
280 Each fee equals the utility cost savings generated in a single decision produced through 
heuristic, rationally-apathetic behavior as compared to a single decision produced through 
algorithmic, Bayesian behavior.  Research suggests that even moderate attempts at the latter 
decisional mode may lead to reductions in post-choice satisfaction—a type of decisional cost 
saved, on a single-decision basis, through rationally-apathetic behavior.  See, e.g., Timothy 
D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction, 19 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331 (1993). 
281 In other words, life-long engagements in rational patient apathy are “buy-now-pay-later” 
transactions gone wrong.  Passivist patients “finance” the cost of ultra-rationality through 
apathy (thus, every time they “finance,” they  avoid the personal expense of producing by 
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         And we are talking existentially heavy apathy costs materializing and 
revealing themselves here:  assuming, at the end of life, that (i) patients have 
self-awareness of prior suboptimal choices—which with the benefit of 
hindsight can be recognized as suboptimal282 and therefore will lead to the 
awareness of regret,283 and (ii) patients have self-awareness of suboptimal 
prior decisional task completion284—which with the benefit of hindsight can 
be recognized as suboptimally done and will lead to the awareness of 
unfulfilled decisional potential,285 patients are now openly burdened with the 
following costs: 
1. the compounded opportunity cost of all rationally-apathetic 
and regret-inducing choices made over their entire 
cognitive lives (in terms of current awareness of once 
available but now permanently lost choice opportunities—
apathy costs of earlier choice-initiation avoidance), 
2. the psychological cost of facing an absolute bar to complete 
all earlier decisional tasks that were accomplished 
suboptimally (in terms of current decisional impotence 
notwithstanding current awareness of what the better 
choices would have been—apathy costs of earlier choice-
ratification avoidance), 
3. the psychological cost of regret awareness itself as a result 
of the inability to revise prior suboptimal decisions (in 
terms of current disappointment with one’s own past 
decisional performance—apathy costs of earlier choice-
monitoring avoidance), and 
 
themselves more ultra-rational decisional behavior and outcomes) and now, at the end of life, 
they lack both “revenues” and “savings” to repay earlier financings and, at the same time, 
produce “better bad-Bayesian” end-of-life choice behavior (see infra note 291 and 
accompanying text)—in particular, given that they never learned to produce their own ultra-
rational decisional “income” and “resilience.” 
282 “Suboptimal” here means not achieving “subjective ultra-rationality”—that is, the 
maximum of “better bad-Bayesian” choice (see infra note 291 and accompanying text) at the 
maximum of a given human’s current rational capabilities at the respective time(s) of her 
choice. 
283 See generally David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 
OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982); Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb, Regret in Cancer-Related 
Decisions, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S29 (Supp. 2005); Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., Eliciting 
Regret Improves Decision Making at the End of Life, 68 EUR. J. CANCER 27 (2016); 
Athanasios Tsalatsanis et al., Extensions to Regret-Based Decision Curve Analysis: An 
Application to Hospice Referral for Terminal Patients, 11 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & 
DECISION MAKING 77 (2011). 
284 The task here being the ratification, implementation and completion of “better bad-
Bayesian” choice (see infra note 291 and accompanying text) at the maximum of their current 
rational abilities at the respective time(s) of choice. 
285 I.e., awareness of lost-opportunity cost. 
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4. the psychological cost of completing one outstanding and 
specific decisional task which is both unwanted and 
unreceptive to rationally-apathetic behavior (in terms of 
attempting, through a few remaining, time-sensitive 
choices, to “die well”—apathy costs of earlier better-bad-
choice-rehearsal avoidance).286 
In other words, all of the dying patient’s earlier-life apathy utility in terms of 
“hedonic tax”287 avoidance and “regret avoidance”288 comes to an abrupt and 
complete end in end-of-life decision-making.  Fully aggregated, we therefore 
also posit that there is no such thing as “rational inertia.”289  Eventually, 
every human life runs out of time.  Accordingly, decisional inertia—as the 
meta-utility and sum total of all rationally-apathetic and rationally-ignorant 
choice behavior accruing over one’s entire decisional lifetime—is never 
costless, nor optimally cost-reducing, nor even minimally-rational in the 
long-term view of human life.  At the end, the “meta-utility balance” of costs 
and benefits of decisional inertia is always a negative sum.  Decisional 
intuition will always evaporate into thin air as any remaining time for 
decisional systematicity rapidly disappears. 
         As with every human endeavor and skill, there seems to be at least one 
clear solution for making better choices: practice makes perfect.290  Good 
decisions in dying are practiced and modelled by good decisions in living.  
Patients, before becoming patients, while still in good health, should work to 
robustly develop, through life-long practice, two fundamental qualities of 
their complex medical and non-medical decision-making: 
1. the quality of “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior—
i.e., patients should develop good habits of more ultra-
 
286 See also infra notes 348–349 and accompanying text.  The costs under 1. through 4. can 
also be aggregated into the apathy cost of decisional-systematicity avoidance. 
287 Bobadilla-Suarez et al., supra note 198, at 188. 
288 Id. at 189. 
289 See, e.g., Hugh H. Kim et al., Time is Money: Life Cycle Rational Inertia and Delegation 
of Investment Management 1 (Pension Res. Council, Working Paper No. WP2013-33, 2013) 
(describing “[i]ndividuals’ tendency to maintain their [financial] portfolio allocations for long 
periods of time [as] investor inertia” and demonstrating that by “incorporat[ing] time costs 
associated with investment management . . . such inertia can be consistent with optimal 
behavior”).  Alas, if one incorporates time cost in one direction (i.e., in terms of savings of 
current time not spent for purposes of short-term optimal, rationally-apathetic behavior), one 
also needs to incorporate time cost in the other direction (i.e., in terms of losses of later time 
spent as a result of prior rationally-apathetic behavior).  We posit that the long-term cost of 
time losses eventually always catches up with the short-term benefit of time savings.  In short, 
time always catches up as lost—it can never be saved. 
290 “Good decisions come from experience.  Experience comes from making bad decisions.”  
Schlesinger et al., supra note 83, at 38S (quoting Mark Twain); see also REID HASTIE & 
ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2 (2d ed. 2010) (“Choosing wisely is a learned skill, 
which, like any other skill, can be improved with experience.”) (emphasis in original). 
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rational and less biased choice behavior in order to 
maximize their utility of decisional outcomes;291 and 
2. the quality of “selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior—
i.e., patients should develop an activist decisional ability to 
discriminate between choice situations warranting only 
default rational apathy292 and choice situations requiring 
“better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior.293 
B. Legal Effects: The Infra-Marginality of Informed Consent 
         Informed consent law is idealistic and flawed because it assumes the 
prevalence of Williamsonian ultra-rationality where (i) patients and 
physicians make decisions with only bounded rationality and opportunism 
 
291 What we call “better bad-Bayesianism” is not a normative decisional theory.  It is neither 
aimed at making correct decisions nor at making decisions correctly.  Cf. Beach & Lipshitz, 
supra note 38, at 28 (“[C]lassical decision theory does not address the question of making 
correct decisions, it merely addresses the question of making decisions correctly.”).  And it is 
only a prescriptive decisional theory to the extent that it assumes humans to be capable of 
decisional systematicity as a result of which they strive to optimize the value of their choices.  
Accordingly, “better bad-Bayesianism” accepts a given patient’s ability to strive for a less-
minimally-rational decisional process and outcome, therefore, to attempt attaining a personal 
decisional optimum.  This optimum will rarely, if ever, be perfect, will often be less “better 
bad-Bayesian” than would be possible for similarly-situated others or even possible for the 
patient herself at a different time of deciding, but the “best bad-Bayesian” choice that this 
particular patient in her particular choice situation and under the particular conditions of the 
overall choice architecture at the time of deciding is personally capable of. 
292 Or other cognitive heuristics and biases. 
293 Accordingly, what we call “selective bad-Bayesianism” applies to the threshold decision 
of whether or not to engage in “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior.  Thus, overall, 
“selective bad-Bayesianism” is a procedural-rationality subset of “better bad-Bayesianism.”  
Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 53 (“Navigating through the ups and downs of life 
requires a delicate balance between self-deception and honest objectivity.”).  We all, at least 
intuitively, understand the prevalence and efficiency of “selective forgetfulness” in order to 
avoid cognitive overload.  In terms of learning, the ease of short-term memory loss (as the 
default) and the difficulty of long-term memory gain (as a learned behavior, either by choice 
or circumstance) are, depending on task environment and utility preferences, either a benefit 
or a detriment.  Thus, if rational apathy (as the default) is an autopoietic decisional behavior 
aimed at the ex-post suppression of cognitive awareness and current memory of earlier choice 
situations (in terms of “deciding not to decide and then forgetting” or “waiting to decide and 
then not seeing”), we also must, at least intuitively, understand that, as learned behavior, we 
need to exert more effort to overcome the default (short-term memory loss/rational apathy) 
and opt into the exception (long-term memory gain/“better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior).  
In terms of rational apathy, this opt-in behavior is, by necessity, both decisional and active—
i.e., there is no secondary passivist default overwriting and correcting the primary passivist 
default of apathy in case the primary default choice would lead to the prediction of suboptimal 
choice outcomes.  Hence, “selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior is a probabilistic utility 
judgment and, as with all decisional judgment, can be learned, regularly practiced (to avoid 
loss of “selective bad-Bayesian” memory and technique) and, accordingly, optimized.  Good 
habits of decision-making are, in and of themselves, of immense (meta-)value and 
(meta-)utility. 
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as constraints, (ii) Knightian uncertainty is either absent or can be overcome 
by confident calculation, (iii) cognitive heuristics and biases are 
inapplicable, and (iv) “ultra-autonomy”294 prevails across a vast spectrum of 
end-of-life patient populations.295  In short, informed consent law “has 
substituted an ideal moral agent for a practical one.”296  Dying patients, 
however, are rarely superheroes.297  Recent developments such as decision-
support aids, shared decision-making and nudging298 may help improve the 
quality of end-of-life decision-making so that it comports somewhat more 
with the utopian ideal of informed consent.299  Physicians and ethicists are 
now more actively advocating strategies for responding to requests for 
potentially inappropriate medical care.300  These functional and legal 
rationality augmentations301 and palliatives,302 can, however, only make a 
small dent in rational patient apathy because of (i) the inherent limiting 
effects of various types of clinical uncertainty, including Knightian 
uncertainty, on an individual-patient basis, and (ii) the limitation of those 
mechanisms to point-of-care improvements only (i.e., when serious illness 
already has arisen and complex medical decisions have to be made).303  
Although commentators have recognized that classical theories of decision-
making do not adequately describe the realities of the process, they 
 
294 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
295 I.e., excluding only patients without current decisional capacity irrespective of the cause(s) 
thereof. 
296 Butkus, supra note 65, at 76. 
297 As in all human affairs, there are notable exceptions.  See, e.g., SOLOMON ET AL., supra 
note 6, at vii–viii (“On a rainy, gray day in December 1973, philosopher Sam Keen, writing 
for Psychology Today, trundled down the halls of a hospital in Burnaby, British Columbia, to 
interview a terminally ill cancer patient who doctors said had just days to live.  When Keen 
entered the room, the dying man told him, with a touch of mortal irony: ‘You are catching me 
in extremis.  This is a test of everything I’ve written about death.  And I’ve got a chance to 
show how one dies . . . how one accepts his death.’  The man in the hospital bed was cultural 
anthropologist Ernest Becker . . . .  Ernest Becker died on March 6, 1974, at the age of forty-
nine.”).  Becker’s magnum opus is ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH (1973). 
298 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 133; Wright, supra note 268. 
299 See generally Noah & Feigenson, supra note 3. 
300 See, e.g., Gabriel T. Bosslet et al., Responding to Requests for Potentially Inappropriate 
Treatments in Intensive Care Units, 191 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1318, 
1319–28 (2015) (recommending use of the term “potentially inappropriate” rather than 
“futile” in these situations and suggesting that physicians should seek dispute resolution and, 
if necessary, decline to provide the requested care). 
301 Cf. Patel et al., supra note 157, at 66–68. 
302 Cf. Clark, supra note 68, at 779; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 396–97. 
303 Either in actuality (i.e., the patient has been diagnosed with a serious illness) or 
hypothetically (i.e., the patient engages in advance planning for possible future situations of 
serious illness). 
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nevertheless assume that a “best” decision is achievable under the right 
circumstances.304 
         Ideally, an ultra-rational patient would not only have a deep awareness 
and appreciation of the impact of uncertainty on all aspects of her life 
(including, but not limited to, her health and mortality), but would also have 
practiced rational choice, with full awareness and appreciation of these 
limiting conditions, through a multitude of different choice contexts and 
iterations of similar choice situations during most of her adult life.305  In other 
words, the ultra-rational patient would be good at making rationally 
competent, “better bad-Bayesian” decisions.306  She would also be good at 
spotting her individual inclinations towards rational apathy and, in each 
instance, at making good, “selective bad-Bayesian” meta-utility judgments 
between either avoiding or engaging with apathy.  Furthermore, as a highly-
skilled repeat player, she would fully appreciate the cognitive “bandwidth 
tax” which every engagement with serious illness and the resultant 
involuntary exposure to a complex health care system will bring.307  As a 
result, any treatment decision would normally come with such a high burden 
of calculative complexity and uncertainty that the good-Bayesian patient 
would simply not be able, and so would rationally refuse, to resolve and 
reduce the complexity and uncertainty at the point of care.308 
         Notwithstanding its idealistic conception, in the context of rational 
patient apathy, informed consent law principally operates within the 
individual realm (between individual doctors and patients) as a means of 
avoiding litigation risk.309  In the collective realm, the superficial compliance 
with the legal requirements of informed-consent process among doctors and 
patients as a group has the effect of cementing suboptimal consent outcomes.  
 
304 See, e.g., McCaul et al., supra note 172, at S106 (noting the effects of bounded rationality 
and heuristics on patient decision-making but suggesting that, when decision-makers consider 
the probability of various outcomes for each possible choice, it is still possible to select the 
“best” option). 
305 Cf. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 380 (“[M]uch health care involves repeat business.”). 
306 Cf. John Harris, Consent and End of Life Decisions, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 10, 12 (2003) (“It 
is not people who are competent but decisions.”). 
307 See, e.g., Ada C. Stefanescu Schmidt et al., Boundedly Rational Patients? Part 2: Health 
and Patient Mistakes in a Behavioral Framework, 1 J. BEHAV. ECON. POL’Y. 17, 19–20 
(2017). 
308 I.e., while still at the hospital or in the doctor’s office or in any other circumstance of 
temporarily reduced cognitive bandwidth.  Accordingly, and unless it were a situation of dire 
emergency, she would impose on herself a “cooling-off period” after which she would be able 
to reflect and decide (more) ultra-rationally.  Cf. id. at 21. 
309 See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT (1986).  In this regard, rational patient apathy has a meta-utility similar 
to malpractice insurance.  Insurance allows both patient and physician to minimize (if not, 
avoid) complementary financial risk—thus, to “un-bear” and (mostly) forget the residual risk 
of suboptimal choice.  Unlike the patient, however, the physician will continue to bear 
reputational risk of malpractice (litigation). 
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Large numbers of passivist patients working on an iterative basis with large 
numbers of passivist physicians reinforce mediocrity in complex medical 
and end-of-life decision-making.  Because suboptimal but superficially-
acceptable informed-consent practices usually “work” to protect (i) the 
patient against rational-apathy meta-utility losses and (ii) the physician 
against potential legal liability, there is no urgent incentive for the collective 
of patients and health care providers to do better.  Superficial compliance 
with informed consent law allows the passivists to free-ride on the en banc 
legal compliance of the “herd” with little to no incentive to attempt a 
discussion that aims higher—namely, to a level of ultra-rational 
understanding and decisional autonomy that would be achievable within the 
limits of bounded rationality, residual opportunism and Knightian 
uncertainty. 
         To be clear, we are by no means advocating the abandonment of 
informed consent law or a return to the “bad old days” of physician 
paternalism.  At a minimum, the law still serves a hortatory function within 
every physician-patient relationship.  For those activist patients and 
physicians who wish to optimize the quality of decision-making, informed 
consent law can still provide the legal framework in which to evaluate what 
information to provide and discuss.310  If informed consent law, however, 
were more than just half-heartedly idealistic and utopian, it would also 
prescribe an understanding that “reasonable” scope of disclosure would 
mean “reasonable to a good Bayesian.”  Accordingly, genuinely utopian law 
would further require that competent medical decision-making, particularly 
at the end of life, would be a collective, shared agency311 and responsibility 
of patient and doctor312 and that it should be guided by algorithmic rather 
than heuristic thinking and deciding, unaffected by either rational patient 
apathy or rational physician apathy.  In contrast, pursuant to the prevalence 
and exploitation of rational apathy in non-utopian decision-making, actual 
informed consent law, both on the books and in application, is not about 
“obtaining consent or respecting [patient] autonomy [but rather about] 
securing acquiescence—quite another thing.”313 
 
310 I.e., depending on jurisdiction, what a reasonable physician would disclose or what a 
reasonable patient would find material.  See supra note 190. 
311 See supra note 230. 
312 I.e., not simply a shared responsibility for complementary decisional components (e.g., 
physician provides the information, patient ratifies the choice), but a “joint and several” 
responsibility for an indivisible, team-produced outcome which would be the ultimate shared 
choice and understanding between patient and physician, only memorialized in terms of an 
actual informed consent. 
313 Harris, supra note 306, at 12. 
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1. Patient Infra-Marginality 
         Autonomy, in the context of informed consent, is “the value expressed 
as the ability to choose and have the freedom to choose between competing 
conceptions of how to live and indeed of why we do so.”314  In order to 
competently choose between those rival conceptions and to single out and 
consent to a single ‘best” conception on an informed basis, patient autonomy 
and the law of informed consent assume that patients are what we call “ultra-
autonomous” decisional experts.  They enjoy “freedom from [all] controlling 
influences.”315 
         In a Coasean utopia of hyper-rationality, patients would also be “hyper-
autonomous” informational and decisional experts—with regard to every 
one of the above competing conceptions.  They would require no input from 
medical experts or other forms of (informational) assistance by anyone in 
making perfectly autonomous decisions.  They would have absolute freedom 
(and subject-matter competence) to choose because, as perfectly independent 
agents, they would know everything there is to know (including all of their 
future utility preferences) and would rely on no one other than themselves in 
order to make a perfect choice—which, while still giving the inevitable nod 
to their mortality, would pair the exact maximum of surviving with the exact 
maximum of thriving available under the circumstances. 
         Notwithstanding its idealistic conception, the law of informed consent 
rejects the utopia of hyper-autonomy.  But it still erroneously embraces ultra-
autonomy in that it presumes that patients are not only aware of, and can 
factor into their decision-making, the rationality limitations of the Knightian 
world316 in order to provide informed consent, but are also always able to 
autonomously factor the autonomy limitations of the real world into their 
decision-making.317  It is true that humans, in general, can ultra-
autonomously breath and supply oxygen to their bodies because (i) air is 
usually freely available; (ii) their bodies can usually process air perfectly; 
and (iii) they are generally aware of both their need for air and their ability 
to meet that need because they can test for both of these attributes by simply 
holding their breath for a short period of time.  Patients, however, unless they 
are physicians and have the relevant specialty expertise, can never ultra-
autonomously choose and consent to complex medical treatment because (i) 
knowledge is not freely available; (ii) they cannot perfectly find, filter and 
process relevant knowledge by themselves; and (iii) they are generally 
unaware of their need for more relevant knowledge and of their inability to 
 
314 Id. at 10–11. 
315 George, supra note 60, at 140. 
316 See supra Figure 1. 
317 For example, they would be aware of any and all “decision frames” impacting their 
choices, thus, unavoidably limiting their ability to “mak[e] truly autonomous decisions in the 
sense of effectuating their own preferences.” Epstein, supra note 133, at 1286. 
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meet that need because they have no means to test for this dual lack of 
awareness.  Accordingly, an ultra-autonomous patient would, through 
logical reasoning, “know[] one thing, that he knows nothing.”318 
         Again, rational patient apathy here works as a principal mechanism to 
shield passivist patients’ awareness of their lack of ultra-autonomy and 
decisional control.  This rational-apathy shield allows for minimally-
autonomous decision-making but without even the awareness that the 
minimally-autonomous choice is, at best, limited to a better bad choice.  As 
a result, the vast majority of patients is infra-marginal to improvements in 
informed consent law, particularly at the end of life, when whatever one is 
consenting to is not going to be preferred and can never amount to a “best” 
or even a “good” choice.  Patients simply do not know—and usually do not 
want to know—what they are missing.  Thus, whatever we do in terms of 
improving informed consent law in order to nudge and engage passivists at 
the point of contact with serious illness and the health care system, it does 
not matter—not even marginally.  The majoritarian apathetic default set by 
infra-marginal, passivist patients means that overall decisional behavior is 
normally beyond the reach of any improvement in the rules.  Infra-marginal 
apathetic patients are excellent Bayesian updaters in terms of protecting prior 
beliefs of rational apathy and its utility.  Accordingly, the design and 
provision of more and better decisional aids, more and better advance-care 
planning tools, etc.—all aimed at improving the experience of patients as 
well as the quality of clinical outcomes—only marginally increase patients’ 
cognitive payloads for rationally-apathetic and ignorant non-Bayesian 
updating.  In fact, these efforts at improvement will continue to allow 
passivist patients to escape any awareness of self-deception in terms of their 
imagined decisional ultra-autonomy and rationality. 
         To be clear, we do not in any way criticize passivist patients for their 
rational apathy.  All of us are passivist patients and decision-makers at least 
some of the time.319  All of us “have neither the willingness nor the ability to 
[rationally] manage”320 our lives all of the time.  Being decisionally-
apathetic is a reasonable option when well-chosen (i.e., in a “selective bad-
Bayesian” manner).321  We only here posit that patients who, irrespective of 
 
318 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  See also Wright, supra note 268, at 1093 
(discussing how patients “understand the exercise of autonomy to be relational in two distinct 
dimensions: deciding with others and deciding, in part, based on others’ interests”). 
319 Given that (i) Bayesian updating is always immediately (i.e., non-deferredly) costly and 
often inefficient and (ii) non-Bayesian updating is often only costly on a deferred (thus, not 
immediate) basis and often works well (enough), we all, over a lifetime of “experiential 
learning,” have developed a “meta-preference” for non-Bayesian updating and with it, for 
passivist decision-making. 
320 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 397. 
321 Thus, “ecologically rational.”  See, e.g., Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 368.  
(“A heuristic is considered ecologically rational when it functionally matches the structure of 
environment.”); see also Revenson & Pranikoff, supra note 107. 
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preset legal structures and choice architectures, prefer to be more activist—
cognitively, emotionally, and with a willingness to embrace uncertainty—
could have better tools for doing so, particularly at the end of life.  
Accordingly, the “legal approach toward improving the efficiency of 
collective [patient] action [should be] to make it cheaper for each [activist 
patient] to act in an informed way.”322  At present, however, activist patients 
fend for themselves.  They are functionally orphaned by the scope and 
practice of informed consent law.323 
2. Physician Infra-Marginality 
         Rational physician apathy, i.e., the minimally-rational decisional 
support of, and influence over, patient decision-making by individual 
doctors, is similarly infra-marginal to improvements in informed consent 
law.  In the individual physician-patient realm, the practical application of 
informed consent law is more about avoiding litigation risk than about 
supporting patients in making robust, high-quality health decisions.  Thus, 
in the limited context of informed consent law compliance, an efficient 
passivist physician can be rationally apathetic to all outcomes of patient 
choice other than the reduction of litigation risk.  As explained above, 
“[p]hysicians are [also] imperfect agents in that they will recommend 
treatment beyond the ‘patient’s optimum level’ in order to gain income.”324  
In the current context, this income includes both financial gains and meta-
utility gains.  There is strong evidence of this meta-utility: “Physicians have 
been shown to be creatures of habit in making medical choices, and are slow 
to adopt new practices and technologies that would improve the quality of 
care and in turn their patients’ health.”325  Again, to be clear, there are many 
activist physicians who seek to help their patients make good choices and so 
optimize care at the end of life, to the benefit of the individual patient and 
the collective.  And even passivist physicians no doubt care about achieving 
good health outcomes.  Even the best activist physician, however, will be a 
bad Bayesian at least some of the time, and activist physicians will always 
constitute a minority of “better bad-Bayesians” in a system skewed towards 
passivist apathy. 
         Within the collective realm of informed consent law as lived by 
patients and doctors, the baseline legal process of simply providing the 
patient with required material information and asking the patient to agree or 
“choose” constitutes the most competitive transaction with the lowest 
 
322 Clark, supra note 68, at 783. 
323 Thus, at a minimum, raising “an issue of fairness;” cf. Pinto, supra note 271, at 326.  See 
also Butkus, supra note 65, at 77 (“If we genuinely care for our patients, we ought to help 
them reach meaningful choices, instead of fiating an empty and ill-defined autonomy.”). 
324 Frank, supra note 230, at 7. 
325 Id. at 8. 
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transaction cost.  Those physicians who adopt this pro forma approach to the 
legal duty of informed consent are free-riding on activist physicians’ efforts 
to make consent more robust.  Fully aggregated, they negatively affect 
patients’ overall quality of life but win the race to the bottom in terms of 
physician labor-cost savings and meta-utility benefits.  All of their supply-
side actions are in concordance with the demand-side behavior for rational 
apathy by infra-marginal passivist patients.  Thus, the demand from passivist 
patients and supply from passivist physicians for rational-apathy utility meet 
and control the market for suboptimal end-of-life decision-making. 
         Finally, the limitations on physicians’ time and the impact of payment 
structures play a role here.  In light of the general assumption made by health 
economists and health care market participants that patient “outcomes are 
‘non-contractible’, that is it is impractical to pay doctors on outcome” and, 
instead, that doctors paid on a fee-for-service basis should be “rewarded for 
having a higher volume of patients seeking his or her services,”326 how would 
we expect passivist doctors to respond to marginal legal or financial 
incentives aimed at improving informed consent?327  Given that (i) the 
incentive (i.e., price change) will increase physician labor; (ii) physician 
labor is a scarce resource; (iii) physician labor will generally have higher-
priced uses (in terms of serving other patients at higher fees for service than 
spending the same physician labor on lower-fee informed-consent services); 
and (iv) more physician labor spent on “better bad-Bayesianism” will 
decrease the utility of rational physician apathy, the marginal cost of 
physician labor will be significantly higher for “better bad-Bayesian” 
informed consent labor than for bad-Bayesian informed consent labor.  As a 
result, the passivist default for many physicians will be to remain infra-
marginal, to consistently offer subpar quality on all aspects of informed 
consent, and to be rewarded by “[b]ecoming a bad doctor.”328  Moreover, as 
this passivist physician behavior also promotes horizontal rational patient-
physician apathy, it will help turn the information-asymmetric market for 
complex medical decision-making into a “market for lemons.”329 
 
 
 
 
326 Id. at 10. 
327 For example, in the form of a Medicare reimbursement rule change that allows doctors to 
earn an extra fee for the service of having an advance-planning conversation with a Medicare 
patient.  See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text (discussing this rule). 
328 Szech, supra note 90, at 244. 
329 Akerlof, supra note 54. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
If the disease does not respond to the medicine, the explanation 
lies not in flaws in the medicament but in insufficient dosage, in 
want of time, in want of “commitment” to the treatment.—Frank 
Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel330 
 
Start where you are.—Pema Chödrön331 
 
         Rational patient apathy refuses to formulate concrete and realistic 
patient-outcome preferences.  It refuses to decide on the merits of an optimal 
“pathway” between the patient’s decisional situation and her most-preferred 
health outcome.  Rational patient ignorance refuses to recognize that a 
particular choice situation may have arisen, i.e., that choice uncertainty and 
a need for evidence even exist.  In combination, rational patient apathy and 
ignorance refuse to recognize that anything has to be decided which may 
have a bearing on a patient’s outcome preferences and their attendant 
probabilities—other than, by reiterative default, to “decide not to decide.”  
As a result, and assuming that we want to improve both patient experiences 
within the informed-consent system and wholistic clinical outcomes for 
patients based on better informed-consent practice, we need to develop 
concrete, intervening methods and practices that educate patients and 
physicians to bypass the non-outcome centeredness that rational patient 
apathy promotes. 
         This reform process should include what we call “non-utopian practical 
pathways” aimed at developing viable incentives and solutions for improved 
choice behavior at the end of life.  Put simply, we have to design meaningful 
ways for current and future patients to learn to actively participate in their 
complex medical treatment decisions.332  As mentioned above,333 the focus 
here is to develop no-nonsense, cost-effective and otherwise sufficiently 
“appealing” avenues to support and nurture “better bad-Bayesian” and 
“selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior—both on a per-patient/per-
physician basis and systemically.  In the individual realm, the objective is to 
move beyond the atomistic competition334 faced by two groups of 
 
330 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 396. 
331 PEMA CHÖDRÖN, START WHERE YOU ARE—A GUIDE TO COMPASSIONATE LIVING (2001). 
332 In other words, if rationally-apathetic indifference towards informed consent is attributable 
to a lack of meaningful ways for patients to participate more actively in their complex medical 
treatment decisions, it is a self-reinforcing frustration given the relative powerlessness 
encountered in end-of-life decision-making.  This frustration could be somewhat overcome if 
patients believed and understood that their decisions, passive or active, will inevitably have 
some direct effect on, and correlation with, treatment outcomes and the generation of 
individual and collective welfare benefits. 
333 See supra notes 292–293 and accompanying text. 
334 See supra note 259. 
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participants in the “market for rational apathy:” (i) patients and doctors who 
are already activist-inclined; and (ii) passivist patients and doctors who are 
at least minimally inclined to question the one-size-fits-all meta-utility of 
their respective rational-apathy defenses.  In other words, we are realists who 
do not presume that even a majority of passivist patients and physicians 
would want to become more rationally activist.  We also fully acknowledge 
that a large majority of complex medical decisions at the end of life can never 
be made in a good-Bayesian, ultra-rational manner.  Rather, in the individual 
realm, practical pathways should be designed to provide opportunities to all 
end-of-life patients—which most of us will eventually become—to be less 
bad-Bayesian in their decision-making some of the time.  Accordingly, the 
teleological design of pathways should not be remedial and normativistic—
i.e., in terms of busting or solving rational patient apathy and returning or 
nudging patient decision-making to where it should be in the first place.335  
As we hope our discussion has made clear, rational patient apathy and 
ignorance are both “rational” in that they serve valid, efficient and important 
private and public goals336—but never indiscriminately across the entire 
board of all possible choice behavior, never all of the time, and certainly 
rarely, if ever,337 at the end of life.  As a result, the design of individual 
pathways should be supportive and, at most, prescriptive.  The design should 
provide enabling mechanisms and structures aimed at helping interested 
patients and physicians to improve their individual choice behavior.338 
         In the collective realm of patients and medical providers, similar 
enabling mechanisms and structures should support the totality of their 
choice behavior.  In other words, here we should try to bring patients and 
physicians together—ideally, outside of their actual point-of-care 
interactions—in order to collaboratively improve their team-produced339 
choice behavior at the end of life.  The objective here is to move beyond the 
rational-apathy-inducing free-rider problem340 of latent-group patient-
decisionmakers and physician-decisionmakers.  Each of these two large 
groups has “latent power or capacity for action, but that potential power can 
 
335 See, e.g., Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., Rational Decision Making in Medicine: 
Implications for Overuse and Underuse, 24 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 655, 656 (2018) 
(discussing differences between descriptive, normative and prescriptive theories of 
normativity). 
336 In addition, we would also claim that humans are unable to ever entirely transcend the 
rational-apathy boundary shown in Figure 1, and, thus, to transfer their complex medical 
decision-making completely from a bad-Bayesian into a good-Bayesian choice architecture.  
Hence, our focus on “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior. 
337 Particularly, for the reasons discussed in Part IV.A supra. 
338 Cf. Pauly, supra note 58, at 537 (“No single . . . policy is ‘best’ or ‘most efficient’ for a 
whole population of diverse tastes.”). 
339 See supra note 312. 
340 See supra notes 242–251 and accompanying text. 
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be realized or ‘mobilized’ only with the aid of ‘selective incentives.’”341  In 
addition, the latent group of physician-decisionmakers must largely overlap 
with the latent group of patient-decisionmakers given that most physicians 
will also become end-of-life patients at some time.  This presents an 
opportunity to capitalize on the concordance342 that already functionally 
exists between patients and physicians as part of their joint decision-making 
as well as on the empathy-based concordance that should accrue from the 
fact that physicians are also future patients.343  Therefore, in the collective 
realm, we should attempt to design pathways to move far beyond the 
standard response for improving or remedying the quality of complex 
medical decision-making such as calls to improve medical training of 
physicians for better point-of-care patient interaction.344 
         Instead, we should consider two very different changes:  first, because 
the race to the bottom is produced through the joint agency of physicians and 
patients, practical pathways should attempt to selectively slow down and 
possibly reverse the race by bridging the relational distance that commonly 
exists between patient and physician cohorts.  The practical implications of 
rational patient apathy and its effects on the delivery of health care for 
seriously ill and dying patients require not only education of the 
stakeholders, but also ways for patients and physicians to jointly and 
systematically disrupt some of their co-generated rational apathy and its 
consequent effects.  These efforts can realistically focus only on those 
physicians and patients (in our opinion, a minority of both populations) who 
are open to change and not already rationally apathetic towards rational 
apathy.  Accordingly, we are fully aware that these “concordance” 
approaches based on commonality, affinity and joint responsibility will at 
best appeal to only some patients and doctors some of the time. 
         Second, because most of the race to the bottom is the result of only 
structurally-limited point-of-care engagements between patients and 
physicians, namely, where a diagnosis of serious illness triggers complex 
choices for wholistically optimal health care delivery, collective pathways 
should provide supports for complex medical decision-making well before 
end-of-life points of care.  In other words, we believe that, collectively, 
 
341 OLSON, supra note 242, at 51. 
342 See, e.g., Schmidt et al., supra note 307, at 20 (discussing “a concordance between frame 
of mind of the physician and patient”); see also Harris, supra note 306, at 11 (“Informed 
consent is a dimension of respect for persons in that it is through consenting to things that 
affect us that we make those things consistent with our own values.  When we consent to what 
others propose we make their ends and objectives part of our own plans . . . .”). 
343 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing physicians’ preferences respecting 
their own end-of-life care). 
344 For a critical assessment of those standard calls, see, for example, Hall, supra note 69, at 
1135–36 (“In the inner sanctum of the treatment relationship, the concern is that trust may be 
too high, not too low, creating impossible demands on physicians and institutions to meet 
such unrealistic expectations.”). 
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patients cannot wait until a diagnosis of serious illness “eats up” even more 
bandwidth than they will normally have and be willing to commit in order to 
critically engage with rational patient apathy and “better bad-Bayesian” 
updating.  Optimizing end-of-life decision-making needs to be practiced well 
before the crisis eventually occurs, namely much earlier in life and much 
more pervasively.345  As a result, the design of collective pathways should 
aim to increase both awareness and practice of better choice behavior, 
including in end-of-life decision-making.  Being realists, we acknowledge 
that practical pathways must be feasible and effective notwithstanding the 
large burden of external pressures on physicians (such as fear about liability, 
payment-system incentives to provide more than necessary care, and the 
broader challenges of the complex, multi-institutional payor/provider system 
of health care finance and delivery in the United States) which will always 
limit their potential efficacy. 
         Finally, we acknowledge that less-apathetic, more ultra-rational 
decision-making, to the extent that it is feasible in a given choice situation, 
always remains unalterably constrained by Knightian uncertainty, bounded 
rationality and opportunism.346  The value of transcending the rational-
apathy boundary in a single choice “transaction” may be minimal-to-
nonexistent in terms of concrete benefits (i.e., marginal costs of bad-
Bayesian decision-making compared to those of “better bad-Bayesian” 
decision-making on a per-choice basis).347  We suggest, however, that (i) 
similar to the meta-utility of rational patient apathy, “better bad-Bayesian” 
decision-making, practiced over the long-term, also offers compounding 
meta-utility returns—but in terms of more competent and confident decision-
 
345 Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 (“And here’s the really tragic part of our condition: 
only we humans, due to our enlarged and sophisticated neocortex, can experience [the] terror 
[of feeling mortally threatened] in the absence of looming danger.”) (emphasis in original); 
id. at 10 (“Socrates defined the task of philosophy as ‘learning how to die.’”).  For a perhaps 
mundane but certainly outside-of-the-box practical “tool” to promote this practice, see, for 
example, Bianca Bosker, The App That Reminds You You’re Going to Die, ATLANTIC 
(Jan./Feb. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/when-death-
pings/546587/ (describing an App called “WeCroak” which sends five daily reminders, at 
random times, that users of the app are mortal, based on a Bhutanese folk saying that “to be a 
truly happy person, one must contemplate death five times daily”). 
346 See supra Figure 1. 
347 Particularly, given the existence of uncertainties that cannot be quantified probabilistically.  
See, e.g., ITZHAK GILBOA, THEORY OF DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 130–31 (2009) (“The 
main difficulty with . . . the entire Bayesian approach is, in my mind, the following: for many 
problems of interest, there is no sufficient information based on which one can define 
probabilities.  Referring to probabilities as subjective rather than objective is another symptom 
of the problem, not a solution thereof.  It is a symptom, because, were one capable of 
reasoning one’s way to probabilistic assessments, one could have also convinced others of 
that reasoning and result in a more objective notion of probability.  Subjective probabilities 
are not a solution to the problem: subjectivity . . . does not give us a reason to choose one 
probability over another.”). 
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making rather than decision-avoidance; and (ii) unlike the meta-utility of 
rational patient apathy, this “better bad-Bayesian meta-utility” will generate 
significantly better psychosocial and medical dividends over the long run 
and, in particular, at the end of life.  Patients and physicians who have a 
preference to systematically practice more ultra-rational and wholistically 
authentic decision-making, in principle, will reap significant “utility 
rewards” at the end of life: 
1. reduced opportunity cost as well as increased psychological 
benefit—because of their past choice behavior that resulted 
in improved completion of important decisional tasks and 
their current awareness thereof; 
2. reduced psychological cost—because of their past ability to 
avoid regret through more competent decision-making 
generally348—as well as further increased psychological 
benefit—because of their current “awareness of regret-
avoidance;” 
3. further reduced psychological cost—because, in now 
attempting, through a few remaining choices, to “die well,” 
they have long learned to accept and embrace limited 
choice and limited autonomy; and 
4. the eventual psychological benefit of dying with less fear 
and being more at peace.349 
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to expect that, on average, these patients 
will also be more likely to refuse highly-invasive, life-prolonging 
technologies at the end of life because they are more content with their earlier 
decisions.  They may more easily accept impending death as they look back 
over their lives as decision-makers who opted to step away from rational 
apathy and practiced better rational choice at key points throughout life. 
         The overall practical impact of rational patient and physician apathy on 
informed consent law and the delivery of end-of-life care also prompts a need 
for further theoretical and empirical study and testing.  As examples, areas 
for further research should include the following: 
1. basic and applied decision research350 of rational patient 
apathy in each of its four dimensions as well as in various 
combinations—for example, co-individual intersections of 
rational patient apathy and rational physician apathy, co-
collective intersections of vertical and horizontal rational 
patient-physician apathy,351 intersections of individual and 
 
348 Frank, supra note 230, at 7. 
349 See also supra notes 282–289 and accompanying text. 
350 See, e.g., Nelson et al., supra note 230, at S3. 
351 For example, the specialization and resultant fragmentation of health care service providers 
and patients’ reliance on multiple medical experts as part of a “single” treatment (as over the 
course of  June’s treatment for Stage IV ovarian cancer) should normally bring with it a 
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collective realms, and interdependencies among all four 
realms; 
2. theoretical and empirical research situating rational patient 
apathy, similar to other heuristics, within “ecological 
rationality”352—for example, if “selective bad-
Bayesianism” may be understood as decision-making 
which adheres to “an ecological notion of rationality that is 
achieved through a functional match between the heuristic 
strategy and the task environment,”353 how does this 
environment fundamentally change at the end of life and 
what are the consequences of this change on the meta-
utility of rational patient apathy on the one hand and the 
meta-utility of “better bad-Bayesian” patient choice on the 
other hand; 
3. theoretical research on the presumed meta-utility of ultra-
rational decision-making—for example, to what extent 
may a reduction of rational patient apathy have unintended 
consequences for the overall system;354 
4. empirical research on the role of physicians as “better bad-
Bayesian decisional intermediaries”—for example, given 
that physicians have a competitive advantage as repeat 
players with more experience in complex medical decision-
making under uncertainty, qualitative research 
interviewing physicians in relevant specialties (such as 
oncology, cardiology, critical care medicine, and palliative 
care) could provide better insight on rational patient apathy 
and its implications for informed medical decision-making 
as well as on how physicians would, if freed from external 
pressures, envision a better informed-consent process, 
including practical pathways in promoting that process; 
 
diverse network of rational patient apathy because (i) the same patient will interact with 
differently-positioned physicians in terms of rational physician apathy and (ii) those 
differently-positioned physicians also have to coordinate the patient’s diagnosis and treatment 
amongst themselves.  Thus, in both these realms, there could be “rational apathy asymmetry,” 
“rational apathy noise” and other “rational apathy distortions” observable within these 
collective point-of-care interactions. 
352 Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 368 (“Heuristics are adaptive tools that ignore 
information to make fast and frugal decisions that are accurate and robust under conditions of 
uncertainty.  A heuristic is considered ecologically rational when it functionally matches the 
structure of environment.”) (emphasis in original). 
353 Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 367. 
354 Cf. DAVID COLANDER, BEYOND MICROFOUNDATIONS: POST WALRASIAN ECONOMICS 116 
(1996) (“In the Walrasian conception the ultra-rational economic actor drives the system to 
equilibrium and serves a useful purpose.  In the Marshallian system such ultra-rational 
economic actors can destroy the system by destroying the institutions that give it stability.”). 
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5. “translational research”355 of patient infra-marginality and 
its impact on specific reform measures within informed 
consent law—for example, empirical correlation studies on 
the utilization of specific decisional aids, tracking 
utilization distribution between activist and passivist 
physicians, and patient treatment choices; 
6. theoretical institutional research on collectivized modes of 
activist patient and physician organization and team 
decision-making—for example, to what extent might 
“activist-patient cooperatives” allow the bundling of 
patient interests in matters of informed consent and, thus, 
counteract the atomistic competition356 in the market for 
informed consent; 
7. theoretical and empirical research on the impact of rational 
apathy on health care agents (what we call “rational agent 
apathy”)357—for example, qualitative empirical research as 
to how rational apathy affects the procedural and 
substantive rationality of surrogate decision-making given 
that agents frequently must decide for incapacitated 
patients while under the burden of extra levels of non-
clinical uncertainty; 
8. theoretical and empirical studies on the intersection of 
rational patient apathy, physician-patient trust and end-of-
life care—for example, does a reduction of rationally-
apathetic patient behavior also correlate with either 
reduction or increase of physician-patient trust, 
particularly, when the credence good of health care is 
“buying” the patient “relatively little” at the end of life, 
thus, when continued “credence” and “apathetic belief” in 
 
355 Nelson et al., supra note 230, at S4 (“[T]ranslational research is a reciprocal process 
whereby basic scientists provide applied/clinical researchers with new tools to test and 
potentially use in the clinical arena, and applied/clinical researchers make observations about 
patients and diseases that stimulate basic investigations.”). 
356 See supra note 259. 
357 As explained above, many seriously ill patients lose decisional capacity at the end of life 
and so must rely on health care agents (often family members) to make decisions on their 
behalf.  Agents are tasked with choosing what the patient would choose if able to decide 
herself.  See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text (briefly describing the common 
need for surrogate decision-making when patients lose decisional capacity).  All of the 
arguments concerning the effects of rational patient apathy on patients similarly apply to the 
health care agents of incapacitated patients.  In fact, agents often labor under the additional 
burden of extra levels of non-clinical uncertainty, including questions about how family 
members might react to their choices, whether they are “doing the right thing” in consenting 
to or declining additional care, and whether declining additional care makes them somehow 
responsible for the patient’s death. 
NOAH & REICH-GRAEFE (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2019  10:45 AM 
628 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:535 
the value and “success” of any medical interventions may 
be seen as no longer warranted by (passivist) patients; and 
9. applied research on physician-apology laws and the 
empirical distribution of activist versus passivist 
patients358—for example, foundational observational 
inquiry into the question of whether physicians who wish 
to apologize and patients who derive benefit from 
apologies are more likely to be ultra-rational actors or 
rationally-apathetic ones. 
         The deficiencies of informed consent law are well-documented and 
understood.  The phenomenon of rational patient apathy—and its dynamic, 
deleterious effect on the law, application and practice of informed consent—
is neither.  This Article has merely corroborated a direct behavioral link 
between rational patient apathy and the deficiencies of informed consent 
law.359  Without a more profound and better-researched understanding of 
rational patient apathy and corresponding legal reform, informed consent 
practice will continue to be static, ineffectual, and regulatorily sidetracked 
by its own utopian vacuum—at tremendous and avoidable cost for all.360 
 
 
358 In recent years, a number of states have enacted so-called “apology laws” which attempt 
to avoid or reduce liability in malpractice litigation by rendering physician apologies for 
medical error inadmissible in court.  See Nicole Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Efficacy of a 
Physician’s Words of Empathy: An Overview of State Apology Laws, 112 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC 
ASS’N 302 (2012) (explaining that apology laws “have been shown to reduce the financial 
consequences of a medical malpractice lawsuit”).  The rationale behind these laws is two-
fold: many physicians wish to apologize for errors that harm patients but are advised by risk 
managers and other attorneys to remain silent and to refrain from speaking with patients and 
families.  At the same time, patients and families often state that their primary reason for filing 
a malpractice suit is to “find out what happened” after receiving only limited information from 
the relevant health care institution about the events.  Research suggests that when physicians 
apologize and admit fault, those receiving the apology appreciate and respect the physician’s 
honesty and are more likely to settle claims or to reduce the amount of damages requested.  
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement, 45 COURT REV. 90 (2009); Jonathan 
R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000). 
359 Cf. Beach & Lipshitz, supra note 38, at 28 (“[C]lassical decision theory does not address 
the question of making correct decisions, it merely addresses the question of making decisions 
correctly.”); McCaul et al., supra note 172, at S107 (“It is important to recognize that 
normative decision models were not intended to describe how decision making actually 
occurs but rather to describe how decisions ought to be made.”). 
360 Cf. Djulbegovic et al., supra note 335, at 655 (stating that “suboptimal [medical] decision 
making is considered a leading cause of death and is responsible for more than 80% of health 
expenses”). 
